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Abstract 
In spite of decades of research into corporate turnaround strategies, corporate 
failures persist. Knowledge of remedies appears to be a necessary but insufficient 
condition for turnaround. There exists yet a serious gap in extant knowledge on what 
motivates managers to choose or avoid well-documented restructuring strategies. 
Further, extant research has focused predominantly on severely distressed firms. 
Though contributing immensely to corporate management out of a crisis, it throws 
little light in the direction of management to avoid a crisis, and thus avoidance of 
economic value destruction. Also, no large sample analysis has properly tested the 
general effectiveness of prescribed turnaround strategies. 
This research attempts to fill these empirical gaps by exploring three key 
research questions: 
I. What are the determinants of restructuring strategy choice in response to 
performance declineT 
2. How effective are the prescribed turnaround strategies in contributing to 
corporate turnaround from performance decline? 
3. Are the turnaround strategies equally applicable and effective to both poorly 
performing and financially distressed firms? 
We integrate the disparate studies to date and devise a coherent framework for 
performance decline research and corporate restructuring. We also design a 
comprehensive strategy determinants framework for explaining the firm strategy 
selection process, incorporating the impact of lenders, owners, corporate governance 
structure and control factors. We employ the standard event study methodology to 
examine effectiveness of strategies. We then separate implementation success from 
other sources of strategy effectiveness 
- 
choice, timing and intensity of restructuring 
strategies. We also explore differences in the determinants and effectiveness of 
strategies between two samples comprising nearly 300 poorly performing and 200 
financially distressed firms, as a function of the extent of firms' performance decline. 
Our results show that turnaround strategy choices are significantly influenced 
by the complex interplay of the ownership structure, corporate governance and lender 
monitoring of the firms in decline. While there is agreement among stakeholders on 
certain strategies there is also evidence of conflict of interests. The results also show 
the somewhat detrimental effects of dominance by certain stakeholder groups. 
However, no support for managerial inaction as a contributor to non-recovery from 
performance decline is found. Instead of being paralysed by inertia, managers of non- 
recovery firms appear to take vigorous and intensive restructuring actions. Our results 
suggest the root cause of non-recovery is bad implementation of restructuring 
strategies. Although pursuing similar strategies, non-recovery firms' managers are 
perceived by the market to be far less effective in their implementations than those of 
recovery fin-ns. Comparative analysis of poorly performing and financially distressed 
firms reveals a striking similarity in determinants of strategy choice but some 
differences in the impact of restructuring strategies on corporate turnaround. 
xvi 
Chapter 1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
1.1 Introduction 
The research theme in turnaround or distress studies has shifted from 
decade to decade. The focus in the 1960's, was on accounting measures of firm 
performance and failure prediction models (e. g. Beaver, 1966, and Altman, 1968), 
in the 1970's on more sophisticated failure prediction models and turnaround 
strategies (e. g. Argenti, 1976, Schendel, Patton and Riggs, 1976), in the 1980's on 
more strategic management research (e. g. Hambrick and Schecter, 1984; Slatter, 
1984) and some financial economics-based work (e. g. Gilson, 1989), and in tile 
1990s to specific study of corporate restructuring actions in response to financial 
distress (e. g. Gilson, 1990; Robbins and Pearce 11,1992; Ofek, 1993). 
Although the literature prescribes a range of corporate restructuring 
strategies, few studies to date have explored compreliensively and empirically the 
detenninants of corporate restructuring strategy choice. Although organisational 
resistance to deep cuts in costs and assets is noted by strategy researchers 
(Bibeault, 1982; Sloma 1985), and firms able to overcome such resistance are 
found to be better positioned to achieve a turnaround (Slatter, 1984), few strategy 
researchers have empirically explored the motivations and compulsions behind 
managers' restructuring strategy choices. Tile failure to appreciate why managers 
choose or avoid particular strategies may have contributed to the persistence of 
corporate failures, despite the voluminous turnaround research to date. 
The choice of turnaround strategies is contingent upon a number of factors. 
1 
Finns' choice of turnaround strategies is primarily influenced by the finn's major 
stakeholders such as managers, shareholders and lenders. Since different strategies 
may have different, and often conflicting, welfare implications for managers, 
shareholders and lenders, the choice of any strategy can only be made as a trade 
off among these contending stakeholders. The restraints on any single stakeholder 
group such as managers maximising their own self-interest to the detriment of 
other stakeholders is a function of the governance structure and the mechanics of 
agency monitoring in a firm (Gilson, 1990). Thus, an understanding of the nature 
and sources of these restraints is necessary to make the appropriate turnaround 
strategy choices. 
Most of flie restructuring strategies prescribed in the turnaround literature 
arc largely based on small samples or case-study-based analyses. Tile general 
applicability of these generic and specific strategies has not yet been tested on a 
large, multi-industry sample. Further, no large scale cross-sectional analysis has 
been conducted to test the general effectiveness of these turnaround strategies. 
Corporates' downward spiral to failure is attributed by past researchers (e. g. 
Schendel et al., 1976; Hofer, 1980; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983, Hoffman, 1989, 
Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989; Barker and Mone, 1993) to managerial inaction, and 
poor timing, lack of intensity and poor implementation of turnaround strategies. 
Again, empirical evidence on flie factors underlying the effectiveness of strategies, 
based on large scale analysis, is limited. 
Moreover, extant studies in corporate turnarounds have invariably focused 
2 
on firms with severe distress 
- 
firms that have sunk into crisis after a number of 
years of declining perfonnance. Though extant research in corporate turnarounds 
contributes ignificantly to successful management of crisis, it throws only scant 
light on how corporate management should act to avoid a crisis. Turnaround 
strategies are not relevant only to severely distressed firms. They are equally 
applicable to firms suffering from poor performance and to those aiming to 
achieve improved financial or competitive performance (Slatter, 1984). Poor 
performance firms do not wait to become severely distressed and destroy 
economic value along the way, before taking any action. Instead, management 
often seek to 'stop the bleeding' and nip the problem in the bud through 
restructuring. However, only a few studies have examined finns' actions in 
response to poor performance sbort of distress. Interesting but unanswered 
empirical questions remain: (1) Do poor performance firms recover or sink into 
severe distress? (2) Do firms that recover adopt restructuring strategies different 
from those that decline into severe distress, (3) VAlat determines management's 
choice of restructuring strategies that may be instrumental in corporate recovery? 
and (4) How effective are these strategies in contributing to a turnaround from 
perfonnance decline? 
Ofek (1993), Robbins and Pearce 11 (1992) and Pant (1986) shift the focus 
away from predominantly severely distressed firms and investigate how firms 
respond to poor performance. However, these studies suffer from weak definitions 
of poor performance and use of incomplete strategy determinant models. 
3 
Ofek (1993) defines poor performance as a situation where a firin 
experiences a sharp decline in stock market returns ranking, i. e. it falls from the 
top 67% in one year to the bottom 10% in the subsequent year. Ofek's definition 
may incorporate fmns lingering below average performance for many years prior 
to decline to bottom 10%. Robbins and Pearce 11 (1992) define a poor performance 
firm as one with two successive years of increasing ROI (return on investment) 
and ROS (return on sales) followed by an absolute decline in both ROI and ROS 
for a minimum of two years, tile rate of decline exceeding tile industry average 
rates. However, Robbins and Pearce II's definition is flawed as finns that have 
rising ROI and ROS for two years may still end up with returns ranking below 
industry average (bottom 50% rank), whilst finns that have declining ROI and 
ROS for two years may still have returns ranking above industry average (top 50% 
rank). Pant (1986) defines a poor perforining firm as one that remains in the 
bottom 25% of firms in its industry, in terms of ROA, for a period of two years. 
However, Pant does not specify that a firm has to exhibit superior pcrfonnance 
(i. e. be in top 501/6) prior to reporting a drop to the 25% rank. This definition 
ignores the exact timing of decline and can include firms that may have under- 
performed their industry for a number of years prior to decline to the bottom 25% 
rank. 
Ofek's (1993) study is the only research that empirically examines the 
detenninants of finns' actions in response to poor perfonnance. His results support 
Jensetfs (1989) contention that high leverage and associated high lender 
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monitonng induce speedy firm actions to remedy poor performance. Greater 
going-concem value is therefore preserved by highly geared finns than by less 
geared firms. However, Ofek finds block shareholder monitoring to be 
insignificantly related to corporate actions, contrary to subsequent findings by 
Bethel and Liebeskind (1993). 
Ofek's findings, and particularly the findings of past turnaround studies, 
need to be interpreted with caution as they do not apply a compreliensive strategy 
determinants framework. The comprehensive strategy determinants framework 
devised in this research includes firm specific factors such as lender monitoring, 
block shareholder influence, board structure, managerial shareholding, severity of 
decline, cause of decline, firm size, and external economic and industiy 
conditions. The exclusion of board monitoring variables and the external 
environment in past studies may have resulted in potentially flawed results caused 
by omitted variables. 
However, flie conceptual strategy detenninants framework we develop does 
not relate every agency or control variable to every restructuring strategy. To this 
extent some of the empirical work in this research is exploratory. In this respect, 
the thesis not only contributes UK evidence to confinn existing theories but also 
provides new empirical evidence to substantiate new concepts, such as the role of 
firms' governing board during the critical period of performance decline. 
Although past turnaround researchers have examined the issue of what 
strategies are instrumental to corporate turnaround, they have not tested the 
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effectiveness of strategies on a proper basis. Past studies such as by Schendel and 
Patton (1976) and Robbins and Pearce 11 (1993) suffer from two fundamental 
methodological deficiencies. First, they confound proxies for strategies with the 
criteria for turnaround, for example cost reduction as a strategy and improvement 
in profit margin as a turnaround performance measure. Second, proxies for cost 
reduction strategies uch as lower cost of sales, may be impacted by various other 
specific strategies such as operational restructuring, asset sales, investment in new 
plant and machinery or acquisition of new businesses, or financial restructuring 
which gives nse to lower interests cost. In other words, the accounting proxy often 
merely measures flie end result of a strategy and not the strategy itself. Hence, the 
question, whether declining finns' chosen restructuring strategies are effective or 
not in accomplishing turnaround, remains largely unanswered. 
1.2 Alternative perspectives on financial performance 
In this study, we examine corporate responses to performance decline 
measured in two different ways: (1) The decline in relative stock returns 
perfortnance and (2) The decline to financial distress, reflected in bankruptcy risk 
and measured by the conventional Z score. Whereas the first financial measure 
of performance decline is based on an explicit perspective of shareholder value 
maximisation, as a corporate objective, the second is an explicit measure of the 
potential bankruptcy risk. We believe that both perspectives are important in 
evaluating corporate responses to performance decline. 
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The conceptual premise of this study is that managers respond to 
performance decline reflected in both stock returns and accounting performance 
terms. However, managerial responses to the two types of decline may differ in 
terms of speed, scope and effectiveness. These responses may also differ in the 
factors which trigger or moderate them eg. Lender monitoring or share ownership 
structure. Arguably, bankruptcy risk, proxied by the Z score, represents a more 
stringent measure of performance decline, and is relevant to a much wider 
stakeholder community than stock returns. 
1.3 Corporate restructuring framework 
Consequent upon performance decline, management may respond by 
adopting various restructuring actions to regain the finn's financial bealtli. This 
study employs a compreliensive corporate restructuring framework, syntliesising 
both the strategic management and finance literatures. It covers tile generic 
strategies of managerial, operational, asset and financial restructuring. 
Managerial restructuring which entails the removal of top management 
responsible for the corporate decline is quoted widely as a prerequisite of 
corporate turnarounds. Restoring management credibility in flie eyes of employees, 
lenders, and sliarebolders is so vital tliat replacing managers irrespective of tl1eir 
share of the blame for decline, may be seen as imperative. 
One of the remedies most prescribed for poor perfon-nance is operational 
restructuring aimed at cutting costs, improving margins, productivity and profits. 
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Corporate managers wield the axe on costs via headcount reductions, overhead 
cuts, consolidation and termination of certain operational facilities. 
Where operational restructunng is an inadequate remedy, due, for instance, 
to the existence of loss-making subsidiaries or where cash is required to fund 
restructuring, asset sales may be instigated. 
Often, capital expenditure and acquisitions may be necessary to improve 
operational cfficiency and productivity if the current state of operations is 
critically under-equipped due to past low investments or change in technologies. 
Also, once the operations are successfully rationalised and survival is assured, 
investments to rebuild and grow become a priority. 
Frequently, a finn's finances are in need of surgery to resolve or avoid a 
financial distress. Financial distress is a situation where there is insufficient 
liquidity in flie firm to meet current obligations. The commonest financial strategy 
then is to cut dividends drastically or omit them entirely. Next, negotiations may 
be initiated with lenders to rewrite covenants, where a breach is expected or has 
occurred, and refinance the firm on a committed and/or long term basis. 
Shareholders are also frequently asked to stump up more cash to keep the firm. 
afloat by way of subscribing to fresh equity issues. 
1.4 Determinants of restructuring strategy choice 
The strategy and finance literatures abound in remedies for performance 
decline. Despite die proliferation of these remedies, corporate failures stubbornly 
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persist. Corporates' downward spiral to failure is widely claimed to stem from 
management inertia in the wake of performance decline. The question is 'Why do 
corporate managers fail to practise the 'wisdom' of past turnaround researchT. 
The answer may lie in the 'soft element' of corporate strategy 
- 
what 
determines managers' choice of strategy? The agency paradigm predicts managers 
can act in their own self interest. They may also act for the benefit of lenders to 
the detriment of shareholders, or vice-versa. However, managers do not have a free 
hand in choosing restructuring strategies, especially at moments of financial 
distress. Other key stakeholders uch as lenders, owners and the governing board 
have their own motivation and preferences and hence influence the choice of 
strategy. 
The role of corporate governance in the UK has undoubtedly been put in 
the limelight by the Cadbury Committee's report on corporate governance in 
December 1992 titled 'The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: The Code 
of Best Practice'. The report stresses the importance of division of power at the 
top so that no one person has unfettered powers of decision, and highlights the 
significant role played by non-executive directors'. The impact of governance 
structure on restructuring strategics has not been recognised in most previous 
studies such as Ofek (1993). We plug this serious empirical gap by incorporating 
'Post-Cadbury, two other committees have been set up to further the work initiated by the 
'Cadbury Committee'. The 'Greenbury Committee', set up in January 1995 and chaired by Sir 
Richard Greenbury, has examined and reported on good practice in determining and accounting 
for directors' remuneration. The successor to the 'Greenbury Committee' is the 'Hampel 
Committee', set up in 1996, to extend the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees' work. 
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board leadership and composition variables into our strategy determinants 
framework. 
The choice of strategy is, therefore, ultimately, dependent on a complex 
interplay of power and influence among managers, lenders, owners and the 
governing board. Certain uncontroversial strategies may be adopted easily. Others, 
such as asset sales to raise cash to pay lenders, may benefit lenders at the expense 
of shareholders who lose the option value of the assets sold and, may, therefore, 
be resisted by the disadvantaged group. Potentially, the downward spiral to 
corporate failure may be driven by the selfish power plays of stakeholders. 
1.5 Effectiveness of restructuring strategies and corporate turnarounds 
Given that managers, under the influence of stakeholders, decide to adopt 
a range of strategies to combat financial perfon-nance decline, do they succeed in 
their endeavours, and manage to turn around their firms' declining performance? 
Is faithful adoption of the generic turnaround strategies a guarantee of a success? 
As described earlier, past turnaround studies have applied flawed 
methodologies in their investigation of strategy effectiveness. A proper approach 
to examining strategy effectiveness should directly test the impact and 
effectiveness of specific strategies and avoid using proxies for effectiveness which 
may be affected by a range of strategies or factors. Since the long term effect of 
a specific strategy is inherently incapable of direct measurement, two appropriate 
approaches to measuring such effects are the event study and econometric 
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regression methodologies. Event study methodology can be used to capture the 
shareholder wealth effects of strategy announcements reflecting the perceived 
effectiveness of strategies, at least from the stock market perspective. The 
regression approach is based on testing the association between restructuring 
strategies and the extent of corporate recovery from performance decline. If a 
restructuring strategy is effective, it will register a strong positive association with 
recovery from performance decline. 
We also contend that the choice of apparently appropriate strategy and the 
speed and intensity of its application are a necessary but inadequate condition for 
turnaround success. The key to successful turnaround lies in effective 
implementation. The best strategy is futile if implemented badly, indiscriminately 
or half heartedly. In this research, effective implementation is measured in terms 
of achieving a benchmark performance. This benchmark is defined later in 
Chapter 5. 
1.6 Research objectives and contribution 
We aim to fill the empirical gap by extending and improving on existing 
studies. The unique contributions of this study lie in a more comprehensive 
conceptual framework, in improved empirical mefliodology and in the examination 
of a wider range of issues relating to the cboice and effectiveness of turnaround 
strategies than in tile extant literature. 
The key objective of this research is to examine empirically three related 
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research questions. First, what are the detenninants of corporate restructuring 
strategies in response to performance decline? Second, how effective are the 
various corporate restructuring strategies in contributing to firm recovery from 
performance decline? Third, what are the differences, if any, in the determinants 
and effectiveness of restructuring strategies between merely poorly performing and 
financially distressed finns? 
We apply a comprehensive strategy detenninants framework, incorporating 
the agency perspective which is generally missing from decline-related research 
in finance as well as strategy literature. This framework integrates approaches in 
the strategic management literature with the finance-based agency theory widely 
researched by financial economists. An integrated strategy determinants 
framework enables managers seeking turnaround strategies to understand the 
complex forces impacting on strategy choice, gather support from various 
stakeholders, and enhance the effectiveness of chosen strategies. Managerial 
failure to take into account the complex intcrplay of influences may accentuate 
conflict of interests amongst contending stakeholders and thereby impede 
recovery. 
In terms of methodology, we formulate a practical and simplified 
framework for performance decline research by integrating, and putting into 
perspective, the disparate studies of distress to date. The framework classifies 
sample firms by their severity of performance decline, i. e. non-distress and 
distress. The simplified framework is conceptually easier to understand and 
12 
operationalise for empirical analysis. 
Also, instead of looking at restructuring strategies piecemeal, we formulate 
a comprehensive framework which integrates the 'gestalt' of turnaround strategies 
found in the strategic management literature and the corporate restructuring 
strategies examined in the financial economics literature. This framework 
encompasses managerial, operational, asset and financial restructuring. The 
comprehensive framework provides corporate managers with a range of strategic 
choices and the possibility of maximising recovery prospects through employing 
an integrated, rather than, a piecemeal approach to corporate turnaround. 
In addition, we employ a longitudinal analysis of corporate restructuring 
strategies for diree years from the year of performance decline. This significantly 
improves on Ofeles one year study of the determinants of strategy choice, and thus 
allows for a longer tracking of firm actions following the year of perfonnance 
decline, leading to recovery or severe distress. 
We also employ improved methodologies to test for the cffectiveness of 
restructuring strategies. We use shareholder wealth effects of strategy 
announcements to proxy for perceived strategy effectiveness. These wealth effects 
are measured using standard event-study methodology. In addition, we apply 
econometric models to examine flie impact of restructuring strategies on recovery 
from performance decline. 
To ensure flie robustness of our results, we choose to examine two samples 
of fmns, rather than one. They are non-distressed but poorly performing firms, and 
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financially distressed firms. The aim is to compare and contrast the determinants 
and effectiveness of restructuring strategies for fin-ns experiencing different 
degrees of performance decline. We can gain insights into the forces impacting on 
firms' strategy choices, the general applicability and relative effectiveness of 
restructuring strategies, for these two turnaround situations. The results would be 
of immense interest to corporate managers, lenders and investors alike. 
1.7 Outline of thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature for alternative perspectives on financial 
performance measures, from performance decline to financial distress. The review 
highlights the attractiveness and criticisms of popular measures based on 
accounting returns, cash flows and stock returns. Based on synthesising extant 
studies a performance decline research framework is fon-nulated. The choice of 
performance measures used in this study to define the poorly performing and 
financially distressed samples is discussed. 
Chapter 3 reviews the finance and strategic management literature on 
restructuring or turnaround strategies. A compreliensive corporate restructuring 
frarnework encapsulating the four generic strategies identified in the literature is 
devised. The generic strategies are managerial, operational, asset and financial 
restruc ring. 
Chapter 4 reviews the literature on detenninants of restructuring strategy 
choice. The existing evidence on the impact of firms' agency monitoring 
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mechanism and other internal and external factors on strategy choice are 
discussed. This exercise reveals a serious lack of evidence, particularly in the UK, 
on what determines firms' choice of restructuring strategy, in a turnaround 
context. Resulting from the review, an overall strategy determinants framework 
is designed representing the complex forces impacting on strategy choice, but 
which have been largely ignored in past studies. 
In Chapter 5, we discuss the deficiencies of extant turnaround strategy 
effectiveness measures, propose improved methodologies and support thern with 
evidence from a review of wealth effects of strategy announcements 
predon-tinantly from the finance literature. The aftermath of decline and the factors 
contributing to corporate turnaround are also discussed. 
Chapter 6 outlines the methodology for measuring poor performance and 
I" 
-- fmancial distress and the swnpling criteria. The logistic regression equations used 
to investigate the impact of determinants of agency and control variables on 
restructuring strategy choice are discussed. Also, the methodology to assess the 
effectiveness of strategies is presented. The definitions of dependent and 
independent variables are presented and the characteristics of both poor 
performance and financial distress samples are described in the chapter. 
Chapter 7 presents tile results of stakeholder dominance and logistic 
regressions of restructuring strategies on agency and control variables for the 
poorly performing sample. The separate impact and joint impact of explanatory 
variables on restructuring strategy choice are identified and their economic 
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meaning is discussed. 
Chapter 8 reports and discusses the empirical results on effectiveness of 
restructuring strategies for the poorly performing sample. The results from event 
study analysis, and logistic and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 
corporate recovery from poor performance on restructuring strategies and control 
factors are discussed. 
Chapter 9 reports and discusses the empirical results on the determinants 
and effectiveness of restructuring strategies for tile financially distressed sample. 
Results of stakeholder dominance and logistic regressions of restructuring 
strategies on agency and control variables for the financially distressed sample are 
presented. The separate impact and joint impact of explanatory variables on 
restructuring strategy choice are identified and their economic meaning is 
discussed. The results from logistic and OLS regressions of corporate recovery 
from financial distress on restructuring strategies and control factors are also 
discussed. 
Chapter 10 compares and contrasts the determinants and effectiveness of 
restructuring strategies between the poorly performing and financially distressed 
samples. Possible reasons for similarities and differences are explored. 
Chapter II summarises the research outline, and the empirical findings. It 
also discusses die implications for corporate managers, lenders, owners and policy 
makers, and provides suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2. ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE DECLINE 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite the wealth of dcclinc-related studies, no coherent framework 
integrating the disparate research conducted to date is yet established (Robbins and 
Pearce 11,1992,1993). For example, there exist as many dcf initions of distress as 
there are empirical studies on the subject. In this chapter, we review the extant 
distress literature for different perspectives on financial perfon-nance measures, 
and explore several models of distress. Based on a synthesis of the extant studies, 
we formulate a more compreliensive performance decline research framework, and 
define the type of financial decline examined and choice of performance measures 
used in this research. 
2.3 Financial performance measures 
As flie first stage in any tumaround study is to define what is meant by firm 
performance, in this section we explore in detail, the alternative measures of 
financial performance used in the literature. 
Since Beaver's seminal paper in 1966 on accounting measures of corporate 
perfonnance, fliere has been a profusion of research in distress-related areas with 
distress being defined on the basis of accounting performance measures. However, 
recently, several studies bave used stock-retums as perfonnance measures (e. g. 
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Gilson, 1989,, 1990,1993; and Ofek, 1993). Unfortunately, a consensus definition 
is still elusive, and in fact there appear to be as many variations of definitions as 
there are research papers. Also, a significant number of recent studies employ 
debt/bankruptcy-based measures of distress, i. e. financial distress as evidenced by 
default and potential default on debt (e. g. Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993). The 
following discussion is based on a review of decline-related studies from tile 
1960s to date. A summary of this review outlining the distress definitions used in 
past studies is included as Appendix 2.1 to this cbapter. 
2.3.1 Accounting-based performance measures 
In a nutshell, the literature on accounting-based definitions can be broadly 
categorized into earnings, accounting return, casliflow and composite-accounting- 
based measures. 
i. Earnings-based accounting performance measures 
Many studies identify candidates for potential turnaround using the 
earnings level. Popular definitions of earnings are profit before tax and profit after 
tax or net income. Scliendel, Patton and Riggs (1976), in one of the first major 
studies of corporate tumarounds, define a turnaround candidate firm (hereafter 
referred as turnaround finn) as one with four consecutive years of earnings 
decline. Similar definitions adopted by subsequent turnaround researchers are 
growth in net income less than industry average over three years (ONeill, 198 1), 
minimum three years of decline in net income or decline of 80% or more in 
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earnings in a single year (Bibeault, 1982), minimum three years of successive 
decline in real (net of inflation) pretax profit (Slatter, 1984), and at least one year 
of negative earnings following positive earnings (John, Lang & Netter, 1992). 
Earnings level on its own is meaningless except when used for comparison 
purposes. Comparisons can be made over time to highlight significant 
improvement/deteriomfion in financial perfortnance. Generally, die use of earnings 
level per se to measure firm performance can be flawed. Earnings level can be 
boosted for example by acquisitions which in turn increase capital or assets 
employed. However, the resulting return (say ratio of earnings to assets) may be 
relatively worse than in prior years. On the other hand, earnings level may not 
suffer from accounting asset changes e. g. asset write-offs to reserves, which tend 
to distort ratio-based measures, such as return on assets which has assets as its 
denominator (Ramanujam, 1984). 
ii. Accounting return-based performance measures 
Accounting returns are returns based on profits, at various levels e. g. profit 
before tax and profit after tax, deflated by either sales, assets/capital employed or 
shareholders' equity. Popular accounting return-based measures are therefore 
return on sales (ROS), return on asset or invesihnent (ROA/ROI), and return on 
equity (ROE). Accounting return-based definitions of turnaround candidates in 
the extant literature include: average ROA below US Treasury Bond yield 
(Graham and Richards, 1979), average pretax return on investment (ROI) below 
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10% for two years (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983), four or more years' decline in 
ROI to below 5% (Ramanujam, 1984), ROA in bottom 25% of industry ranking 
for two years (Pant, 1986), negafive post-tax return on sales (ROS) for a minimum 
of one year (Zimmerman, 1989), and successive increase in ROI and ROS for at 
least two years followed by absolute decline in both ROI and ROS for at least two 
years, the rate of decline greater than that of the industry average (Robbins and 
Pearce 11,1992). 
As wifli level earnings, accounting ratios themselves are meaningless except 
when used for comparison purposes. Comparisons can be made over time to 
highlight significant improvement/deteri oration in financial perforinance or 
compared to industry averages to detect under-over-performance relative to 
industry rivals. Past studies (e. g. Hambrick and Scliecter, 1983) have 
predominantly focused on comparison over time although recent studies (e. g. Pant, 
1986, and Robbins and Pearce 11,1992) have recognized the need to adopt both 
time and industry comparisons. Potentially, a decline in a finn's ratio over a period 
of time may simply mirror a decline in the entire industry, and the firm may be 
relatively no worse off than its competitors. However, being the best in a troubled 
industry may not necessarily mean the firm is financially healthy. Further, the 
extent of a decline, for example to the bottom 25% in the industry (Pant, 1986), 
better represents the within-industry variation of accounting returns. In other 
words, describing the finn's return as below industry average is insufficient as it 
does not indicate how far the firm's return is below its industry rivals. 
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However, caution sbould be taken w1len using accounting returns ratios. 
ROA measures how effectively management operate the business and how 
productively assets are employed. As ROA is a product of ROS (net profit margin) 
and asset urnover (profit before interest and tax/sales x sales/net assets), ROA 
is distorted by variations in net assets computation. In other words, varying 
depreciation policies or greater prudence in writing down assets, during tile 
turnaround period to reflect permanent diminution in assets, affects ROA. On the 
other hand, ROS alone is insufficient to evaluate firm performance as firms 
operating in a low margin, high turnover business e. g. food retailing, may have 
robust profits due to the productive employment (or turnover) of firm assets. Next, 
ROE, as measured by net income over shareholders' equity, is also subject to 
variations in firms' capital structure and financial risk. In simple terms ROE' is a 
product 
- 
J[(ROA x Assets) less interest] x (1-tax rate)) / equity. Finns can 
increase profits through increasing borrowing whilst simultaneously benefiting 
. 
e___ 
from the tax-deductibility of debt interest, a benefit not available from dividend 
payment to shareholders. In simple terms, ROE can be boosted by rasing more 
debt capital, providing the ROA generated exceeds the costs of borrowing. 
However, as financial gearing increases, the probability and costs of bankruptcy 
also increase. Hence, in addition to the problems associated with ROA, ROE's 
comparative value is potentially undermined by variations in firms' financial 
'Adapted from Shapiro's (1991, p755) modified Du Pont formula. Assets are equivalent to the 
sum of debt and equity funds. Extraordinary items are included within items forming profit before 
interest and tax, in accordance with Financial Reporting Standard FRS 3. 
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geanng and risk level. 
Two ratios popularly tracked by analysts in the City are earnings per share 
(EPS) and the price-eamings (P/E) ratio. EPS is measured by tile ratio of profit 
after tax, extraordinary item (since FRS3 became cffective in 1993), minority 
interest and preference dividend to the average number of shares in the year. It 
indicates the earnings attributable to shareholders but is different from dividends 
insofar as the company's payout policy is not 100% or where dividends are 
maintained and paid out of past earnings despite negative current earnings. P/E 
ratio is measured by price per share over earnings per share (see e. g. Shapiro, 
199 1, p 757). If the stock market is efficient at least in the semi-efficient form, 
stock prices would reflect all publicly available infortnation (Fama, 1970,1991). 
Thus, changes in market prices signal market participants' assessment of corporate 
earnings and their likely impact on shareholder wealth. P/E ratio provides an 
indication of market's perception of firms' growth and profit opportunities as well 
as the risk attached to them. 
Surprisingly, despite the City's keen focus on EPS and P/E ratios, extant 
research on turnaround has largely avoided them as measures of financial 
performance. Presumably, this may be born out of ignorance or due to an 
appreciation of the inherent weaknesses of the two measures. EPS may suffer from 
'bootstrapping' effects i. e. artificial boosting of earnings, caused by acquisition of 
low P/E companies with Wgh P/E shares. As P/E ratio is made up of market price 
per share over EPS, P/E ratio is open to potential distortions caused by stock 
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market anomalies such as 'overreaction' and size effects (see discussion below), 
on top of the deficiency inherent in its EPS denominator. 
iii. Cashflow-based accounting performance measures 
The tenn distress is widely taken to rcfer to financial distress. This is 
defined as a condition in which a finn has insufficient cash flow to cover current 
obligations (Wruck, 1990). Carrington and Aurelio (1976), in their study of a 
small US firm, define financial distress as one where a firm faces severe cash 
shortage. However, it is not easy to use cash flow to measure distress. For 
example, a firm with negative net cash position may not necessarily be in financial 
distress if it has unutilised debt capacity which allows it to increase its borrowing. 
Therefore, unless a finn's debt capacity is known, it is difficult to tell if tile cash 
shortage is critical to the firm's survival. Presumably, due to the technical 
difficulty in operationalising cash shortage, no otlicr empirical turnaround study 
has attempted to explicitly define distress based on cash flow. 
iv. Multivariate accounting performance measures 
ROA and ROE are univariate measures. A widely recognised multivariate 
measure is the Z score. Altman (1968) created the Z score as a measure of firms' 
bankruptcy likelihood. In the UK, a popular Z score model used by banks and 
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industrial firms has been developed by Taffler (1976,1984)'. Using the multiple 
discriminant analysis technique, a composite Z score integrating multiple financial 
ratios is developed to distinguish failing from non-failing firms. A composite Z 
score is technically superior to individual ratios as it captures a much widcr 
perspective of financial perforinance with its multi-factor nature. However, Z 
scores may suffer from cut off problems i. e. below what score is a firm potentially 
bankrupt and above what score is it financially healthy, and the lack of a 
conceptual underpinning to the statistically cbosen ratios (see e. g. Gambling, 
1985). 
2.3.2 Debt/bankruptcy-based performance measures 
A popular proxy employed in recent studies to capture cash crisis or 
financial distress is the incidence of debt restructuring, both private and public 
restructuring (under the auspices of Chapter 10 or II of the Bankruptcy Code in 
the US and the Insolvency Act 1986 in the UK). Empirical studies employing this 
definition include Gilson (1989,1990,1993), Brown et al. (1993,1994) and 
'There is voluminous work in corporate failure prediction in the literature. Differences 
among these failure prediction models tend to lie in their explanatory variables. They range from 
models employing: key financial ratios (eg. Altman, 1968 and Taffler, 1974); cash flow data (eg. 
Aziz and Lawson (1989) and Gahlon and Vigeland (1988)); stock market vafiables (eg. Scott, 
1981); and non-financial information such as lag (delay) and changes in lag in filing of annual 
accounts, changes in directors shareholdings, and director resignations (Peel, Peel and Pope, 
1985). Also, extant studies employ statistical methods ranging from univariate (Beaver, 1966) 
to multivariate discriminant analysis (eg. Altman, 1968), conditional probability models (eg. 
Gentry et a], 1985; Peel, Peel and Pope, 1985), non-parametric analysis ( eg. Barniv and Raveh, 
1989, recursive partitioning (eg. Frydman et al, 1985), and neural networks techniques which 
circumvent many of the problems inherent in parametric analysis (eg. Coats and Fant, 1993). 
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Franks and Tourous (1994). To avoid capturing finns that restructure their debt 
voluntarily, without the pressure of financial distress, these studies impose 
additional conditions in their distress definitions. Gilson (1989,1990,1993) 
restricts his sample to firms which have suffered a severe decline in stock market 
performance i. e. drop to the bottom 5% in three years' cumulative returns in tile 
market. Similarly, Brown et al. (1993) look for evidence of distress in news reports 
of firms restructuring their debt, while Franks and Tourous (1994) impose a debt 
downgrading to CCC or worse grade (ie. speculative investment grade) in firms 
that restructure their debts. 
The incidence of debt restructuring is not suitable as a criterion for 
captuting firm performance decline for two reasons. One, since only highly geared 
firms tend to require a debt restructuring, lowly geared finns which tend not to 
restructure their debt may be defined as not experiencing performance decline. 
Two, although high gearing is observed to be a cause of decline (Slatter, 1984; 
John, Lang and Netter, 1992), it may not necessarily be the key factor driving 
performance decline. The major reason we do not define performance decline in 
terms of debt restructuring is that we regard such restructuring as a turnaround 
strategy. Tlius, debt restructuring in our framework is a consequence, rather than 
a cause, of perfonnance decline. 
2.3.3 Stock returns-based performance measures 
In spite of the popularity of earnings-based definitions of distress in past 
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turnaround studies, several recent studies have used stock returns-based measures 
as a perfon-nance indicator. Since a firtn's corporate objective is oflen posited as 
the maximisation. of shareholder value, stock return as a measure of financial 
performance satisfies the objective of this key stakeholder group. 
Ofek (1993) defines a poor performance firm as one with its annual stock 
return ranking in the bottom 10% of all firm returns in tile stock market after 
having been in the top 67% the year before. Each firm in his sample has a 
minimum drop of 23% and a maximum drop of 100% in ranking. Gilson (1989) 
defines distress as a situation in which a firm falls to the bottom 5% ranked on 
three years' curnulative returns in the market and the firm either defaults, becomes 
bankrupt or restructures its debt in the surrounding five years. 
Extant empirical studies find that stock returns tend to lead earnings 
changes because historical financial reports are not designed to reflect 
expectations of future net cash flows on a timely basis. Put differently, stock 
returns reflect the revision in the market's expectation of future earnings (e. g. 
Kothari and Sloan (1992), Kothari (1992), Beavcr, Larnbcrt and Ryan (1987), 
Collins, Kodiari and Rayburn (1987), Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980), Benston 
(1976 and 1966), Ball and Brown (1968), Muth (1961)). In fact, several studies 
find prices to be better Ulan past and current earnings in forecasting future earnings 
(e. g. Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980), Collins, Kothari and Rayburn (1987)). 
"As debt restructuring may be undertaken in response to an anticipated or actual default, 
a five year period surrounding decline is thus imposed by Gilson. 
26 
Similarly, earnings are also found by the above studies to be only one of many 
factors influencing stock returns changes. 
However, stock prices and hence returns are influenced not just by 
fundamentals but also by supply and demand factors and market sentiments. Stock 
market-based measures are efficient only insofar as the market is 'rational' and 
efficient. Potentially, market sentiment can cause stock returns-based measures to 
erroneously characterise finns as experiencing performance decline even though 
the firm remains fundamentally and financially sound. More serious threats to 
stock returns and accounting earnings as performance measures are discussed 
below. 
2.3.4 Criticism of stock return measures 
A major criticism of stock returns as a performance measure is that stock 
returns are'noisy' and are subject to market inefficiencies or anomalies. De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985,1987) argue that mean reversion' (see Poterba and Summers, 
1988) in stock prices is evidence of stock market overreaction. They demonstrate 
the 'overreaction' anomaly by constructing arbitrage portfolios of long positions 
in 'losers' and short positions in 'winners' which yield an impressive average 
market-adjusted return of 3 1.9% over 10 consecutive 5-year test periods. Losers 
and winners are respectively the 50 worst performing and best performing stocks, 
' Mean reversion refers to the phenomenon of a variable's propensity to revert to its mean 
value in the long run. 
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measured on the basis of five years cumulative market-adjusted returns. De Bondt 
and Thaler attribute this to the tendency of investors to overweight recent 
information and underweight old information, as suggested by Kalmeman and 
Tverskty (1973). Investors expect 'losers' ('winners') to continue their recent poor 
(good) performance into the future. This results in the temporary overshooting of 
the equilibrium value of the affected firms' share prices. Such a strategy, based on 
going against investors' 'herd instinct', is generally referred to as a contrarian 
investment strategy. 
The overreaction hypothesis has since been subjected to widespread 
investigation. As suggested by Power and Lonie (1993), the anomaly can be 
separated into studies of short- and long-run overreaction. Evidence in support of 
and against both types of the oveffeaction anomaly is mixed. 
Evidence in support of the short-run overreaction hypothesis bas been 
reported in studies over time periods ranging from a day (Dyl and Maxfield, 
1987), a week (Howe, 1986 and Lcliman, 1990), to a month (Zarowin, 
1988,1989). On the offier hand, Atkins and Dyl (1990) question whether investors 
can extract profit from such a contrarian strategy once transaction costs are 
included. Also, in the UK, MacDonald and Power (1993) do not find a 
mean-reverting behaviour in short-horizon share returns. In other words, short run 
stock market overreaction, proxied by mean reversion in share returns as asserted 
by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), does not exist in the UK. A study by Jacobs and 
Levy (1989) finds only an asymmetric short-term effect. They find a significant 
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correction of the initial reaction to negative events e. g. report of losses, within one 
month but prices subsequently follow the general (i. e. negative) trend of the 
original event. Positive events e. g. report of positive NPV projects, on the other 
hand, do not exhibit any price reversals. This phenomenon is confirmed by 
Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1990) and Pettengill and Jordan (1990). However, 
these studies find a large proportion of the abnormal returns to be related to finn 
size and to arise in the month of January. 
The debate on the long-run overreaction phenomenon is more extensive 
than on the short-run phenomenon. Apart from De Bondt and Ilialer (1985,1987), 
Poterba and Summers (1988) and Chopra ct al. (1992) in the US, and Power, 
Lonie and Lonie (1991), and MacDonald and Power (1991) in the UK, find further 
evidence in support of the long run (over one year) overreaction anomaly. 
However, there are three popular alternative explanations to the overreaction 
phenomenon, both short and long run. Firstly, the size and seasonality effects are 
able to explain a major part of the phenomenon in studies for example by Keim. 
and Stambaugh (1986), Zarowin (1989) and Campbell and Limmack (1993). 
Secondly, increase in risk and lience returns have been propounded by Chan 
(1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) as explanation for abnonnal returns found in 
'overreaction' studies. However, DeBondt and Thaler (1987) also show that size 
and risk do not fully explain the abnormal returns found in their 1985 study, but 
29 
the January effece does apparently account for a substantial part of the excess 
returns found. Their conclusion is supported by the findings of Chopra et 
al. (1992). Thirdly, the conflicting findings to date can be traced to subtle 
differences in methodology, for example, in measurement of price and risk 
(Conrad and Kaul, 1993). 
Mean reversion in accounting profitability measures is also found in studies 
by Jones, Tweedie and Whittington (1976), Mueller (1977), Clayman (1987) and 
Power, Lonie and Lonie (1991). In fact mean reversion in accounting profitability 
tends to mirror share price reversals as seen in studies by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1987) and Zarowin (1989). The debate on mean-reversion behaviour is therefore 
not restricted to share prices. Indeed, DeBondt and Tbaler (1985,1987) argue that 
investors overreact to earnings announcements. They find earnings of losing firms 
(firms which have suffered an extreme decline in stock returns) to have fallen over 
the portfolio fort-nation period but rebound strongly subsequently. They speculate 
that the market may overact to current earnings and not anticipate reversals in 
earnings. Ms, they argue, drives the stock prices of under-perfortning finns to too 
low a level, and over performing fmns to too high a level. Similarly, Ettredge and 
Fuller (1991) find the existence of a one year overreaction (11.6% positive 
abnormal return) to negative earnings even after controlling for risk and size. 
However, their findings are criticized by Ali and Klein (1994) for bias in their 
'rhis refers to the anomaly in stock returns where there exists a general tendency for large 
positive returns in the month of January. 
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abnormal return measure. Ali and Klein show that standard event study 
methodology which uses prior periods' returns to estimate the parameters of the 
market model introduces a measurement bias that favours finding positive 
abnormal returns following negative earnings announcements. 
However, De Bondt and Thaler's (1987) and Zarowin's (1989) finding of 
an overreaction to earnings announcement is contrary to two sets of research 
studies which indicate an under-reaction rather than overreaction to earnings 
announcement i. e. post-earnings announcement driftS7 and security analysts 
forecast. First, studies on post-earnings announcement drift indicate that stock 
prices underreact to earnings (e. g. Ball and Brown, 1968; and Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989,1990). In respect of analysts forecasts, Klein (1990) finds them to 
be too optimistic in the case of prior 'losers' i. e. loss-making fit-ins, which she 
argues to be consistent with underreaction rather than overreaction to earnings 
announcements. Similarly, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) and O'Hanlon and 
Whiddett (1991) also find analysts' forecasts undeffeact to recent earnings. On the 
other hand, De Bondt and Thaler (1990) find security analysts make extreme and 
optimistic forecasts which they argue to be consistent with generalised 
oveffeaction. 
"A phenomenon whereby the stock market does not respond completely and immediately 
to information contained in announced earnings (e. g. Bernard and Thomas, 1989). 
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2.4 Financial decline models 
Financial distress is, arguably, not a dichotomous event but a continuum in 
which firms sink from a position of good financial health to a distressed one, 
gradually rather than abruptly. The literature contains several financial models 
which attempt to capture this decline process, and map the stages of decline from 
good financial health to extreme financial distress. 
Lau (1987) proposes a five-state financial distress model to capture the 
continuum of financial distress. Her model deviates from conventional failure 
prediction models in that, instead of classifying firms as failing or non-failing, she 
estimates the probabilities of a firm entering one of five financial states. The 
continuum of corporate financial health comprises: 1. financial stability, 2. 
omitting or reducing dividend payment, 3. technical default or default on loan 
payments, 4. protection under Chapter 10 or II (in the US) and 5. bankruptcy and 
liquidation. 
Lau's use of dividend cut/omission as a second stage of distress is 
potentially flawed. Finns can technically and do in practice continue paying 
dividends, financed perbaps by increased borrowings, in spite of severe losses and 
negative operating cash flows. Research on dividend policies such as by Marsh 
(1992) and Christie (1994) show firins to cutlonýt dividends only as a final resort. 
Also, cut/omission in dividends may be driven by the need to conserve cash to 
fund growth opportunities (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1990). Lau's framework 
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may thus not capture the precise continuum of firm's financial health. 
Weitzel and Jonson (1989) also develop an organisational decline model 
which documents the stages of decline as: 1. blinded, when the organisation. is 
blind to the early stages of decline; 2. inaction when it recognises the need for 
change but takes no action; 3. faulty action when it takes, but inappropriate, 
action; 4. crisis whcn it rcaches a point of crisis; 5. dissolution when it is forccd 
to dissolve. Weitsel and Jonson's model captures the organisational behaviour of 
a corporate's downward spiral to failure. However, there exists tremendous 
difficulty in operationalising at least the first two stages of their decline model. 
Winn (1993) synthesises the performance measures applied in bankruptcy 
studies and classifies them into five distinct categories of performance: 1. pre. 
bankruptcy (crisis); 2. declining profitability (and eventually cash flow); 3. 
substandard performance relative to industry; 4. declining market share; 5. 
inadequate asset productivity. However, Winn's classification does not reflect a 
continuum of distress. There appears to be a lot of overlap between the 
performance categories in her model. 
The above review suggests that a practical performance decline framework 
must be capable of capturing the continuum of distress with minimal overlapping 
states while amenable to being operational ised. 
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2.5 Performance decline research framework 
In the absence of a universally agreed definition of firm distress we 
synthesise the extant decline-related studies and define three categories of decline' 
representing different degrees of financial decline: 1. non-crisis but poor 
performance (e. g. Robbins and Pearce 11,1992; Ofek, 1993), 2. crisis or 
(financial) distress' (potential bankruptcy) (e. g. Hamennesh, 1977; Bibeault, 1982; 
Slatter, 1984; Zimmerman, 1989; Gilson, 1989; Brown et al, 1993), and 3. 
bankruptcy (e. g. Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; Franks and Tourous, 1989). The 
tenn distress, in practice, tends to be applied generically to describe all tile three 
categories. Figure 2.1 show flie three categories of decline. The difference between 
the categories lies in the level of perfonnance decline. 
Poor performance firms (position I*, Figure 2.1) are those which, after a 
period of superior performance, suffer a decline in performance. Superior 
performance is often taken as being among the top 50% of firms in the same 
industry, on accounting-based performance measures such as return on assets 
(ROA) (see for example Grinyer et al, 1988; Robbins and Pearce 11,1992) whilst 
poor performance is taken as being among the bottom 25% (Pant, 1986). 
This classification is consistent vvith Hambrick and D'Aveni's (1988) description of corporate 
failure as a'protracted process of decline'and a'downward spiral'. 
"Distress will be used throughout this research to refer to financial distress, unless where 
reference is made to studies employing the specific term financial distress. 
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Figure 2.1: Types of financial decline 
Financial 
health 
Decline to poor 
/Recovery 
from 
performance poor performance 
Non-crisis Recovery from 
ff . 
r 
Inanclal distress 
2 r) Decline to 
Time (years) 
financial distre 
Crisis 
,* solv cy Gradual 
.......... .... ... .... .... . ..... .............. ...... ....... 
Sharp decline to 
failure Insolvency 3 decline to 
failure 
Note: I*= Poor performance; 2*= Distrcss(poicniial bankruptcy); 3*- Failure (bankruptcy) 
According to Schendel et al. (1976) the time span for assessing firm 
perfonnance should be long enough to ensure that any downturn is indeed due to 
some basic problem with the firm. A one year decline may not be long enough, for 
example, to rule out temporary demand shifts, introduction of new product or 
technology, and accounting rule changes (Winn, 1993). Therefore a minimum of 
two years' decline is often considered necessary to determine accounting-based 
performance decline (Robbins and Pearce 11,1992; Pant, 1986). In contrast, stock 
return performance-based measures may not suffer from this restriction. As the 
price of a firm's stock represents the present value of its future cash-flows and not 
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just one year's earnings or cashflow, a sharp decline in one year stock 
performance may be sufficiently indicative of long term poor performance. 
However, the literature on stock price overreaction (De Bondt and Thaler, 
1985) raises the concern that a stock Teturn-based measure of performance decline 
may merely represent a correction for the earlier overreaction. This problem can 
be mitigated by incorporating the condition of two consecutive years' good 
performance preceding decline. Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that stock 
market performance decline is not greeted with inertia and indifference by 
managers who smugly attribute such decline to the stock market whims such as 
overreaction. It appears that such performance decline is a cause for managerial 
concern and triggers remedial action including corporate restructuring (Barker, 
1996).. 
In dic wake of poor performance, management may take no action, a classic 
cause of failure (see Schendel et al, 1976; Bibeault, 1982) or adopt various 
corporate restructuring strategies which may, or may not, be appropriate to 
recovery from poor performance. In consequence, poor performance firms can 
recover from their poor performance, decline gradually to distress (position 2*) or 
decline precipitously into failure or bankruptcy (position 3*). 
Distressed firms are, therefore, poor performance firms that have 
consistently declined for two or more consecutive years culminating in a financial 
crisis. Distress tberefore manifests itself in profit and/or casli flow crisis. Casli 
flow crisis is a situation where a firm suffers from an acute cash flow problem 
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with insufficient cash to meet its financial obligations. As a result of management 
action or inaction, distressed firms may recover or decline to bankruptcy. Poor 
performance firms can potentially slide rapidly into bankruptcy without passing 
fluough a prolonged period of perfonnance decline. Equally, a firm can slide 
directly into distress without being initially poor performing due for example to 
fraud e. g. BCCI and Polly Peck. 
Financial distress firins are generally defined (e. g. Gilson et al., 1990; 
Wruck, 1990) as firms that have insufficient cash flows to cover current debt 
obligations. This tends to be evidenced by very low interest cover or liquidity 
ratios (Winn, 1993), default or restructuring of debt (Gilson et al, 1990), and 
negative Z score proxying for high potential bankruptcy risk (Taffler, 1984; 
Lasfer, Sudarsanam and Taffler, 1996). The mismatch between liquid funds and 
the obligations faced by firms in 'financial distress' can be alleviated by 
recontracting hard claims into soft claims (debt restructuring) or converting illiquid 
assets into liquid assets (asset restructuring) (Jolin, 1993). 
Failure to resolve distress will lead to position 3* of the distress continuum 
i. e. bankruPtcy or insolvency. This is a situation when finns file for bankruptcy 
protection, in the United States, or when insolvency proceedings, such as 
administration, receivership or administrative receivership, are initiated in the 
United Kingdom. Details of UK insolvency procedures are included as Appendix 
2.2 to this Chapter. 
Finally, though not indicated in Figure 2.1, firms facing poor performance 
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can be taken over". This aspect of perfonnance decline research has received 
scant attention in the literature". However, our research does not focus on 
distressed finn takeover as a tumaround strategy 
12 
. 
2.6 Choice of decline and financial performance measures 
We choose to investigate the first two stages of financial decline in our 
research framework i. e. firms experiencing poor performance, and firms 
experiencing distress as proxied, by potential bankruptcy. As outlined in the 
research objective, this research aims to plug the gap in extant research with regard 
to the detenninants and effectiveness of restructuring strategies in response to 
performance decline. As our research framework clearly illustrates, performance 
decline is not a static but a continuos event. As such, for a complete and thorough 
analysis of the detenninants and effectiveness of restructuring strategies, we feel 
an examination of the entire spectrum of performance decline is imperative to 
"Stallworthy and Kharbanda (1988) suggest that a declining firm may consider being 
taken over as a sensible 'survival' strategy. Distressed firms tend to have substantial accumulated 
tax losses. These tax losses are valuable to more profitable bidders as they could offset these 
losses against future profits. A recent example of a takeover where value of tax losses form a 
substantial element of'financial synergy'is GKN's bid for Westland. Also, distressed firms may 
merge with equally or less distressed competitors in order to achieve economies of scale and 
consolidate their position in a crowded market. The high incidence of bank mergers in the US in 
the late 1980s lends support to this strategy (de Carmoy, 1990). 
"A recent study related to this area is by Clark and Ofek (1995) on post-takeover 
performance of acquired poor performance firms. 
"Distressed firms may also be taken private or acquired. In this case distress may continue 
but the turnaround and turnaround strategies cannot be tracked. Hence, we do not focus on such 
firms. 
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ensure robustness of our results. However, the bankruptcy stage (stage 3) is not 
examined as UK firms rarely emerge from insolvency proceedings intact. They are 
frequently either sold piecemeal or as a going concern or closed down. 
Given our choice of poor performance and distressed firms for 
investigation, what then are the appropriate financial performance measures to use 
to capture poor performance and distress? From Section 2.3, two financial 
performance measures emerge as the most suitable choice. They are stock returns 
and the composite accounting ratio, in the form of Z scores. These two measures 
reflect the different perspectives on financial performance decline from tile view 
of the major stakeholders in a firm. Firms' major stakeholders, amongst others, are 
lenders, and shareholders. 
Stock return as a financial measure of performance decline is based on an 
explicit perspective of shareholder value maximisation as a corporate objective, 
whilst Z score is an explicit measure of firm's potential bankruptcy risk. Stock 
return measures die degree to which shareholder objective of maximising retums 
on investment is met. On the other hand, Z score, proxying for potential 
bankruptcy risk, serves the objective of lenders well, as lenders are more 
concerned about risk of default than about levels of firm growth and return to 
shareholders' equity. Bankruptcy risk, proxied by Z score, arguably, represents 
a more stringent measure of performance decline, and addresses the concerns and 
interests of a more diverse stakeholder community than stock returns. 
We believe that both perspectives are important in evaluating corporate 
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responses to performance decline. The conceptual premise of this research is that 
managers respond to performance decline in both stock returns and accounting 
performance terms, proxied by the Z score. 
2.7 Corporate responses to performance decline 
In response to performance decline, managers can sit back, do nothing and 
await recovery from say, a revival in industry and/or economic condition. 
Altematively, they may adopt a range of restructuring strategies to restore their 
firms' financial health. We believe the latter is tile more plausible scenario unless 
managers consider performance decline to be a process subject to 'auto-reverse'. 
The strategies espoused in the extant literature can be fonnulated into one 
compreliensive framework encompassing die strategies of managerial, operational, 
asset and financial restructuring. In die following chapter, we explore in depth the 
generic and specific strategies encapsulated in the corporate restructuring 
framework. 
2.8 Summary 
In "s chapter, we have reviewed the literature for alternative perspectives 
of financial performance decline, formulated a performance decline research 
framework, specified the type of financial decline firms to examine, and chosen 
the appropriate performance measures to define them. 
In the following chapter, we review the strategic management and finance 
literatures for turnaround and restructuring strategies. 
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Appendix 2.1: Review of decline-related studies: Definitions of Distress 
Study Distress definition and sample US/UK 
Accounting performance-based 
Altman (1968) Z score model to predict corporate us 
bankruptcy. 33 failed and 33 non-failed 
manufacturing firms in the period 1946- 
1965. 
Argenti (1976) Collapse is when a company, which has UK 
u 
hitherto being operating successfully, just 
begin to falter and then has to fight to 
remain profitable. 
No empirical analysis. 
Carrington and Aurelio Severe cash shortage. us 
(1976) 1 small firm (case study) covering the 
period 1973-75. 
Hamennesh (1976,77) Profit crisis 
- 
where profit declines over us 
prior years. 
4 divisions of a US manufacturing firm, 
1962-75. 
Schendel,, Patton and Four consecutive years of decline in net us 
Riggs (1976) income normalised by Gross National 
Product (GDP) growth. 
54 manufacturing firms covering the period 
1952-1971. 
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Appendix 2.1: Review of decline-related studies: Definitions of Distress 
(Contd. ) 
Study Distress definition and sample US/UK 
Schendel. and Patton Finns' net income growth is lower than us 
(1976) GNP growth for four years. 
54 US manufacturing firms in the period 
1952-71. 
Taffler (1976) Z score model computed using stepwise UK 
Linear Discriminant Analysis. 
45 healthy and 23 bankrupt firms (mainly 
manufacturing firms), period 1968-1973. 
Graham and Richards Average ROA less than average US us 
(1979) Treasury Bond yields. 
10 US railroads, 1957-1976. 
Hofer (1980) Operating health (firm value greater than us 
liquidation. value) near breakeven. 
10 firms over the period 1951-1978. 
O'Neill (198 1) Growth in Net Income (NI) less than the us 
industry average over 3 years. 
51 US banks between 1959-78. 
Bibeault (1982) One or more years of losses or a severe us 
decline of 80% or more of pre-tax profits in 
a single year. 
81 mature US firms. 1967-76. 
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0 Appendix 2.1: Review of decline-related studies: Definitions of Distress 
(Contd. ) 
Study Distress definition and sample US/UK 
Hambrick and Schecter Average ROI less than 10% for 2 years. 
260 US manufacturing firms. 
4 or more years' decline in ROI (to below 
us 
(1983) 
Ramanujam (1984) us 
5%). 64 US manufacturing firms, 1962-79. 
Slatter (1984) Real (1970 prices) profit before tax has UK 
declined for three or more successive years. 
20% of the approximately 2100 quoted 
firms for part or all of tile period 1961-76 
were classified as in need of a turnaround. 
i. e. 437 firms. [Case analysis of 17 firms] 
Taffier (1984) Z score model for distribution companies. UK 
49 healthy and 24 failed firms, period 1974- 
1978. 
Kharbanda and Z score (supplied by Syspas Limited 
- 
UK 
Stallworthy (1985) Taffler, 1976,1984) for failure prediction 
used in a few illustrations. No empirical 
work. 
ONeill (1986) Growth in net income less than industry us 
average over three years. 
13 US firms in the 1970s. 
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Appendix 2.1: Review of decline-related studies: Definitions of Distress 
(Contd. ) 
Study Distress definition and sample US/UK 
Pant(1986) ROA in bottom 25% ranking of firm's us 
industry for 2 years. 
137 US industrial finns, 1970-83. 
Grinyer, Mayes and A period of decline followed by an UK 
Mckieman. (1988) improvement in performance in the second 
period relative to decline period. The shortest 
time for the two periods together is three 
years. The focus is on companies which 
chose to and not forced to change by crisis. 
ROE, ROA, labour productivity (value added 
per employee) and capital prod ucti vi ty(val ue 
added per capital employed). 
25 UK (mainly Scottish) firms in the period 
1970-79. 
Bonnier and Bruner Negative earnings in the last quarterly us 
(1989) report, accompanied by dividend omission 
no more than 2 years prior to decline. The 
firm must have paid at least four successive 
dividends before the omission. 
70 firms, from 1969-1983. 
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Appendix 2.1: Review of decline-related studies: Definitions of Distress 
(Contd. ) 
Study Distress definition and sample US/UK 
Zimmennan (1989) Negative net profit (after tax) as a us 
percentage of revenue for one or more 
consecutive years. 
Case study on turnaround of 15 finns over 
15 years. 
Wruck (1990) A situation where cash flow is insufficient US 
to cover current obligations. 
No empirical work 
-a literature survey. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo Initially healthy i. e. one year of positive net US 
(1990), and income and dividend-paying followed by at 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo least three years of negative net income (NI) 
and Skinner (1992) or negative pre-tax operating income. 
Final sample 
- 
76 dividend-reducing NYSE 
finns selected in the period 1980-85. 
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Appendix 2.1: Review of decline-related studies: Definitions of Distress 
(Contd. ) 
Study Distress definition and sample US/UK 
Robbins and Pearce II Two successive years of increasing ROI and US 
(1992) ROS followed by decline in both ROI and 
ROS for at least 2 years. The decline rate 
must also be greater filan flie industry average 
decline rate. 
38 finns in tile textile sector, between 1976- 
1985. '
John, Lang and Netter At least one year of negative earnings, 
(1992) followed by three years of positive 
eamings. 
Questionnaire survey: 
Initial sample consists of 82 f inns between 
1980-87 with average annual assets of a $1 
billion or more. Final sample consists 46 
firms after excluding firms taken over, gone 
us 
private or filed for Chapter 11. 
Lang, Poulsen and Finns which made voluntary asset sales (not US 
Stulz. (1995) in financial distress) in excess of $1 million. 
93 firms with asset sales from 1985-1988. 
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Appendix 2.1: Review of decline-related studies: Definitions of Distress 
(Contd. ) 
Study Distress definition and sample US/UK 
Lasfer, Sudarsanam and Z score (supplied by Syspas Limited 
- 
based UK 
Taffler. (1996) on Taffler, 1976,1984). 
Industry model (1976): 
23 failed and 45 non-failed manufacturing 
finns, 1968-73. 
Distribution model (1984): 
24 failed and 49 non-failed finns, 1974-78. 
Stock-return based 
Gilson (1989) Ranked in the bottom 5% in the market on US 
three year cumulative stock retuni. 
Financial distress is a situation where a finn 
defaults, goes bankrupt or restructures its 
debt in the surrounding 5 years of decline to 
bottom 5% ranking in the market based on 
three year cumulative retum. 
381 finns between 1979 and 1984. 
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Appendix 2.1: Review of decline-related studies: Definitions of Distress 
(Contd. ) 
Study Distress definition and sample US/UK 
Gilson, John and Ranked in the bottom 5% in the market on US 
Lang. (1990) fluee year cumulative stock retum. 
Financial distress is a situation where a firm 
defaults, goes bankrupt or restructures its 
debt in the surrounding 5 years of decline to 
bottom 5% ranking in tile market based on 
three year cumulative retum. 
447 firms. Period 1979-1985. 
Ofek (1993) Decline in stock returns ranking from top us 
67% in the market (base year) to bottom 
10% (distress year) 
358 firms with market value of $30M or 
over. Period: 1983-1987 
Debt/bankruptcy-based 
Franks and Tourous Filing for Chapter II bankruptcy protection. US 
(1989) 30 firms which emerged from Chapter 11, 
period 1970-1984. 
Gertner and Scharfstein Filing for Chapter II bankruptcy protection. US 
(1991) Theoretical paper. 
Brown, James and Firms restructuring their debt in private or US 
Mooradian (1993) through exchange offers. 
63 finns. 
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Appendix 2.1: Review of decline-related studies: Definitions of Distress 
(Contd. ) 
Study Distress definition and sample US/UK 
Gilson and Vetsuypens Same as Gilson (1989,1990) us 
(1993) Firms that either filed for bankruptcy or 
privately restructured their debts. 
77 finns during the period 1981-1987. 
Brown et al. (1994) Default or anticipated default, near us 
bankruptcy or restructuring of debt (as 
cause for asset sales). 
49 firms in the period 1979-1988. 
Franks and Tourous Firms with publicly traded debt us 
(1994) downgraded to Standard & Poor's CCC 
(repayment doubtful) or worse rating 
(including default (D) and non-rated (NR)) 
and which restructured their debt privately 
or publicly. 
82 finns. Period 1983-1988. 
Undefined 
Argenti (1976) None. G7 UK 
Melin (1985) Not defined. N/A 
Scandinavian TV manufacturers, 1970- 
1980,6 finns. 
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Appendix 2.2: UK Insolvency Procedures 
A2.2.1 Definition of insolvency 
A company is insolvent if its liabilities exceed its assets i. e. it has negative 
shareholders funds (Insolvency Act 1986, S123 (2)), or where it is unable to pay 
its debts wben. they fall due (Insolvency Act 1986, S123(l)). A company is 
deemed to be 'asset insolvent' if the court is satisfied with evidence that the 
company9s assets are less that its liabilities including contingent and prospective 
liabilities. 
To return to asset solvency a company merely has to increase shareholders 
fund until it becomes positive again. Commonly, this can be achieved by way of 
share issues, asset revaluations, prorits or a fortnal reconstruction to reduce 
liabilities. 
On the other hand, inability to meet debts when they fall due can only be 
alleviated by the injection of cash via equity or borrowing, by the replacement of 
short-term borrowing with longer-term borrowing, or by a repayment moratorium. 
Also, a corporate reconstruction would enable a proposal to be put forward to 
creditors incorporating liquidity elements such as the deferment of repayment of 
term loans, interest holidays or the conversion of debt into equity. 
Technical default 
- 
default triggered by breaches hi debt (both privatelbank 
and public/bond) covenants is usually due to violations of affinnative covenants 
such as net tangible worth, working capital or current ratios, rather than negative 
covenants uch asnegative pledges'or cstricfions on disposals ctc. (Citron 1992). 
A breach of covenants, which can trigger cross-default clauses, would nonnally 
so 
cause the entire borrowings of the company to be payable on demand. Lenders 
have the right to recall the loans immediately, renegotiate, or waive the breach in 
expectation of an improvement in the firm's business. 
A more serious default is a substantive default triggered by the failure to 
meet interest or debt repayments when they fall. Insolvent firms can be rescued by 
infonnal procedures uch as private workouts, with tile support of bankers and/or 
creditors. Failing that, they can resort to fonnal insolvency proceedings, which 
could be creditor-led in the case of administrative receivership or firm-led i. e. 
bankruptcy protection. 
A2.2.2. Informal insolvency proceedings: Private workout 
No rescues can be effected without bank facilities. Bank rescues have 
played a valuable part in assisfing a number of major companies to survive periods 
of difficulty due to recession, market changes or mis-management. Ill recent years, 
the Bank of England, through the 'London Approach"", has played a major part 
in persuading banks to cooperate in rescues. The 'London Approach is designed 
to ensure that decisions about whether to call in the receivers on the one hand or 
to organise a'workouf on the other hand, are orderly and well-founded. Workout 
is a tenn used here to describe a non-statutory i. e. private, agreement o extend 
financial support to a company wbicli, witbout this support, would liavc to ccasc 
"The key features of the London approach are: 1. Banks remain for the time being 
supportive and do not rush to appoint receivers, 2. Decisions about a company's future are made 
on the basis of reliable information which is shared among all parties to a workout, 3. Banks, and 
other creditors, work together to reach a collective view on whether and how a company should 
be given financial support, 4. Pain is shared on an equitable basis. Source: Pent Kent, director 
Bank of England and The Banker, March 1994. 
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trading (Kent, 1994). The objective is to maximise value for creditors by reducing 
receiverships. Workouts reduce the incidence of 'indirect costs' of financial 
distress. Indirect costs include lost sales and profits and inability to raise funds, as 
opposed to direct costs which can be measured with ease e. g. fees of lawyers, 
accountants and bankers (Warner, 1977). For example, in a receivership, publicity 
could severely damage a company's ability to trade, and the forced sale of assets 
would most likely be made at less than full value. 
A workout would entail secured creditors not appointing a receiver and 
unsecured creditors not petitioning for a winding-up order. All creditors also have 
to refrain from pressing for repayment until the viability of the company is 
assessed and a consensus on a way forward is reached. Frequently, the first step 
before a full scale refinancing is attempted is tile agreement of lenders to a 
#standstill agreement'. This would take the form of not demanding repayment 
despite breaching of certain covenants (technical default) or actual default 
(substantive default), extending loan repayment for a short-temi period, and 
provision of temporary 'rescue or working capital' facilities. 
The London Approach for collective work-outs has been claimed to be quite 
effective and has acquired an impressive track record over the past few years 
(Kent, 1994). Until recently, raising additional finance in the form of equity and 
new loans for rescue purposes was more common than private debt restructuring 
in the UK (Slatter, 1984). 
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A2.2.3. Formal or public insolvency proceedings 
a. Involuntary proceedings: Administrative Receivership or Receivership 
Bank debts commonly form the highest proportion of a typical UK 
corporate's debts and tend to be secured. Security is normally by way of fixed and 
floating charges over substantially all of the companies assets. Fixed charges 
cover fixed assets, goodwill and uncalled share capital whereas a floating charge 
'floats'over assets that are changing and less-permanent in nature such as debtors, 
stocks and work-in-progress. Fixed charges cntitle the holder to absolute right to 
the realisation. proceeds whilst floating-charges entitle the holder only to the 
residue of proceeds realised. from floating-cliargc assets after repayment of 
preferential creditors such as Value Added Tax (VAT), Pay As You Earn (PAYE), 
National Insurance Contributions (NIC) and salaries, and secured creditors. 
Administrative receivership is primarily a recovery mechanism for an 
individual creditor, or a group of creditors, holding a floating charge. A 
bank/secured creditor may appoint either a fixed charge receiver or an 
'administrative receivee where a floating charge is held as well. Banks would 
prefer to appoint an administrative receiver (AR) to a fixed-charge receiver as an 
AR takes immediate cffective control of the management of the indebted 
corporate. The AR has extensive rights over assets and power to manage the 
business as well as sell assets covered by the charge. In addition, lie has the 
authority to implement a rescue plan designed to rescue the profitable parts of the 
business. In practice, banks will only appoint an AR if they are doubtful of 
recovering their monies or their security is in jeopardy. 
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b. Voluntary proceed i ngs/bankru ptcy protection 
i. Administration 
An administration order, where applied for by the directors and granted by 
the court, will allow an insolvent company to continue trading under the 
supervision of an administrator who serves the total interest of all creditors. Tile 
objective of administration can be one of three: 1. turnaround and the survival of 
the company and its business, 2. affangement with creditors and shareholders to 
reorganise the business, 3. better realisation of assets than would be achieved on 
a winding up order (liquidation). 
Generally, administration is aimed at securing a 'breathing space' as an 
immediate 'moratorium' is obtained upon presentation of tile petition. The 
moratorium i. e. relief against creditors claims, lasts until the hearing of the 
petition or, if an adrninistration order is granted by the court, until the discharge 
of the order. However, floafing charge holders have the right to be given notice of 
petitions and the right to object and appoint an administrative receiver. 
Administration has several advantages over bank-led rescues such as 
receivership and private workout in that the administrator cannot be pressured into 
payment of compensation for loss of employment and closure costs. In addition, 
an administrator has the power to dispose charged property, property held under 
hire purchase or held subject to retention of title. 
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ii. Scheme of arrangement 
In a scheme of arrangement, governed by S425 Companies Act 1985 (CA 
85), and subject to approval by the court, creditors would be asked to waive or 
capitalise part of the debt and/or convert short (unsecured) to long-tenn (secured) 
debt. Creditors may find they have the choice of either liquidating tile company 
and receiving a small dividend or agree to the scheme of arrangement with a view 
to receiving more. This is a rarely used procedure as it is complex, expensive, 
and curnbersome to operate. Further, the firm is exposed to the risks of a winding 
up order anytime before the sanctioning of the scheme by the court. In contrast, 
petitioning for an administration order achieves the same objective whilst the 
petitioner is guaranteed full protection by way of an'immediate moratorium'. 
A framework similar to the S425 CA 85 scheme offered by the Insolvency 
Act 1986 is the voluntary arrangement scheme, which like the S425 scheme, is 
initiated by company directors requiring court approval. 
iii. Creditors Voluntary Arrangement and Compulsory Liquidation 
The outcome of financial distress is either recovery or liquidation of the 
fmn. Liquidation is a process whereby the assets of tile company are realised and 
distributed among its creditors according to their statutory priority and 
enfitlements. Liquidafion can be effected flirough a creditor voluntary arrangement 
(CVA) or a compulsory liquidation order. A CVA is a situation where the 
directors recommend to shareholders the passing of ail extraordinary resolution 
to put the company into voluntary liquidation. This is followed by creditors' 
meetings and once approved liquidation is the responsibility of the creditors. CVA 
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is the most commercially effective, and hence the most used, corporate insolvency 
procedure. 
In a compulsory liquidation, creditors can petition to wind up the company 
where the company is unable to pay its debts. This is an expensive procedure as 
an Official (DTI) Receiver has to be appointed to oversee the liquidation process. 
Compulsory liquidation is only used when serious management wrongdoitig or 
fraud is suspected. 
Figure 2.2 below shows the incidence of public insolvencies amongst UK 
listed finns in the period 1987-1993. As public insolvencies exist only post the 
Insolvencies Act 1986, which became cffective from mid 1987, and due to a 
healthy economy, tile incidence of public insolvencies is low in the 1987-1988 
period. The recession of die late 80s and early 90s saw a steep rise in the number 
of public insolvencies, which subsequently declined in the 1992-93 period. 
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Figure 2.2: Public Insolvencies of Listed UK Finns: 1987-1993 
Source: Extel Financial, London Stock Excbange Official Yearbook, London 
Stock Exchange Quarterly Review, and Datastream International. 
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Chapter 3. CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
When a firm falls from a superior performance position to an extremely 
poor posifion on any appropriate performance criterion, it manifests fundamental 
problems with the firm's management and strategies. However, given that the firm 
is performing badly, how should management respond? Management can either 
'do nothing! and sit fight in hope of an upturn. or restructure to recover rapidly from 
performance decline. However, 'masterly' inaction may lead to further 
deterioration in firm performance (Scbendel et al, 1976). 
Rescues and recovery of distressed firms would usually involve some 
management clianges entailing dismissal of incompetent managers, rationalisation. 
resulting in redundancies and closures of loss-making operations, and reduction 
in borrowings by selling-off peripheral businesses or through fresh capital 
injection. The business for sale may need to be transferred ('hived down') to a 
newly incorporated subsidiary, the shares of which are then sold. However, the 
rescue would only be successful if, after such disposals, the rump of the group 
remains viable and can be made profitable. 
Stuart Slatter (1984) propounds ten elements of successful recovery 
strategies. They are: 1. appointment of a new chief executive, 2. imposition of 
strong financial control, 3. cost cutting including increasing margins, 4. asset 
disposals to raise cash, 5. debt restructuring [elements 2 to 5 aim, at 'stemming the 
bleeding'], 6. organisational change and decentralisation, 7. reassessing 
products/markets, 8. improved marketing, 9. attracting additional investment, and 
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10. acquisitions. In other words, the 'rescue' stage (comprising elements I to 5) of 
the recovery plan is to raise cash via asset-reduction, cost-reduction, and debt 
restructuring, whilst the 'rejuvenation' stage (comprising elements 6 to 10) centres 
on profit improvement through improved operations, reshaped product/market mix 
and improved organisation structure, and finally a return to growth via 
acquisitions, new product developments and increased market penetration. 
Nelson and Clutterbuck (1988) consider corporate turnaround a three-stage 
process. First, achieve survival through strategies to contract and rationalise the 
business to provide a financial breathing space, Second, refocus to a viable core, 
through divestments, investments and new product development. Third, achieve 
long tenn. expansion through growth-oriented strategies uch as internal investment 
or acquisitions. A similar schema is also proposed by 11offinan (1989). 
Corporate turnaround models such as Slattcr's and Nelson and 
Clutterbuck's seldom work in a clockwork fashion. Frequently, firms facing 
performance decline have to respond rapidly, usually requiring a mixture of 
strategies uch as cost cutting, refinancing, and investment strategies, toretumtlie 
firm to profitability within a short period of time. This means that the various 
turnaround strategies are not necessarily sequential but often are taken 
simultaneously. In addition, not all strategies are relevant to all tile different levels 
of decline. There may also be interactions between the various strategies. 
Corporate rescue and recovery, in practice, employ strategies which arc 
essentially corporate restructuring strategies, a field well researched by financial 
economists in the US. Hence, for the purpose of this study, corporate rescue and 
recovery strategies are subsumed under the generic heading of corporate 
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restructuring strategies.. 
The objective of this chapter is to identify the range and variety of 
restructuring strategics reported in die literature. The empirical evidence and main 
conclusions from these studies are discussed later in Chapter 5, in the context of 
the effectiveness of restructuring strategies. The strategic management and finance 
literatures on corporate restructuring strategies are reviewed next. A summary of 
this review is included as Appendix 3.1 of this chapter. 'niis research encompasses 
a comprehensive corporate restructuring framework, synthesising both the strategic 
management and finance literatures. It covers the generic strategies of i-nanigerial, 
operational, asset and financial restructuring. 
3.2 Managerial restructuring 
Top management change is widely quoted as a precondition for successful 
tumarounds (Schendel et al, 1976; Hofer, 1980, Bibcault, 1982; Slattcr, 1984). 
When old ways of operating need to undergo radical change, it is often difficult 
for top management responsible for developing the existing system to change their 
habits and institute the necessary refonns. Often, banks and creditors will 
continue financial support only if Uley are confident that the twulagement eatil can 
manage the crisis in liand. A change in top management is tangible and reassuring 
evidence to bankers, investors and employees that the firm is aware of the gravity 
of its predicament and that something positive is being done to improve its 
performance, even though the cause of performance decline may have been 
beyond the incumbent management's control (Slattcr, 1984). An inverse relation 
is found empirically between the probability of management change and firm's 
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stock performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner et al; 1988). In other 
words, the worse the firm's stock performance becomes the higher is the 
probability of a management change. Keasey and Watson (1987), Gilson (1989, 
1990), and Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) find significant top management 
changes in distressed finns. 
3.3 Operational restructuring 
The strategic management literature provides empirical support for an 
overlapping two stage approach to corporate turnarounds (e. g. Robbins and Pearce 
11,1992; Arogyaswamy et. al, 1995). The two stages are the effliciency/operating 
turnaround stage based on cost and asset reduction, and the 
entrepreneurial/strategic stage based on asset restructuring or product/inarkct 
refocusing (e. g. Bibeault, 1982; Slatter, 1984; Robbins and Pearce 11,1992). The 
efficiency/operating turnaround stage aims to stabilise operations and restore 
profitability by pursuing strict cost reductions and operating asset reductions. The 
entrepreneurial/strategic stage aims to achieve long term growth through 
restructuring the firm's strategic asset portfolio. Our research classifies 
efficiency/operating measures as operational restructuring and 
entrepreneurial/strategic measures as asset restructuring. 
Operational restructuring comprises cost-reduction, rewnue-generation. and 
operating asset reduction strategies. The objective is to improve efficiency and 
margin through bringing down overheads in line with volume (Slatter, 1984, p: 
99). Operational restructuring is, generally, the first rescue strategy implemented 
as there is no point in assessing the strategic health if the finn goes bankrupt in the 
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near term (Hofer, 1980). Efficiency measures are directed at both maximising 
output (revenue) and minimising input (resources such as costs and assets). Cost 
reduction strategy to reduce costs, restore profitability and improve cash flows is 
the core of corporate rescues. Cost reduction specifically entails cutting direct 
costs and overheads, including headcounts, and interest charges. Cost reduction 
may be sufficient where the finn is weak operationally but not yet in distress. 
Next, revenue generating strategies may be pursued. The focus is primarily 
on existing lines of products, initiating price-cuts (or raising prices where demand 
for products is price insensitive) and increasing marketing expenditure to stimulate 
demand (Hofer, 1980). Due to data availability problems, revenue-generating 
strategy is not explicitly studied in this research. For example, sales growth can 
potentially be used to proxy for revenue growth but the cffect of asset 
restructuring, such as acquisitions, obscures operational revenue generating 
efforts. 
When the fmn is operating well below capacity, asset reduction to improve 
utilisation and productivity of assets is imperative. Also, generating cash flow via 
asset reduction is vital for turnaround in the case of firins in severe financial 
distress. Asset-reduction can be operating or strategic in nature. The latter is 
discussed in the next section. At tile operating level, operating asset reduction 
refers to business unit level sale, closures and integration of surplus fixed assets 
such as plant, equipment and offices, and reduction in short term assets such as 
inventory and debtors. The objective is to contract assets employed to match 
reduced volumes and thereby improve asset utilisation. at the operating level 
(Bibeault, 1982; Hofer, 1980; Scliendel et a], 1976). 
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The objective of operational restructuring strategies is primarily to generate, 
in the short-term, higher cash flow and profitability. In summary, it may be 
sufficient for firms merely in poor performance, but not yet in crisis, to adopt cost 
reduction and revenue-generating strategies to recover. However, if the firm is in 
distress, or there exists excess capacity or there are unprofitable product lines, 
operating asset reduction may be necessary to achieve a turnaround. 
3.4 Asset restructuring 
According to the strategy literature (see Bowman and Singh, 1993), 
strategic asset/portfolio restructuring covers reorganising the finn into self- 
contained Strategic Business Units, divestment of lines of businesses not fitting 
the core businesses; acquiring companies that relate to and strengtben the core; 
discontinuing unpromising products; and forming strategic alliances, joint ventures 
and licensing agreements". In addition, distressed firms may have the option of 
merging with other firms, being taken over in a hostile bid or being bought-out by 
its own management (MBO's). 
As discussed earlier, the strategic management literature suggests a two- 
stage turnaround strategy (see Section 3.3). The second cntreprcneurial/stratcgic 
stage resembles the asset restructuring found in the finance literature, as it refcrs 
to a major reconfiguration, of the firm's assets. This covers asset divestment and 
investment. 
14 Asset restructuring refers to strategic or long term asset restructuring and excludes short 
term asset restructuring such as reduction of debtors and stocks which is part of operational 
restructuring. 
63 
3.4.1 Asset divestment 
According to the strategic management literature, where the firm is in 
distress and/or where strategic health is weak e. g. where present capacity far 
exceeds long term revenue potential or assets are in declining product/markets, 
asset reduction is imperative for recovery (Hofer, 1980; Pearce II and Robbins, 
1993). Asset-reduction at the portfolio (corporate strategic) level covers, in tile 
main, corporate divestment of subsidiaries/divisions. The objective at this level 
may be to divest non-prof"it generating assets (and lialt cash drains), non-core 
assets or even profitable assets for the purpose of raising cash to alleviate financial 
distress and fund new strategic investments. Where the firm is in distress, 
corporate strategy takes second priority to alleviation of financial distress and 
survival. Divestment of subsidiaries is claimed to be the most common tuniaround 
strategy by all but die smallest firms (Slatter, 1984). Divestment can take the form 
of sell-off, management buyout, spinoff/demerger, equity carve-out and sale and 
leaseback. 
i. Sell-offs 
Sell-offs refer to complete and permanent disposals of parts of a finn's 
assets, normally a subsidiary company (see Wright and Thompson, 1987).. 
Duhaime and Grant (1984) find sell-offs to involve less profitable and more 
peripheral units of a diversified finn, and also to be related to the profitability of 
the parent firm ie. sell-offs represent a viable response to financial difficulties. 
Voluntary sell-offs are generally empirically shown to be related to efficiency 
improvements in the new sold-off entity (eg. Hite and Owers, 1983) and to 
generate significantly positive effects on selling and buying firins share prices 
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(Sichennan and Pettway, 1992) 
ii. Management buyouts (MBO's) 
Restructuring by way of Management Buyouts (MBOs) is suggested in the 
literature as related to inefficient companies (e. g. Duhaime and Grant, 1984; Seth 
and Easterbrook, 1993). MBO's'incentive-intensive' management is posited as 
suitable for increasing firin efficiency and refocusing to core business for the 
bought-out entity (see Seth and Easterwood, 1993). Consistent with this, 
Liebeskind et al. (1992) found LBO finns to downsize corporate operations and 
forego excess growth to improve performance, but found little difference in 
refocusing between LBOs and non-LBOs firms. Wright and Coyne (1985), in a 
study of I 11 UK MBOs up fill 1983, find MBOs to facilitatc finn (the MBO: rinn) 
reorgardsation ranging from changes in management structure to employee levels, 
improvement in cash and credit control systems, and movements into new product 
areas wWch had previously been difficult to achieve. Their findings are supported 
by a subsequent study of 182 MBOs, over tile period 1983-86, by Thompson, 
Wright and Robbie (1989). 
iii. Spin-offs 
Spin-offs, which involve the listing of an operating unit as an independent 
firm and distributing die shares to shareholders of the parent finn, are found to be 
associated with significant abnonnal retunis (see Hite and Owers, 1983). Gains 
can be attributed to elimination of diseconotnies of scale among dissimilar 
operating units, contracting flexibility or efficiency (Hite and Owers, 1983), tax 
and regulatory advantages and/or resulting managerial efficiency (Schipper and 
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Smith, 1983). Typically, a parent firm relinquishes control over its subsidiary's 
assets after spinoff (e. g. Zeneca after its demerger from ICI). 
iv. Equity Carve-Outs 
Equity carve-out announcements, a situation where a portion of a wholly- 
owned subsidiary's stock is offered for sale to the public, are associated with a 
positive increase in shareholder wealth (see Schipper and Smith, 1986). This is 
often attributed to changes in asset management, better infon-nation dissemination 
of subsidiary performance, better market valuation of subsidiary's assets, changes 
in managerial incentive contracts, and ease of acquisition of the subsidiary by 
another finn. 
ve Sale and leaseback 
Firms facing performance decline may resort to sale and Icascback 
arrangements to raise cash whilst retaining the use of key assets via long term 
leasing contracts. Properties, plant and machinery and cars are popular iterns for 
sale and leaseback arrangements to tide over troubled times. In this form of 
divestment, although the legal ownership of the asset rests with the lessor, the 
lessee retains the economic use and benefit of the asset through paying agreed 
rental payments for a specific period (lease period), at the end of which the lessee 
may have the option of repurchasing the asset for a specified sum". 
3.4.2 Asset investment 
In general, asset investments are feasible only for firms with strong 
"We are concerned only with cash flow and not with the Balance Sheet cffect, such as 
whether the lease is capitalised or not. 
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financial health and can be implemented only after corporate survival is assured. 
Asset investment covers operational and strategic investments. Associated with 
efficiency/productivity improvement, firms may upgrade flieir production facilities 
through building new plants and equipment or automating existing processes 
(Schendel et a], 1976; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983). Capital expenditure of this 
nature complements, rather than conflicts with, the cost-reduction strategy, as the 
common objective is enhancing efficiency/productivity, reducing unit costs and 
improving price competitiveness or profit margin. Though aimed at improving 
operational efficiency, internal capital expenditure is seldom made for short term 
purposes (Slatter, 1984). With strict financial control in operation during period 
of performance decline, only capital expenditure of the highestjustification (e. g. 
central to survival in product/markets) may be approved. Capital expenditure is 
generally classified as 'organic' asset investment. 
Strategically, firms facing performance decline may seek to acquire assets 
that fit their core businesses. The strategic objective is to refocus from unprofitable 
or unrelated businesses to a profitable core with long tenn profit potential. This 
stage is crucial for recovery by firms with ill-suited corporate strategy or mature 
or declining product/markets where a new strategic direction is imperative 
(Schendel et al, 1976; Hofer, 1980; Pearce Il and Robbins, 1993). Acquisition is 
suggested as the most commonly used turnaround strategy for stagnant firins i. e. 
firms with poor financial performance but not yet in crisis, as acquisition is 
quicker to implement than an organic growth strategy (Slatter, 1984, p: 96). 
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3.5 Financial restructuring 
Cash generation strategies e. g. asset divestment and equity issues, are 
commonly used strategies to alleviate financial distress, as proceeds are frequently 
applied to pay down firms' borrowings (Slatter, 1984). Extant strategy-based 
research on corporate turnarounds has paid scant attention to financial 
restructuring as an integral component of corporate turnaround strategy, as 
opposed to the finance-based research (e. g. Gilson, 1989; DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo 1990; John, Lang and Netter, 1992; Brown, James and Mooradian, 
1993; Ofek, 1993; Franks and Tourous, 1994). This study incorporates financial 
restructuring as a key element of the corporate restructuring framework. 
Financial restructuring is the reworking of a firm's capital structure to 
relieve the strain of interest and debt repayments. Financial restructuring, in this 
study, is separated into two strategies: equity-based and dcbt-based. 
3.5.1 Equity-based financial restructuring 
Equity-based strategies cover dividend cuts or ornissions and equity issues 
i. e. rights issue, public offer or institutional placing. Finns in casliflow crisis tend 
to reduce or omit dividends for reasons of liquidity constraints, restrictions 
imposed by debt covenants, or strategic considerations e. g. to improve a firm's 
bargaining position with trade unions (DeAngelo, and DeAngelo, 1990). DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (1990) and John et al. (1992), empirically, find large finns respond 
to financial distress with rapid and aggressive dividend reductions. Recently, 
Jensen and Johnson (1995) find dividend cut is associated with financial decline 
and marks the beginning of a firm's restructuring efforts to reverse decline. 
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Failing companies are also found to be more likely to raise equity funds via 
share issues than non-failing firms because of pressure from creditors concerned 
with the security of their lending (Storey et al, 1987). The recent recession in the 
UK (1990-1992) saw a lot of financial restructuring activities by 'recession- 
scarred' firms involving the launching of rights issues. A small but significant 
percentage of these firms is thought to be in some form of financial distress. 
Colloroll, Lovell, and Pentos are a few that resorted to rescue rights issue to 
alleviate financial distress during flie last recession but yet failed to recover. Funds 
may also be needed to repay banks where a covenant is breached or potentially 
breached if sufficient funds are not found to service debts. 
3.5.2 Debt-based financial restructuring 
Debt-based strategies refer to flie extensive restructuring of finn debt. Finns 
restructure their debt either to avoid financial distress or to resolve an existing 
financial distress. Gilson (1989,1990) defines debt restructuring as a transaction 
in which an existing debt is replaced by a new contract, with one or more of the 
following characteristics: 1. interest or principal reduced; 2. maturity extended; 
3. debt-equity swap. 
i. Increase/decrease in interest costs and reduction in principal 
Increase/decrease in interest costs and reduction in principal are common 
in debt refmancing, including increases in rates of borrowing to the distressed fin-n 
simply because the risks of failure, and default, have increased. However, there 
are cases, such as the Euro Disney, where reductions in principal or interest 
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payments are made to resuscitate an ailing firm. Wiere principal amounts are 
reduced or loans cancelled, the distressed firm may be deemed in tax law to have 
received a taxable income. However, insolvent fmns can obtain tax relief if such 
taxable income arises from a formal debt restructuring (Income and Corporation 
Tax Act 1971). The amount that may be excluded from income is tile difference 
between the old and new debt amounts. 
ii. Extension of loan or credit facilities 
Extension of loan or credit facilities by bank creditors includes extension 
of the maturity term of loans (e. g. conversion of short term overdraft to longer 
terni loans), provision of additional finance, and conversion from uncommitted to 
committed funding. 
iii. Debt-equity swap 
Debt-equity swap ie. converting debt to equity, including conversion to 
preference shares/convertible debt, is common in private and public debt 
restructuring as a means of relieving the distressed firm's debt burden (Gilson, 
1990). 
Debt restructuring is frequently accompanied by changes in covenants, 
increases in security cover and may be conditional on successful implementation 
of a rights issue and divestments. 
iv. Changes in covenants 
Changes in covenants arise when lenders require increased control over the 
distressed firm, mainly in the form of non-financial covenants such as dividend 
and capital spending restrictions, are also aimed at conserving the firm's asset base 
(Citron, 1992). In tenns of financial covenant such as minimum net worth, existing 
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ones are often relaxed, to avoid their continuous breach, while addition of new 
ones is rare (Benish and Press, 1993). 
ve Increase in security cover 
Increase in security cover is aimed at inducing banks to extend and/or 
increase credit facilities sufficient for the company to continue in business. They 
may require the creation of debentures charging all the distressed firm's assets to 
them. Unsecured creditors have always been incensed by such rescue attempts 
which may leave them with nothing if the rescue fails, as banks will have a prior 
charge over all assets (Campbell and Underdown, 199 1). 
As discussed earlier, cash generative actions such as rights issue and asset 
divestments are frequently targeted at raising cash to pay down firm debts and thus 
alleviate its financial distress. 
Debt restructuring is principally carried out in the fonn, of a private workout 
in the UK. This is a private arrangement between a finn and its bankers aimed at 
refinancing and reconstructing the finn's debt finances (see Section A. 2.2.2). 
3.6 Capital reconstruction 
Financial restructuring, especially involving debt-cquity swap, would 
normally be accompanied by a capital reduction which results in the dilution of the 
equity stake held by existing shareholders. The objective of this other fonn of 
financial restructuring 
- 
capital reduction 
- 
is to enable dcbt-liolders to own a 
major pail of the restructured firm and to eliminate negative reserves. Capital 
reduction would typically take the form of reducing the nominal value of equity 
shares, splitting it into new shares and deferred shares, and subsequently 
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cancelling the deferred shares (Campbell and Underdown, 199 1). 
Poor performing and distressed firms tend to have low or negative reserves. 
Capital reconstruction schemes, requiring court approval, are attempts by 
distressed finns to repair their balance sheet via extinguishing past negative 
reserves. Firms involved in capital reconstruction schemes frequently claim the 
reparation of the balance sheet to pay dividends as their main purpose for this 
exercise (Campbell and Underdown, 1991). 
The suitability of the above corporate restructuring framework is 
demonstrated in a study by John, Lang and Netter (1992) on the restructuring of 
large firms in response to performance decline. The corporate restructuring 
strategies applied by poor performing firms in their study in response to 
performance decline, adapted to tile framework above, are shown in Table 3.1 
below. 
3.7 Summary of corporate restructuring strategies 
Table 3.2 below summarises the generic and specific corporate 
restructuring strategies reviewed above. Managerial restructuring involves 
replacing inefficient managers responsible for performance decline. Operational 
restructuring entails employee layoffs or retrenchment, closures and integration 
of facilities. The objective is to cut costs and improve efficiency, stem losses, and 
tighten financial control. Asset restructuring can be broken down into asset 
divestment and asset investment. 
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Table 3.1 Restructuring by 46 large US firms in response to performance 
decline during the period 1980-1987. 
Source: Adapted from John, Lang and Netter, 1992. 
Strategies and Actions % of firms adopting 
strategy 
Financial Restructuring 
- 
reduce debt 39 
- 
increase debt 9 
- 
issue equity 7 
Operational and Managerial Restructuring 
Contraction policies: 
- 
change in management structure 13 
- 
job cuts 43 
- 
wage cut 20 
- 
plant closures 26 
- 
reduce capacity 20 
Expansion policies: 
- 
acquire raw materials 26 
Others: 
- 
change marketing or pricing 10 
- 
improve production efficiency and productivity 24 
- 
change in inventory management 8 
- 
improve quality 11 
Asset/Strategic Restructuring 
Contraction policies: 
- 
emphasize core business / refocusing 28 
product/market 
- 
sell assets, divest, spin off, sell business of subs. 63 
- 
reduce capital expenditure 9 
Expansion policies: 
- 
change in focus in product/market mix 20 
- 
introduce new product 24 
- 
enter new markets 15 
- 
diversify 9 
- 
embark on a joint venture 13 
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Table 3.2 : Corporate Restructuring Strategies: A Summary 
Generic 
Strategy Specific strategies Objectives Prior related research 
Managerial Management replacement Remove inefficient Slatter (1984), Gilson 
managers responsible for (1989), Ofek (1993) 
decline. Gilson and Vetsuypens 
g99(1993) 
Operational Layoffs, closures and Cut costs, improve Bibcault (1982), 
integration of facilities. cfficiency to stcm losses, Ramanujam (1984), 
and tighten financial control. Slattcr (1984), Robbins ct 
al. (1992), John, Lang and 
Nettcr (1992), Ofck(1993) 
Asset Acquisitions Recovery strategy c. g. Stallworthy and 
acquire competitors to Kharbanda (1988) 
increase sales ctc, and 
tsurvival' strategy c. S. taken 
over by a healthier bidder. 
Capital expenditure Improve cfficicncy and No prior studies. 
productivity, and profits. 
Management Buy-Outs Rcalisc cash to pay do%%m Wright and Coyne (1985), 
debt, fund restructuring, and Tlompson ct. Al (1989), 
refocus to core. Scth and Eastcnvood 
(1993), Licbcskind et 
al. (1992). 
Divestment Rcalisc cash to pay do%%m Ramanujarn (1984), 
debt (avoid bankruptcy) Slatter (1984), Ofck 
fund restructuring, and (1993), Brown, James and 
refocus to core. Mooradian (1993), Lang 
Poulscn and Stulz (1995), 
Lasfer ct al. ( 1996). 
Spin-Offs Realisc cash to pay do%vn I lite and Owcrs (1983), 
debt, fund restructuring, and Schipper and Smith 
refocus to core. (1983). 
Sale and Icaseback Realise cash. No prior studies. 
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Table 3.2 : Corporate Restructuring Strategies: A Summary (Contd. ) 
Generic 
Strategy Specific strategies Objectives Prior related research 
Financial Equity: Cut or omit Loosen liquidity constraints Slattcr ( 1984), Storey ct 
dividends and/or restrictions placed by al. (1987), Gilson (1990), 
debt covenants DcAngclo and DcAngclo 
(1990), Marsh (1992), 
Ofek (1993) and Christie 
(1994) 
Equity issues Repay debt and increase S lattcr ( 19 84), G rinycr ct. 
working capital. Satisfy al ( 19 8 8), John, Lang and 
condition for debt Ncttcr ( 1992). 
rcstructuring. 
Debt: Debt restructuring Alleviate financial distress Gilson (1990), Brown, 
by rccontracting hard claims James and Mooradian 
to soft claims and increase (1993), John (1993) 
working capital. 
Divestments of subsidiaries and assets are primarily aimed at raising cash 
to pay down debt and fund restructuring and/or refocus to core business. In 
contrast, asset investments uch as capital expenditure are targeted at efficiency 
and productivity improvements whilst acquisitions are aimed at moving away from 
existing unprofitable markets into profitable or growth markets. In terms of 
financial restructuring, dividend cuts/omissions are commonly triggered by 
liquidity constraints or restrictions imposed on flie firm by debt covenants. Wicre 
cash generated via asset divestment and cash conserved via dividend 
cuts/omissions are insufficient to cover restructuring costs or debt servicing, firms 
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may have to resort to equity issues to raise the requisite funds. Frequently, 
successful fund raising via equity issues and divestments are a precondition for 
creditors' agreement to restructure their lending. Debt restructuring is normally a 
final resort for troubled firms and is aimed at alleviating financial distress through 
recontracting hard claims into soft claims and improving the level of working 
capital. Hard claims are binding contracts with fixed payment obligations e. g. term 
loans and payment of interests, whilst soft claims are non-binding contracts 
without any financial commitment to make payments eg. payment of dividends. 
This chapter also highlights that the various turnaround strategies are not 
necessarily sequential but often are taken simultaneously. In addition, not all 
strategies are relevant to all the different levels of financial decline. Poor 
performance firms may require relatively fewer restructuring strategies than 
distressed firms. Whilst it may be sufficient to restructure the operations of poor 
perfonnance firms, drastic asset and financial restructuring may be necessary to 
turnaround distressed firms. There may also be interactions between the various 
strategies. For instance, lenders often insist on successful cash generative actions 
such as divestments and rights issues as a key condition of restructuring their 
debt. 
In the next chapter, we review the literature on what determines managers' 
restructuring strategy choice in the wake of perfonnance decline. 
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Chapter 4. DETERMINANTS OF RESTRUCTURING STRATEGY 
CHOICE: 
- 
THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4.1 Introduction 
Although the literature prescribes a range of corporate restructuring 
strategies for firms facing performance decline, few studies to date have explored 
comprehensively and empirically the determinants of corporate restructuring 
strategy choice. 
This chapter docwnents a comprehensive literature review, airned at finding 
out what could possibly influence managers' choice of restructuring strategies. 
From distilling and synthesising extant studies, a comprehensive detcnninants 
framework is adopted for t1lis researcb. This framework is capable of capturing the 
complex interplay of forces influencing restructuring strategy choice. It seeks to 
enable firms suffering from performance decline to design feasible restructuring 
programmes to achieve turnaround. This framework is illustrated in Figure 4.1 and 
a summary of the literature review is included in Appendix 4.1. In this 
comprehensive framework, managers' restructuring strategy choice is conditional 
upon firm-specific agency monitoring mechanisms and other contextual factors. 
Stakeholders forming the firm-specific agency monitoring framework are lenders, 
managers, block shareholders and tile board of directors. Otlicr firm stakeholders 
such as employees, customers, suppliers, tax authorities and regulators are not 
included as their role in firm monitoring is minimal and not easily amenable to 
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empirical examination. Contextual factors impacting on strategy choice are causes 
of decline, severity of decline, firm size, industry and economic condition during 
the turnaround period. 
Figure 4.1: Agency monitoring and contextual factors influencing recovery 
strategies 
4.2 Agency monitoring mechanisms 
The choice of turnaround strategies is contingent upon a number of factors. 
Since different strategies may have different, and often conflicting, welfare 
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implications for managers, shareholders and lenders, the choice of any strategy can 
only be made as a trade off among these contending stakeholders. The restraints 
on any single stakeholder group such as managers maximising their own self- 
interest to the detriment of other stakeholders is a function of the governance 
structure and the mechanics of agency monitoring in a firm (Gilson, 1990). Thus, 
an understanding of the nature and sources of these restraints is necessary to make 
the appropriate tumaround strategy choices. 
The restraints on managerial choice of turnaround strategies may be 
examined widiin the context of the agency conflicts among shareholders, managers 
and lenders. The motivations of these players also provide the impetus to the 
pursuit of tumaround strategies so that finn value is enhanced and its ability to 
meet its financial commitmentsiS Testored. 
While both lenders and shareholders have a common interest in restoring 
firm viability and its ability to preserve their investment in the finn, in the 
turnaround process either group may gain at the expense of the other. Shareholders 
may benefit from a transfer of wealth from creditors when managers undertake 
risky investments (Myers, 1977). Likewise, lenders may benef it from a wealth 
transfer from shareholders when managers ell assets to pay off debts (Lang et al, 
1995). Shareholders suffer from a loss of wealth when the option value" attached 
to assets is extinguished when the assets are sold. Similarly, managers may pursue 
tumaround strategies which least hann them while the burden of tumaround is 
"Option value refers to the potential value increase if assets old were retained by the firm. 
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bome by shareholders or lenders or both. Managers' pursuit of self-serving 
objectives may manifest itself in their choice of strategy. However, managerial 
discretion in choice of strategy may be tempered by the agency control mechanism 
in place in the firm. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the turnaround options broadly available to 
declining firms include operational, asset, managerial and financial. Not all of 
these actions will appeal equally to shareholders, managers and lenders since they 
demand different degrees of sacrifice from these stakeholders during the 
turnaround process. 
Managerial restructuring, e. g. replacement of the top managcrs, is obviously 
unlikely to be favoured by managers and where tile governance structure is weak 
and the management is entrenched such replacement may not happen. Similarly, 
where financial restructuring involves additional borrowing or dilution of the 
covenants protecting existing lenders they are likely to resist such debt 
restructuring. On the other hand, turnaround based oil fresh infusion of equity is 
likely to be preferred by lenders but frowned upon by sharcholders. Dividend cuts 
may be loathed by shareholders but supported by lenders. 
Asset restructuring in the forra of divestments may be favoured by 
shareholders provided the divestment proceeds are not used to pay down debt. 
Lenders may support divestment provided their debt is paid off. New investments 
of a high risk nature financed by new debt or existing cash resources of the firin 
may be preferred by shareholders but not necessarily by lenders. 
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4.2.1 Impact of lender monitoring on managerial choice 
In the agency model of die firm posited by Jensen (1989) a highly leveraged 
firm will react faster to performance decline than less leveraged ones due to a 
desire to avoid breaching or to resolve an existing breach in, debt covenants. This 
early response preserves the going-concem value of highly leveraged firms as 
compared to less-leveraged firms. 
Ofek (1993) examines the role of lender monitoring within the agency 
paradigm in influencing the cboice of restructuring strategies of poorly performing 
companies in the USA. He finds that high gearing significantly increases the 
probability of financial and operational restructuring. Gilson, John and Lang 
(1990) find no relation between gearing and financial restructuring". 
High leverage is also found by Storey ct al. (1987) to be more positively 
associated with equity rights issues (i. e. financial restructuring) in failing firms 
than in non-failing firms. They attribute this to the monitoring pressure from bank 
creditors who arc only willing to continue financial support conditional upon 
shareholders haring a part of tile burden of turnaround. 
4.2.1.1 Debt characteristics and their impact 
Impact of debt on managerial choice of turnaround strategies may depend 
on the characteristics of debt such as ownership, maturity structure and sccurity 
"A potential explanation for this inconsistency lies in the difference in length of distress 
examined in the two studies. Ofek (1993) studies the short term restructuring actions in the year 
of performance decline whereas Gilson et al. (1990) examine firm actions following three years 
of low performance. 
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available". Debt ownership by informed bank creditors is likely to promote more 
efficient monitoring than by other types of debt bolders. This increased efficiency 
arises from the banks' close relations with firms and their access to private 
information, a right established by loan covenants or through ongoing bank 
relationship. 
Bank lenders 
Banks'reputational capital providcs thcm with flic cconomic inccntivcs to 
monitor firm actions. Hirschey et al. (1990) find that tile higher tile proportion of 
bank debt in total debt the higher is the positive return on announcement of a sell- 
off to the divestor shareholders. This superior valuation is attributed to the more 
effective and credible monitoring by banks with a large stake. 
James (1987) argues that banks provide some special services not available 
from oflier lenders. He finds evidence of a larger positive stock price reaction to 
new bank credit agreements than to announcement of private placements or public 
straight debt offerings. In Gilson's (1989) study bank lenders frequently initiate 
senior management changes in distressed firms. 
Short term lenders 
Maturity structure of debt is likely to influence the borrower finn's 
"Publicly traded debt which is prevalent in the US is restricted to large firms in the UK. 
Also, as information on UK public debt is scarce, the impact of public debt monitoring on strategy 
choice is not examined in this study. 
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restructuring decisions since the greater the proportion of short term debt the 
greater is the likely level of monitoring. The credit renewal process associated 
with short term debt subjects firm managers to more frequent monitoring than long 
term debt and increases the bargaining power of lenders over managerial decisions 
such as liquidation (Diamond, 1993, Rajan, 1992 and Gertner and Scharfstein, 
1991) and the use of proceeds from asset sales (Brown et al, 1994). Empirically, 
Ofek (1993) finds that short term leverage increases the probability of operational 
and managerial restructuring strategies in poorly performing firms. 
Securedlenders 
In addition to debt ownership and maturity structure, the security for the 
debt may also impact on the restructuring decision. A high proportion of 
unsecured debt is likely to be associated with more effective monitoring because 
of the unprotected nature of this debt. Lack of security may induce more intense 
monitoring by unsecured lenders. 
Leverage may have a positive and significant relation with the incidence of 
all four generic turnaround strategies. The primary motivation is debt repayment. 
Lenders are expected to favour asset sales proceeds to be applied to dcbt 
repayment rather than retained by the firm. (Slatter, 1984; Lang et a], 1995). They 
are also likely to favour cut/omission of dividends and reduction in acquisitions 
to conserve cash, and/or equity issues to increase liquidity (Storey ct al, 1987). 
Lenders may expect extensive asset sales, operational cost cutting and 
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management changes as a prerequisite for debt restructuring. Debt restructuring 
may be the last resort after exhausting other forms of restructuring. 
4.2.2 Impact of ownership structure on managerial choice 
The share ownership structure in a declining firm may provide an agency 
mechanism for controlling managerial discretion in the choice of turnaround 
strategy. Block sbareholders may provide effective oversight leading to value 
maximising behaviour on the part of managcrs (Sclileifer and Visliny, 1986). 
Where managers hold significant shares, their interests may be aligned to those of 
shareholders in general. The role of block shareholders as agency monitors has 
been studied by many researchers. 
4.2.2.1 Managerial shareholding 
Agency theory suggests that when corporate managers are also 
shareholders, their interests are aligned %rith those of shareholder interests (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Managers, their fortune bonded to that of shareholders and 
forced to bear the wealth consequence of their sup-optimal actions, have greater 
economic incentives to enhance sharcholder value. 
Conversely, managerial entrenchment bypothesis (Jensen, 1986; Schleifer 
& Vishny, 1989; and Stulz, 1990) suggests that managers with substantial 
shareholding in a distressed firm would refrain from taking certain actions that 
wouldjeopardise their interests. An obvious action that they would not take is to 
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sack themselves. Consistent with this argument, both Ofek (1993) and Weisbach 
(1988) find a negative relation between managerial shareholding and top 
management changes. Ofek (1993) also finds managerial shareholding to be 
negatively associated with operational restructuring actions, lending further 
support to the entrenchment hypothesis. 
The signalling hypothesis'9. positing strong negative effects on sharcholdcr 
wealth of dividend reductions and equity issues, suggests that managers of poor 
performance firms would refrain from cutting/omitting dividends (see DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo, 1990) or making an equity issue (see Schippcr and Smith, 1986) 
unless absolutely necessary. Furdiermore, if managers are also sliarclioldcrs, there 
would be even greater disincentive for them to adopt equity-based financial 
strategies, as managers themselves as shareholders would have to stutnp up more 
money to keep the firm afloat. Rational sharebolders would rathcr prcfcr lenders 
to bail out the troubled firm, as lenders with their higher priority claims are ahead 
of shareholders in reaping any rewards flowing from a cash injection. 
4.2.2.2 Non-managerial block shareholding 
Large sbareholders provide an efficient mechanism for resolving the agency 
conflict which arises in a finn owned by atomistic shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Demsetz and Lelin (1985) argue that as the size of large 
11 Due to information imbalance between management possessing superior information 
and outside investors with inferior information, a decrease in dividends may be interpreted as 
signalling management's negative assessment of the firm's current performance and future 
prospects (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). 
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shareholding increases, monitoring effectiveness also increases. Hill and Snell 
(1989) suggest that blockholders possess both the incentive and voting power to 
limit managerial discretion and thus align managers' interests with those of the 
shareholders. Large shareholders have both the cost-effectiveness incentive and 
'risk of financial loss' incentives to monitor as they stand to lose substantially 
from any value-destroying actions taken by management (Demsetz and Lehri, 
1985)" 
. 
Concentration of ownership with a few blocklioldcrs e. g. institutional 
investors, also facilitates the coordination of efforts in monitoring management 
performance". Also, Schleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that potential takeovers 
facilitated by large blockholders act as an effective device for monitoring 
management actions. 
For the US, Hill and Snell (1989) find a positive rclation bctwcen large 
shareholding and finn productivity. Tile positive valuation impact of large share 
acquisitions has been evidenced in a number of studies. Barclay and Holderricss 
(1991), Mikkelson and Ruback (1985), Holderness and Sliccliati (1985) and Choi 
11 For a small shareholder to monitor management actions in diffusely held firms, he/she 
will have to bear the entire cost of monitoring whilst the economic benefits are shared by all 
shareholders. To mitigate this'free ridee problem, share holding must be large enough to ensure 
that the benefits derived from monitoring are commensurate with the costs involved. This implies 
that monitoring is only cost-effective for large shareholders uch as institutional and other 
blockholders. 
21 The City (institutional investors) are also frequently accused of passive and short- 
termist behaviour. They are thought to be more interested in short term dividends and stock 
dumping (sell-out on a takeover bid) than in taking an active role in the long term future of the 
firm. However, recent active debate on governance issues and some high profile interventions in 
corporate policy decisions by institutions in both the US and UK signal a new trend in institutional 
activism. 
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(1991) report, for the US, that block acquisitions in excess of 5% generate 
significant wealth gains for target shareholders. For the UK, Sudarsanam (1996) 
reports similar results. 
Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) report that block share ownership is 
positively associated with corporate restructuring. In tile UK, Sudarsanam (1995b) 
finds substantial asset financial and managerial restructuring following largc block 
acquisitions and value increases attendant upon such acquisitions are maintained 
or enbanced over the following three years. However, Ofek (1993) finds a negative 
relation between block shareholding and restructuring actions. Oil further analysis, 
he fmds only a significant negative relation between institutional investors and the 
probability of operational and managerial restructuring. lie suggests the results are 
consistent widi Pound's (1988) finding that institutional investors tend to support 
top management in proxy contests. 
Block shareholders may be insfitutional or non-institutional, and associated 
with incumbcnt managcmcnt or indcpendent of it. Agcncy monitoring 
effectiveness varies across these different block shareholder categories. 
Institutional shareholding 
Agency theory suggests that institutional blockbolders' expertise allows 
them to monitor management actions at a lower cost than atoinistic shareholders 
could. Consistent with this argument, McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a 
significant positive relation between Tobin's q and the level of institutional 
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holding. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) provide evidence of a positive relation 
between institutional ownership and stockholder wealth effects of various types 
of antitakeover amendments in target companies. Jarrel and Poulsen (1987) show 
that firms that adopt the most value-reducing forms of antitakeover charter 
amendments also have lower institutional shareholding than do other firms. 
Brickley et al. (1988) find evidence that institutional investors who do not have 
business dealings with corporate management are more likely to vote against 
antitakeover amendments. All these US-based results are consistent with the 
reduction of agency costs due to large shareholders monitoring". However, Ofck 
(1993) finds a negative relation between institutional sharcholding and 
restructuring actions. As discussed earlier, Ofek claims hisTesults to be consistent 
with Pound's (1988) finding that institutional invcstors, tcnd to support top 
management in proxy contests. 
Associated and unassociated non-institutional blockholders 
Shivdasani (1993) empbasises tile need to differentiate associated 
blockholders from those non-associated. Shareholders associated with incumbent 
management, e. g. family trusts or company pension funds arc less likely to provide 
effective monitoring of managers than unassociatcd sharcholders. Shivdasani 
22 Pound (1988) provides counterarguments for a less cffectivc monitoring role for 
institutional and large shareholders due to their being passive investors or having other business 
dealings with the company which lead to a conflict of interest detracting from effective 
monitoring. Mallette and Fowler (1992) also report that high levels of institutional shareholdings 
are more positively associated with the adoption of antitakeover poison pills than lower levels of 
institutional shareholding. 
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(1993) finds evidence that unassociated shareholders increase the probability of 
hostile takeovers. Similarly, Ofek (1993) finds different shareholder types to have 
different impact on restructuring actions. Hence, thcre is a need to separate non- 
managerial block shareholding into institutional, non-institutional unassociated 
and associated block shareholding. 
Past event studies suggest shareholders frown upon certain strategies that 
are painful to themselves such as dividend cut/omission (Asquith and Mullins, 
1986; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1990), equity/rights issue (e. g. Schippcr and 
Sn-fldi, 1986) and asset sales where proceeds are utilised to pay down dcbts (Lang 
et. al. 1995). In all these studies shareholders rcact negatively to the respective 
event announcements. Equity holders' dislike for equity issucs is understandable 
as it amounts to 'dirowing good money afler bad'moncy. Indeed, UK investors arc 
claimed to be risk-averse and have rarely been willing to subscribe to new capital 
in distressed firms (Kent, 1994). Equity owners seem no more hiterestcd irt 
dividend cuts or omissions than in equity issues. According to the dividend 
clientele hypothesis' and the infonnation-content or signalling hypotlicsis" 
management would cut dividend only as a last resort. The evidence broadly 
suggests that equity investors dislike dividend reductions and equity issues, and 
23 Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Black and Scholes (1974) contend that investors 
may, for institutional or tax reasons, prefer dividends to capital gain. 
"See Modigliani and Miller (1964). The signalling hypothesis predicts that dividend 
changes convey information about cash flows i. e. a dividend increase (decrease) conveys 
favourable (unfavourable) information about the current and/or future cash flows of the firm. 
Empirical evidence in support of the information content hypothesis is found, amongst others, by 
Healy and Palepu (1988), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Kalay and Lowenstein (1985). 
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would prefer fmns to resort to other sources to raise cash such as asset re uction 
and reduced consumption of cash via operational restructuring. 
4.2.3 Impact of corporate governance structure on managerial choice 
Corporate governance structure as a monitoring mechanism to reduce the 
agency problem between shareholders and managers has recently received much 
attention. The UK Cadbury Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance defines corporate governance structure as the checks and balances 
within the structure of the company, especially at the board level, which assist 
directors in fulfilling their duty to act in the interests of the company and guard 
against undue concentration of power among top managcrs. Composition of the 
board of directors is an important part of this structurc and may cnhancc the 
policing effectiveness of the governance structure. Board composition is thmforc 
likely to impact significantly on the choice of tumaround strategies. 
The Cadbury Code suggests astrong board to be one where there is division 
of power at the top so that no one person has utifettcrcd power of decision inakitig. 
However, boards of directors differ in a number of ways: the leadership of the 
board by an executive or non-executive chairman and the scparition of the roles 
of the chairman of the board and the CEO, and tile relative importance of 
executive versus non-executive directors. Strong or weak governance structures 
in turn may lead to managerial entrenchment or incentivc-alignmcnt i.e. managers' 
incentives are aligned to those of shareholders. 
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Dual CEO and non-executive Chairman 
Where one person combines the roles of board chairman and CEO his or 
her powers are considerable. This duality of roles can promote focused objectives 
and a clear line of command. On tile other hand, duality may strengthen 
management entrenchment reduce the oversight function of the board and weaken 
the governance structure. The Cadbury Code suggests that a strong governance 
structure exists when the roles of Chainnan and CEO are separatcd whereby no 
one person has unfettered powers of decision. In other words, a combined 
Chairman and CEO structure is seen to leads to managcrial vitrenchinctit. 
Mallette and Fowler (1992) find support for the entrenchment hypotlicsis 
in their empirical study widi duality increasing the probability that poison pills arc 
adopted whereas separation diminishes the probability. Ilowcvcr, Rcchncr and 
Dalton (1989,1991) find no significant diffcrcnce in f inn perfonnance bctwccil 
dual and non-dual finns. 
Non-executive Chairman 
If the Chairman and CEO positions are indccd separated, can we rulc out 
managerial entrenchment? Tile answer to that question depends oil wlictlicr the 
Chairman is in an executive or non-executive capacity. In the case of ail non- 
executive Chairman, we can argue that although there is division of power at the 
corporate head, monitoring from the 'outside' by a part-time uninformed 
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Chairman may lead the CEO to wield substantial executive control over the firm. 
Such a weak board structure is expected to lead potentially to CEO cntrcnclimcnt 
and its accompanying malaise ie. managers pursuing self-serving interests. 
However, the Cadbury Code does not cover die nature of the Chairman's position. 
Proportion of outside directors 
According to Fama and Jenscn (1983), the separation of decision 
management and decision control" in the dccision making process can allcviate 
the agency problem. While inside directors are responsible for decision 
management, decision control should be left with outside directors. Outside 
directors have an incentive to monitor management actions since they have staked 
their reputation as professional corporate referees. Consequently, the highcr the 
proportion of non-executive to executive directors, the morc effective would be 
the board monitoring of management. Indeed, the Cadbury Code cniphasiscs the 
importance of non-executives carrying a significant w6glit in the board's dccision. 
It follows that the higher the proportion of outside or tioti-cxccutive directors in 
a firm's board the stronger would be the firm's governance structurc. 
EmPirically, Weisbach (1988) finds that CEO tumovcr is highly corrclatcd 
with the proportion of outside directors to inside directors. The monitoring 
function of outside directors is also supported by Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), 
25Decision management refers to initiation and implementation of decisions whilst decision 
control refers to ratification and monitoring of those management decisions. 
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who find positive share price reactions to the appointment of outside directors. 
Further, Boeker and Goodstein (1993) report that strong insider presence 
significantly influences, favourably, CEO replacement decisions. The recent tussle 
at the UK publishing conglomerate Emap between executive and non-executive 
directors best exemplifies the importance of the non-executive directors' role 
(Financial Times, November, 1996). In this case the non-executive directors 
disagree with odier Emap directors on introducing a 75% rule which pennits 75% 
of Emap's directors to remove a director from the board. 
However, Mallette and Fowler (1992) observe empirically that the 
proportion of outside directors has no bearing oil tile adoptim of poison pills. 
Poison pills are antitakeover meclianisms erected by managenictit for the purpose 
of inflicting financial pain on bidders making a takeover bid for the f inn (see 
Sudarsanam, 1995a, Chapter 12). Poison pills therefore act as a shield against 
hostile takeovers leading to enhancement of managerial cntrcnchment. Hostile 
takeovers are generally considered to be a good thing for the target finn. The thrcat 
of hostile takeovers and the potential loss of corporate control ovcr the finn have 
the effect of putting incumbent target management 'on their tocs'. Ilowcvcr, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1992) and Shivdasani (1993) are unabic to doctuncift any 
systematic relation between outside directors, firm perfonnancc and the 
probability of hostile takeovers. 
There are impediments to effective monitoring by non-cxecutive directors. 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) cite information asymmetry whereby outside 
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directors do not possess all the information that executive directors have. 
Moreover, the insiders may have packed the board with outside directors who are 
beholden to them in some way and flierefore subservient. 
In the context of declining firms, flieir performance decline may have becri 
caused by managerial entrenchment, and weak governance structure may have 
contibuted to this entrenchment. Tumaround may, therefore, demand managerial 
restructuring with the top management being replaced. Alictlier such managerial 
restructuring can be carried out depends upon the independence and strength of 
the board and the power of block shareholders and lenders. 
4.2.4 Summary of agency monitoring mechanisms and their Impact on 
corporate restructuring 
Agency-control mechanisms, in general, contribute to cfficicnt monitoring 
of managerial actions (eg Ofek, 1993; Gilson, 1989; Lang et. al., 1995). Table 4.1 
surnmarises the foregoing literature review on agency motivation-stratcgy choicc 
behaviour and highligbts the incentives to monitor and the empirical findings on 
the impact of agency monitors on corporate restructuring. 
Lender monitoring is motivated by the desire of lenders to reduce tlicir risk 
of losses and maintain their reputational capital as good lenders. Extant empirical 
evidence on its effectiveness is largely US-based except for Lasfer ct al. 's (1996) 
UK study of the role of lender monitoring and their impact on sharcholder wealth 
of divestment announcements by samples of financially healthy arid distressed 
firms. 
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The role of short term lenders is examined by Ofek (1993) and their 
presence is found to be positively related to operational and managcrial 
restructuring. However, there is no similar study of UK firms. The role of 
unsecured lenders, who possess trong incentives to monitor managerial actions 
due to the unprotected nature of their lending, is yet unexplorcd. 
Manager-shareholders' incenfives, are aligned to those of other shareholders 
as they possess high stakes in their own finns. Ofek (1993) finds managerial 
shareholding to favour asset sales but, unsurprisingly, to disfavour rcinoving 
themselves. 
However, no UK-based decline-related study has cxatnincd this 
relafionship. Non-manager institufional block shareholders arc primarily motivated 
to monitor manager's actions by virtue of their desirc to protect tlicir invcstinciits 
and maintain control over flie firm. The evidence on institutional sharcholdcrs role 
in corporate restructuring is mixed as Ofek (1993) finds flicin disfavouring 
restructuring whilst Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) find them favouring it. 
However, Ofek studies specifically poorly pcrfonning finns, and lictice his 
results are more relevant to this research. In tile case of non-institutional block 
shareholding no relation to restructuring strategies is found by Ofck. No study has 
separately examined the impact of associated and unassociatcd Ocnicnts of non- 
institutional block shareholding on restructuring strategy choice, in a turnaround 
context. As for the UK, no study lias examined the role of any of the shareholder 
types on restructuring strategy choice. 
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The role of board or governance structure on restructuring strategy choice 
has received little attention so far. When the Chairman is also the CEO, the 
governing board is practically controlled by tile dominant dual role CEO. 
Similarly, when the board is chaired by a part-time non-executive Chairman, 
monitoring of management actions from the 'inside' may be weak, leading to 
potential managerial entrenchment. This is in spite of the motivation to protect the 
non-executive Chainnan's reputational capital as a corporate rcfcrce. Ilowevcr, 
where the decision control function is adequately separated froin the decision 
management function, as evidenced by a high propoilion of outside directors in the 
board, reputational capital of these corporate referees is likely to promote intcilsivc 
monitoring and hence necessary restructuring in the wake of the firm's 
performance decline. 
4.3 Impact of agency control mechanisms on specific restructuring strategy 
choice 
In the choice of restructuring strategies, the influences rpractiting 
ownersMp, board composition and lenders may oflen be mutually reinforcing but 
at other times working at cross purposes. In other words, the monitoring roles of 
owners, governance and lenders may be complimentary, substitutory or 
contradictory. Lcndcrs and outsidc dircctors may complcmcnt cach othcr, say in 
forcing management changes in declining firms. flowevcr, high leverage and high 
lender influence for management change may substitute for the lack of pressure 
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from outside directors for the same action, where the proportion of outside 
directors in the board is low. An example of contradictory influence arises when 
lenders press for asset sales and rights issue to generate cash for the purpose of 
paying down debt. Lenders' preference, in this case, clearly contradicts owners' 
desire to avoid injecting fresh equity funds and their prcfcrcncc for lenders to 
increase or at least maintain their financial support. 
The primary focus of this study is the impact of three broad categories of 
agency monitoring meclianisms - owncrsilip, leverage and board composition - on CO- 
the tumaround strategies of poorly perfonning finns. We examine the individual 
as well as the combined effects of the three mechanisms. Exploring thc combined 
effects resulting from the complex ex ante interactions among the agency 
mechanisms requires a suitable empirical formulation. In this rcspect, wc introduce 
the practical concept of stakebolder dominance to test for complex interactions, 
and argue that the impact on strategy choice rests, ultimatcly, on the relative 
bargaining powers of the different stakeholder groups. 
In the following sections, we shall adopt a top down approach to cxploring 
the impact of agency variables on restructuring strategy choice. First, we introduce 
the concept of stakeholder dominance and explore the intcractive cfTccts on 
strategy choice when the finns' decision inaking process is dominatcd by a single 
stakeholder. Next, we explore the combined impact of lenders, ownership and 
governance variables on specific strategy choice. 
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4.3.1 Effects of stakeholder dominance on specific strategy choice 
Our discussion earlier has ignored tile relative bargaining powers of the 
different stakeholder groups in declining firms when strategy choices are made. 
The choice of a strategy is likely to be decided by the relative strength and 
dominance of these stakeholders. 
Dominance in the decision-making process by the various stakcholdcr 
groups is discussed below and surnmarised in Table 4.2. We develop thc concept 
of stakeholder dominance to take into account the complex interactions bctwcen 
the various stakeholders or agency monitors indicated above. Five types of 
stakeholder dominance are examined- lender, manager-owncr, blockholdcr, dual 
CEO and collective board dominance. Since this conceptual innovation is derived 
from the literature reviewed earlier, file related enipirical cvidcncc is not rc-quoted 
here. 
Specific strategies are classified, as flu as practicable, into cash gmerativc, 
cash depleting or cash preserving strategies. Divestment and cquity issucs arc 
clearly cash generative actions. Debt restructuring often involves soinc Ocnictit of 
new working capital which qualifies this strategy for discussion purposcs as cash 
generative. Oflier strategies are therefore non-cash generative, cxccpt for dividend 
cut/omission wbich is cash preserving. 
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Lender dominance 
Where a firm is highly leveraged and has suffered a severe decline, 
lendere' are deemed dominant in influencing the firm's policy decision making 
machinery. In the history of the 1986 Insolvency Act, no listed firms put into 
administration"' or receivership has emerged intact without dramatic change in 
ownership and/or business structure (Financial Times, 3/10/1993). 
In the majority of cases, insolvent firms are either sold as going-conccrns 
or piecemeal. Recent work by Jensen (1989 a, b) suggests that leverage is an 
important determinant of how decision rights are allocated among clainiholders. 
Therefore, when a firm is severely distressed, with equity sharcholdcrs occupying 
a very low position in the repayment queue, lenders have the ultimate say and 
influence on thefITM'S Testructuring choice. 
Lenders would generally prefer sliort-tcnn cash generative strategies to 
facilitate debt repayment. They would prefer cash to be gcncratcd by the firm via 
equity issues and asset divestments to facilitate repayment rather than acccpt a 
deferment of repayment through debt restructuring. However, since highly 
leveraged finns, by construct, are bound to need more dcbt rcstructuring than 
lowly leveraged ones, lenders may, indirectly, have a positive relationship with 
, In the UK, secured creditors are frequently blamed for pulling the plug on firms too soon. 
The appointment of a receiver by secured lenders, or an administrative receivcr when a floating 
charge is held, effectively 'terminates' the distressed firm, as few firms cmcrge intact without 
dramatic change in ownership and/or business structure from the exercise (Financial Times, 
March 10,1993). 
"With the exception of Chancery, the small financial scrviccs company which was 
successfully reconstructed in 1991. 
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debt restructuring. 
Also, lenders may frequently insist on removal of top managers and freeze 
on investments as a condition for continuing financial support. Removal of top 
managers poses a serious conflict with managers' interest, but if the firm's 
financial position is dire, managers have little power to avoid displacement even 
if they hold a high equity share holding. 
Asset sales may pose a conflict of interest with block sliarelioldcrs as they 
deem the sale of assets to extinguish the option value attached to assets sold (sce 
Section 4.2). However, lenders' conflict with blockholdcrs intcnsirics ovcr the 
question of equity issues. 
Blockholders would only be willing to risk 'good money' in pursuit of 
recovery if lenders are shouldering a part of tile financial burden by restructuring 
their claim. However, in the final analysis, lender dominance prcvails as their 
continued support is key to tile survival of the finn. Managment may thmforc 
be forced to implement cash generative actions such as asset sales and equity 
issues and refrain from cash consuming asset investment strategies. 
Manager-owner dominance 
If the firm's decision making process is not dominated by lendcrs, and 
managerial and manager-associated shareholdings are high, nianagcr-owners arc 
deemed to be entrenched and possess dominant influence. In the circumstance, 
entrenched managers are expected, in the least, to refrain from adopting 
110 
managerial restructuring strategies. Due to shareholders' dislike of equity issues 
(see e. g. Schipper and Smith, 1986) dominant managers, with their significant 
equity shareholding, would most likely avoid making such issues. Equally, they 
may resist dividend cutslomissions which reduce their effective total income. The 
literature (e. g. Meeks and Whittington, 1975; Conyon and Clegg, 1994) suggests 
that entrenched managers favour large size as power and compensation arc related 
to size. Consequently, dominant managers may refrain from downsizing their 
operations through operational restructuring or asset divcstinclit and prefer 
increasing investment through acquisitions or capital expenditure. In other words, 
manager-owners are expected to disfavour cash generative asset sales and equity 
issues. 
Likewise, dominant managers are likely to disfavour the 'final resort' 
strategy 
- 
debt restructuring 
- 
which is adopted only when all cfforts to pay off (or 
buy out) creditors fail. In a debt restructuring exercise, lenders frequently insist oil 
dealing with a credible management leading frequently to installation of a new 
management team (Gilson, 1989). 
Blockholder dominance 
Where neither lenders nor managcr-owncrs are dominant, and unassociatcd 
blockholding is high, blockholders may dominate the finn's dccision making 
process. Operational restructuring which is the least controversial of all strategies 
is expected to be favoured by dominant blocklioldcrs. Extant litcraturc (e. g. 
III 
Schipper and Smith, 1986; Asquith and Mullins, 1986) indicating sharcholders' 
disRe for equity-based strategies uch as dividend cut and omission, and equity 
issue, would mean that they are shunned by dominant blockholders. As discussed 
above, shareholders also may shun asset sales as they extinguish the option value 
attached to those assets. Following from dominant shareholders' dislike of cash 
generative actions (equity issues and asset sales), we can expect them to disfavour 
investments which necessitate such cash generative actions. 
Dominant blockholders are expected to favour debt restructuring as lenders 
frequently provide additional working capital, forgive loans or intcrcsts or make 
other concessions, though reluctantly, in the hope of realising higher debt 
repayment when the firm is eventually turned around. Similarly, dominant 
blockholders who possess ignificant influence over manageinctit, are cxpcctcd to 
initiate top management replacement. 
in summary, blockholdcr dominance is expected to be positively nssociatcd 
with operational, managerial and debt restructuring but negatively associated with 
all other strategies. 
Dual CEO and collective board dominance 
When the finn is not lender, manager-owncr or blockholdcr dominated, 
corporate control is expected to lie with the board of dircctors. I lowcvcr, whcrc 
the board is chaired by a dual CEO, the dual CEO is expected to dominate the 
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board and hence the firm's decision making process". CEO board dominance is 
expected to favour strategies akin to manager-owner dominance firms i. e. shun 
managerial restructuring, prefer investments, and avoid operational restructuring 
and cash generative actions. 
When the firm is not lender, manager-owner, blockholdcr or CEO 
dominated, corporate control is expected to lie 'collectively' with the board of 
directors. Since the collective interests of all stakeholders are in the aversion of a 
crisis and recovery, collective board dominance is expected to be positively 
associated with all restructuring strategies. 
4.3.2 Combined impact of stakeholders on specific strategy choice. 
Having discussed flie, dominant effects on managerial strategy choice when 
a stakeholder dominates the firm's decision making process, wc extend the 
arguments made above to explore the combined impact of stakcholdcrs - Icildcrs, 
ownership and governance, on strategy choice. Again, based on syntlicsising the 
extant theory and the conceptual arguments made earlier in section 4.2 and 4.3.1, 
Table 4.3 presents the predicted individual impact of lenders, ownership and 
govemance mechanisms on specific strategy choice. The similarity between Tables 
4.2 and 4.3 is to be expected since stakeholders uch as lenders, managers and 
blockholders impose the same demands on declining firms regardless of wlictlicr 
they are in a dominant position or not. 
"Although a non-executive Chairmen structure may lead to potentially weak governance 
and CEO entrenchment (see Section 4.2.3), we do not consider the CEO is entrenched enough, 
in this structure, as to dominate the firm's decision- making process. 
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Table 4.3: Impact of lenders, ownership and governance on restructuring 
strategy choice 
The table shows the predicted impact of lenders, ownership and governance 
variables on restructuring strategy choice. For definitions of strategies, refer to Sections 
3.2 to 3.5. Inside shareholding refer to manager and manager-associatcd ownership, and 
outside shareholding refers to all blockholding unassociated with management. Cash 
generative strategy comprises divestment and equity issue. The signs +, 
-, 
0 dcnote 
favoured, resisted and neutral respectively. 
Specific strategies 
Lender 
Inside 
shareholders, 
Chairman cum 
CEO and 
Non-executive 
Chairman I 
Outside 
shareholdcrs 
I 
Outside 
directors 
Predicted impact 
Operational + + 
Asset: 
Divestment + + 
Investment + + 
Managerial + + + 
Financial: 
Dividend 
cut/omission + + 
Equity issue + + 
Debt restructuring + + 
Cash generative + + 
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Therdorc, Icndcrs arc cxpcctcd to prcfcr cash gencrating stratcgics such as 
divestments and equity issues and resist investments, both capital expenditure and 
acquisitions. This behaviour, and the theory and conceptual arguments in its 
support; are similar to those when lenders become die firm's dominant stakeholder 
(see Lender dominance in Section 4.3.1). 
Earlier, we considered high inside shareholders, comprising manager and 
manager-associated ownership, and dual-CEOs (Chairman cuni CEO) to lead to 
managetial entrenchment and dominance (when the finn is not lendcr-dominated, 
see Section 4.3.1). 
Likewise, inside shareholders and dual-CEO arc expected to prcfer asset 
investment and resist any other restructuring strategics. As discussed in scction 
4.2.3, a non-executive Chairman structure can lead to CEOs wicldhig cxccssive 
executive control over the firm., and that such a weak govcniancc structure is 
expected to lead potentially to CEO entrenchment and its accompanying malaise. 
Therefore, we expect non-executive Cliaimcn, to exiiibit behaviour similar 
to that of entrenched managers i. e. prefer asset itivcstment and rcsist any other 
restructuring strategies. 
Similarly, we expect unassociated blockholders to display prefcrcnces akin 
to the situation whereby blockholders dominate the finn's decision inakirig 
process. They are, therefore, expected to favour operational, managerial and dcbt 
restructuring but resist all other strategies. 
Finally, outside directors are expected to act in the collective interests of 
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all stakeholders. As such, they are expected to favour all restructuring strategies 
instrumental to recovery from performance decline. 
No study to date has examined the relationships between agency monitors' 
motivations and restructuring strategy choice in a comprehensive manner. 
Although Ofek (1993) finds that different agency variables are associated with 
different restructuring strategies, his approach lacks a robust theoretical 
underpinning. More importantly, Ofek does not examine the relative dominance 
of stakeholders in shaping restructuring strategy clioices. lie also does not examine 
the impact of governance variables and control for the impact of external 
environmental factors. This research attempts to fill thc empirical gap by cxploring 
the impact of a comprehensive range of agency monitoring mechanisms on 
specific strategy choice and controlling for other intmal and external factors. 
4.4 Contextual factors 
The empirical literature (e. g. Schendel et. al, 1976; Robbins and Pearce 11, 
1992,1993) suggests that tumaround strategy choices are also dictatcd by many 
non-agency monitoring factors. These additional variables - causes of dcclinc, 
severity of decline, firm size, industry and economic condition arc includcd as 
control vaxiables in this research. 
4.4.1 Causes of performance decline 
Schendel et al, (1976) suggest turnaround response to be dependent on the 
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cause of perfonnance decline. They argue that if the cause of decline is ineffective 
strategy or inefficient implementation of strategy, the turnaround strategy should 
an ropriately be strategic change (long term asset restructuring) or improveincrit UP 
in strategy implementation (managerial and operational restructuring). Hambrick 
and Schecter (1983) empirically find internal or efficiency causes to require 
operating turnarounds while strategic problems require asset/stratcgic turnaround 
measures. Also, Robbins and Pearce 11 (1992) find that firms citing internal factors 
as the primary cause of performance decline are more likely to rctrctich (cost 
reduction and asset reduction) than those that attribute cxtcmal factors to 
perfonnance decline. Examples of internal causes of pcrforniaticc decline are poor 
financial controls and bad investments such as failed new product launches or 
acquisitions. Economic recession, unfavourable cxchatige or ititercst ratcs and 
international. competition are some examples of cxternal causcs of pcrforniance 
decline cited by management (John, Lang and Netter, 1992). 
4.4.2 Severity of decline 
Hofer (1980) introduces the notion that the sevcrity of the turnaround 
situation in terms of how close the troubled firin, is to financial insolvcticy affccts 
its response to perfonnance decline. Wien a finn experiences evere decline, cash 
generation strategies e. g. asset reduction and equity issues, supportcd by tight 
financial control take first priority (Slatter, 1984). They generate grcater and 
quicker cash inflows than cost reduction and revenue generation stratcgics. Asset 
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investment in Us context is feasible only after the 'survival' of the firm is assured. 
In contrast, firms with less severe decline have the flexibility of growing out of 
performance decline via asset investment. Finns in severe distress, as measured 
by below sample mean Z-score, are found, empirically, to require asset reductions 
in additions to cost reduction strategies to achieve turnarounds (Robbins and 
Pearce 11,1992). 
4.4.3 Firm size 
Firm size is suggested as affecting firm choice of rcstructuring actions 
(Ofek, 1993). For example, small firms tend to be less diversified than largc finns 
and therefore have fewer opportunities to raise cash via scIling asscts. Comparcd 
to single product/market finus, a highly diversiried rinn can also reconfigure its 
asset portfolio to recover from perfonnance decline. Asset reduction e. g. 
divestment of subsidiaries is normally feasible only for the divcrsiricd finns. 
Empirically, Robbins and Pearce 11 (1992) find large firms pursuc'miftprcticurial 
retrenchment! or cost and asset reduction strategies inore readily than small finns. 
This finding is consistent with Schleifer and Visliny's (1992) contention that large 
firms with diversified asset portfolios have potentially greater assct liquidity than 
small firms. 
4.4.4 Industry condition 
The industry in which the finn operates affects the choice of strategies opcil 
118 
to it. Where a firm is perfonning poorly against a background of growth in its 
industry, the choice of say asset sales is more feasible and attractive than wlicn the 
firm's industry is at the bottom of its cyclc" (Sclileifer and Visliny, 1992). 
Attempting to start a turnaround during an industry downturn is very difficult 
(Slatter, 1984). There are two strategic options open to a finn attempting to 
recover from performance decline during an industry dovaituni 
- 
restructure and 
remain in the same industry or divest and enter a growth industry. Both measures 
require investments. To compete in flie same depressed industry, poor perfonning 
firms need to raise productivity and efficiency in order to improve margins and 
profits. This probably necessitates investment in new plants and machinery. 
Altematively, poor performing firms can sell out businesses facing industry 
downturns and buy into businesses in growth industries. 
4.4.5 Economic condition 
Similarly, the stage of the macro-cconomic ycle can also condition the 
availability and choice of restructuring strategies. For instancc, cconomic 
condition has a marked impact on the feasibility of cash generating actions. Asset 
sales, equity issues and even debt raising is a more feasible proposition in boom 
times than in recessionary periods. In the last recession, bank-crcdit squcczc and 
interest rates at 15%, virtually ruled out debt issue for most except the strongest 
companies. Simultaneously, the depressed state of the stock market cffcctivcly 
"'When all firms in the industry are likely to experience a downturn. 
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barred many firms from raising rescue-equity from investors. 
4.5 Summary of determinants of restructuring strategy choice 
Finns that experience performance decline may choose a variety of 
alternative methods of restructuring themselves to restore their financial health. 
However, any restructuring strategy has different, and often conflicting, welfare 
implications for the different stakelioldcrs in firms 
- 
sharcholdcrs, lenders and 
managers. Within the agency model of tile firm the strategic choices made by 
managers may benefit one group of stakeholders at the cxpcnsc of the other 
groups. However, managerial choices are also constrained by the agency 
monitoring embodied in the firms. Agency monitoring may bc cmbodicd in the 
rights of lenders, the power and influence of large block sliarcholdcrs or in the 
oversight function and independence of the board of dircctors. Also, scvcral non- 
agency variables, internal and external factors, havc significam impact on stratcgy 
choice. The choice of recovery strategies is, therefore, damnincd by the complcx 
interplay of the ownership structure, corporate govcniaticc, Icndcr monitoring of 
the finns in decline and certain control factors. Conscqucnfly, we fonnulatc a 
conceptual framework to capture all these influences. 
However, the conceptual framework does not relate every agency or control 
variable to every restructuring strategy. To this extent some of the cinpirical work 
in this research is exploratory, but some of it is based on existing theories. In this 
respect, the thesis not only contributes UK evidence to confinn existing theories 
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but also provides new empirical evidence to substantiate new concepts such as the 
role of governance variables and stakebolder dominance on managers' 
restructuring strategy choice. 
Having reviewed the determinants of restructuring strategy choice, we shall 
examine in the next chapter, the theory and empirical evidence oil tile 
effectiveness of these strategics. 
121 
tý. 4 V En 
ch r_ 10 
0 
.Qe4 
*Z: (A 
r. 4i 
1 
JD 
rA t24 
- 
4) 
-0 
, 
-12 
u 
(L) CD. <0 ýe 9 r: 
-i ýä6, -, m8 ta ZA Gn 4) 10 b- o rA 0> Cwo 0 90 
, 6., 
-0 
l! 
ru -D0 ja IM 
ý8 
,... 
2 -, "0 
%X rn 
u< 
V -0 tý Z0 N-w %. 
2 
c2. 
0.6 ;a 10 1. M , r_ 10 ni 10 mi 
r r. le U) ýM, - 
. 
c3. u1%. g=u Cli ce 2u 4) 4. i c24 Gn 10 t24 9 t) (L) 2 8. ý2 Q rA '. ' rA r. -8 c2. 
A 
CDW 2 14M4 
. 
r. vl e0 tu cu 0 10 ': 0 e. 00-, 0Ad 
'01.2 
ýd ci 0 4.4 
-6.2 
0= 
"0 d0 
4j "0 
9 
. 
12 if 4- &Z 4) oh ui *ulll 41 
=E 
u8 (L) . lý 
4) 8 
;e Ell %. gp 
1 
92.4) 4) 
c4-4 g 10 4) iü 0 Ixi E d0 
tu 
4j "rj ýg c2.0 -1 
-4-0 b« "0 2 to el tbo rA 
0 ro- f c; --0, e 
0Q (A 
-w 
§g2b-- 
lu . 2: 
00%. cu b. F c21. 
. 
-0 Ei U t44 511 10 tu .-0ý '221 ýa l18 00 , r. 01 . cj > r- 0 cd Cd 
lu (L) (L) Ci. 
bý 
p4 0. rA E rA +ý EEEEE 
1-41 10 
C% 
rA 1-1% 
2 
*0 0--, 
.Re 7p 
.2e 
(L) r- 10 
"0 Q r- u rý to (: 2= oý 
11 
2umZ0 
Gn 1-0 cn w a 
91 
4ý 
0 2p e b) 2ý ' 
-ci 0 
10 
-0- 
9 
10 ce ý8 . 12 t, 09 
CL) 
0uX 
9mn 
-ci js §Zu .90 cu 
. 
Ei 
9 AD 
999 
4) 
-d -; 3 -9 -g -0 -4 -ä -ä -g -d 7g 
000 
+ý 9 cz New 12.2 0 
926 
(L) 
a2- Cä. 91. M1 
Eý > 0 
> 
8 Iti 00 g 'g !d1 10 c13 0. 
:i (L) ZU MA1 0 t- ] 'ä' t, ý MIO ZM .9 
cn d--N CN Iti 
1--ý P-0 CD 
00 
2 iz 2 cý = 21 Ln 0 iý (In 
p 
0-0 
%-01 
rA 
92 
»o 
Im 
ler 
r6 
z6.4 
4) 
(A 
+ý 
10 
4 
r. 
0 
13 
rA 
0 
Iti 
8 
-rj 
c4-4 0 
eL) 
:i 
0 
32 4. - 
z2 
r. 
0 u 
tý 
l= 
> 
8 
-ci 
M t% 
r. 
ter 
-v 
E 
.- u. 
to ce b 
;; 9 
10 (4.., 0 
9 U 
cý 'to, 0 
0 
4ý 
JD 
e. 
CL) 
LD 
0 b- 
C: 6 
10 
9 
Ici 9 
10 9 
(L) 
. - 
-0 4) 
. 
-2 12 
0 ce 
4) 0 4) 
.2 
19- 
5 Iä 
ig 00 
- 
ID 
"Ci 
Z) 
ä 
lEb 
0 
0 
0 
czw 
"Ci 
e 
0 
e 
(L) 
*- 
9 
4 
ix 
1 
- 
92. 
4) 
Z (L) 
0 
Gn 
u 
rA 
4) 
*g 
b-4 
U 
44 
U 
1 le 
1--ý 
GA 
0 
u 
9 
E 
'CJ 7ý3 
-1 ;e 
0 
r. 
0 *4 Z 
c20 E 0 
Ici (L) 
2 
.- 
0 
-4: 
-a 
. ý 
Ici 
# 
- ja 
N--0 
4) 
9: 6 
8 
-c 
le 
0 
w 
'Z 
2 
r. l= 
u ýd 
4. 0 
-ö 
W-4 
0 
--r r  
4) 
E 
1 
b. 
c2. 
, 
c: r 
e 0 
. - 
*; ý
A b-. 2 
0 0 
c2, 
-. 
r 
4- 
8 
tm (; Z 
t 
0 tt -0 g 
2 
0 
:Z 
* Ei 
m 
t 
t4 
3 
u U lu- 
> 10 
u 
Lý 
0 4- 
=v 0 
=$ 
- 
rL-) 
> 0 
9 
cý 00 
:1 4) 
. 
r: 
8 
'-, g *0 4) 10 
. 
rA 
-0 
'-, 4) 0 4) J-- A 
c 
-8 Zd0 tý 
e 10 
5, ) 
Q21i 10 c29 Ici -4 . 4. 
-4 'm ;a. Ci. GA "0 42 0ds :j> 4) ýa 
A 
CD Z 
"0 10 
tn e >, >, ý5 0 Icie, tlr--'; 0 ci IM 04 oz* 103. ý3 t: -. 
t 
> 
4 c2.8 0 u b. "9 
00 0 
C> -CJ r- : c-: Ir 
: 1-52 4ý 10 Kn Z3 ýgo r. :i s« 
-0 82 CU i. G Ici 00 -A 
0 0 r. "0 -0 90 19 8 (0 4) ti) 
.2 Ici r_ 
19 
I cj 
.M 
-4- 0 
32 4) 4) 8 
-ZJ --% 
8 
Z( MDN 
00 > 0-% 10 IJ rm 2ý ge9 
Le 
rA g C 3 c2 e cn s2 1-ýI g2 = e-, 
0 
%, 
_o 
0 P4 
kn 
eq 
V-0 
mö 
c 
ei 
10 
m 
Ici 
Z 
cu 
*m 
ZM 
0) 
cz 
(1) 
i-- 
g> -ci 
t 
4. -4 0 
0 
Z 
ti 10 2 9 
0% 
ýa :i 
Cýe 
10 :j (> 
-4 
ýo 
C14 
114% 
Chapter 5. EFFECTIVENESS OF RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES 
AND CORPORATE TURNAROUND: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 
5.1 Introduction 
The comprehensive restructuring framework discussed in Chapter 4 
represents the key turnaround 'gestalf found in the literature. However, prior 
strategy research, with a few exceptions (e. g. Grinycr, Mayes and Mckicnian, 
1988), has over-emphasised turnaround strategies and paid scant attention to their 
implementation. Moreover, the restructuring strategies prescribed in the 
turnaround literature are based largely on small samples or case-study nnalyses. 
The general applicability of these generic and specific strategies has not yet been 
tested on a large, multi-industry sample. In other words, no large scale cross- 
sectional analysis has been conducted to test the general cffcctivcticss of tlicsc 
tumaround strategies. 
Corporate downward spiral to failure is attributcd by past rcscarchcrs (c. g. 
Schendel et al., 1976; Hofer, 1980; Hambrick and Scliecter, 1983; 11offinan, 1989; 
Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989; Barker and Mone, 1993) to inanagcrial inaction, poor 
timing, lack of intensity and poor implementation of turnaround strategies. Again, 
empirical evidence, based on large scale analysis, for the validity of thm factors, 
is limited. 
We aim to fill tile empirical gap and leani important lessons from those 
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firms that have suffered performance decline but manage to recover and avoid long 
term distress. Vital empirical questions remain to be answered. Do firms that 
recover from performance decline adopt different restructuring strategies from 
those that decline further into severe distress, and which of these strategies are 
effective in contributing to corporate turnaround? 
In this chapter, we review meaSUTes of strategy effectiveness proposed in 
the strategic management literature, highlight their deficiencies and provide 
improved measure. We review file recent finance literattirc to support the prcfcrred 
measure. Finally, we discuss the tumaround process - the choice of stratcgy, its 
timing and intensity and the role of implementation in usuring cffcctivcness of 
a tumaround strategy. 
5.2 Deficiencies in existing measures of turnaround strategy effectiveness 
Extant turnaround research (e. g. Sclicndcl and Patton (1976) ;I lainbrick 
and Schecter, 1983; Robbins and Pearce 11 (1992,1993)) has invariably used 
accounting ratios to measure the success of turnaround strategies. Thcsc sttidics 
use a variety of accounting ratios to proxy for costs and asset reduction. The most 
common approach has been to analyse change in these proxies between two points 
in time 
-a base year (typically flie worst year financially during Ilic downturn) and 
the year in which firm performance improves to a target lcvcl or aftcr a nuinbcr of 
years post-decline. They conclude, from greater improvcnicnts for successful tban 
for failed turnarounds that costs reduction and asset reduction strategies arc 
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effective recovery strategies. For example, the observation that total costs 
(overheads and interest) are lower in successful than in failed tumaround finns 
leads prior researchers to conclude that costs reduction strategy is effective. 
Likewise, a higher net reduction in assets, both long and short tenn, in successful 
turnarounds is taken to indicate that asset reduction strategies are cffective (e. g. 
Pearce and Robbins 11,1992,1993). 
Two common flaws may be identified in these studics. 
1. Strategy proxy is part of the turnaround measure 
The significant association between stratcgics and turnaround in 
performance is a definitional charactcristic of these studies, as the ratios used to 
proxy for strategies also fonn part of the pcrfonnance measurc. For cumpic, the 
use of costs reduction proxies such as reduction in total costs to relate to 
improvements in return on sales (ROS) 
- 
which use sales less costs as thc 
numerator 
- 
cause the high association between reduction in total costs and 
turnaround in ROS to be high by construct. Similarly, the strong associatioti 
between reduction in total assets and turnaround in rcturn on invcstinctits (1101) 
may be by construct as total asset is the denominator of ROT. 
2. Proxies measure the end result of a strategy and not the strategy itself. 
The proxies for strategies under examination e. g. lowcr costs of sale for 
cost reduction, may be brought about by various spcciric stratcgics such as 
operational restructuring, asset sales, investment in new plant and machinery or 
129 
acquisition of new businesses, or financial restructuring which gives rise to lower 
interests cost. In other words, the proxies merely measure the end result of a 
strategy or strategies and not the strategy itself 
Due to the deficiencies in strategy effectiveness measures used in cxtant 
strategic management literature, we turn our search to the finance literature, for a 
better approach. In the next section, we provide the rationale for our choice of 
effectiveness measures and back up our choice with a discussion of the relevant 
finance literature. 
5.3 Strategy effectiveness measures used in this research 
The true effect of a specific strategy and its impact oil corporate tumaround 
is not easily susceptible to direct measurement. This difficulty stcins from three 
issues. Firstly, strategies such as top managcment replaccinctit havc only ail 
indirect impact on financial performance. Secondly, the lciigth of time rcquired for 
the effect of a strategy to show through in the finn's financial pufonnucc is 
indeteminable. Thirdly, the overlapping and joint cffccts of compicincritary 
strategies confound the effects of individual strategies. 
However, a reasonably robust method for measuring the cffcctivcncss of 
a strategy, indirectly, lies in capturing the stock mark-ct's rcaction to its 
announcement. Using standard event study methodology to measure the 
shareholder wealth impact of strategy announcement, we can obtain a fairly 
reliable assessment of the effectiveness of that strategy, from the perspective of 
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the stock market. 
Admittedly, shareholder wealth impact as a measure of strategy 
effectiveness equally suffers from one of the methodological flaws discussed 
earlier in Section 5.2. Specifically, since turnaround, in the poor performing 
sample of this research, is measured by recovery in stock returns ranking to pre- 
decline levels, total shareholder wealth impact from strategy announcements must 
be inherently more positive in recovery than non-recovery f inns. Although the 
total shareholder wealth impact is more positive in recovery than non-recovery 
ones, the question remains 'which strategies do recovery and non-recovery finns 
execute equally well' and 'which strategies do recovery finns cxectite bctter than 
their non-recovery counterparts? Furthennore, the use of shareholder wcalth 
impact of strategy announcement to measure cffectivcncss c1carly ovcrcomcs the 
other methodological flaw identified in the strategic managuncnt litcraturc (scc 
Section 5.2). In other words, the stock market captures immcdiatclY nd dircctly 
the anticipated effects of a specific strategy and it is not a proxy incasurc for 
strategy. 
We also employ an alternative but direct mcthod for examining stratcgy 
effectiveness. This is based on testing the association bctwccil rcstructuring 
strategy and the extent of corporate recovery from puforniaticc decline. If a 
restructuring strategy is effective, it will register a strong positive association with 
recovery. Likewise, an ineffective strategy will result in a negative relation with 
recovery. 
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5.4 Strategy effectiveness: Shareholder wealth impact of strategy 
announcement 
The following sections review the literature for empirical evidence on stock 
markets' assessment of various restructuring strategies. Most of these studies 
emanate from the finance literature and all except a handful is of a non-distrcss 
related nature. In fact widi the exception of Khanna and Pouiscn (1995), no large 
sample study to date has empirically examined the effectiveness of restructuring 
strategies in a turnaround context. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, this research examines a comprOmnsivc 
range of corporate recovery/restructuring strategies, synthesising both the strategic 
management and finance literature. It covers the generic strntegics of managerial, 
operational, asset and financial restructuring. 
5.4.1 Effectiveness of managerial restructuring 
An inverse relation between the probability of inamiginctit change mid 
firm's stock perfounance is reported by Coughlan and Schmidt (1987) and 
Warner et al. (1988). Further, Keasey and Watson (1987), Gilson (1989,1990), 
and Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) find significant top inanagcnictit changs in 
distressed firms. However, stock market's reaction to top inanagemcrit changs in 
distressed firms is mixed. Announcements of change in scnior managcinctit in 
distressed finns are greeted positively (Bonnier and Miner, 1989), ncgativcly 
(Khanna and Poulsen, 1995) or neutrally (Weisbach, 1988) by the market. 
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Efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms is 
suggested as a reason for positive excess returns whilst new but 'negative' 
information (eg. losses) is claimed to explain negative reactions to announcement 
of change in senior management. Internal and external corporate control 
mechanisms refer respectively to the internal governance structure (see Section 
4.2.3) and external market for corporate control i. e. takeovers. 
Others argue that the distinction between internal and external replacement 
of top managers is important. In the case of internal replaccincrit, the ititcmally 
promoted manager, who invariably shares a part of the blame for the firm's 
predicament, is seen to lack credibility. Indeed significant positive (ticgiltivc) 
excess returns, based on the market model, are found to be associated with 
external (internal) replacement announcements (e. g. Worrell ct. al, 1993). 
However, Khanna and Poulsen (1995), in their study of finns that subscquently 
file for Chapter II bankruptcy protection and a control sample of licalthy finns, 
find both internal and external replacements in Chapter II rinns to be greeted 
negatively but insignificantly by the market. They argue that the market does not 
place the blame on managers as the market does not perccivc internal replacenicnt 
as a continuation of the status quo and view it diffmiltly from an Wmal 
replacement. 
Although Ole impact of managerial restructuring on sharcholdcr wcalth has 
been widely examined in the financial economics literature, little is found in the 
strategic management literature, and virtually no UK-bascd larg sample study in 
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either literature has examined managerial restructuring in a turnaround context. 
5.4.2 Effectiveness of operational restructuring 
Efficiency strategies entailing cost-cutting, productivity improvements and 
operating asset reductions have been found empirically to be associated with 
turnaround success (Schendel, Patton and Riggs, 1976; Hambrick and Sclicctcr, 
1983; ONeill, 1986; Pearce II and Robbins, 1993; John, Lang and Netter, 1992). 
However, few large sample studies have specifically cxamincd the impact on 
shareholder wealth of announcement of oprational rcstructuritig with the 
exception of Blackwell et. al (1990) and Khanna and Poulscn (1995). Blackwcll 
et al. find plant closings to be associated with perfonnaticc decline aild that the 
market reacts negatively to such announcements. They interprct this as a nqativc 
information signal to the market. The negative information it conveys covers the 
cost of restructuring (and consumption of scarce cash rcsourccs) and the 
uncertainty of future finn earnings. However, Khanna and POUISCII (1995) find 
positive announcement effects on announcement of plant closings, layoffs, asset 
sales and downsizing in both Chapter II and healthy sampic rinns. Khannaand 
Poulsen's study, though, is not a suitable comparison to Blackwell ct. al's study 
as their inclusion of asset sales, which are generally greeted positively (e. g. Lasfcr 
et al, 1996) by the market may mask flie potentially negative cffccts of operational 
restructunng announcements (as documented by Blackwell ct. al., 1990) 
. 
In practice, UK finns appear to lag behind their US counterparts in tcnns 
134 
of announcing operational restructuring as a separate event. Most often, 
operational restructuring is announced at the time of announcing financial results 
as it generally entails the provision of huge restructuring costs". As a result, event- 
study analysis of operational restructuring alone is not possible. 
5.4.3 Effectiveness of asset restructuring 
5.4.3.1 Asset divestment 
Lasfer, Sudarsanam, and Taffler (1996) empirically find asset sales by 
financially distressed finns to be associated with positive excess returns on 
announcements. Similar results are reported by Brown ct al. (1994), Lai% ct 
al. (1995) and others. Argwnents on the sources of such value creation though are 
less straightforward. Brown et al. (1994) argue that saics whcrc procccds arc uscd 
to pay down debts extinguish the option value of assets and cffcctivcly transfer 
wealth from stockholders to bondholders. They argue tlint such snics should 
therefore extract lower positive response from the markct than when the funds arc 
retained. In contrast, Lang et al. (1995) argue that retention of funds raiscd from 
asset sales by poorly performing firms is bad news as such a rOcnfloii powntially 
suffers from die agency costs of managerial discretion by swelling free cash flow. 
Consequently, sales where proceeds are used to pay down debts should attract 
higher positive returns on announcement. 
'This conclusion is based on a thorough review of Extcl Financial Ncws Summary (book) 
and Extel Company Research (CD-ROM), both covering company press relcascs to the 
Quotations Department of the London International Stock Exchange. 
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5.4.3.2 Asset investment 
An entrepreneurial/strategic i. e. investment, approach to recovery is 
suggested to be instrumental to turnaround success (Schendel ct al, 1976; Hofer, 
1980). Although numerous large sample studies have empirically examined the 
benefits of asset divestments, no study has yet examined the importance of asset 
investments to turnaround fmns except for Khanna and Poulscn ( 1995). In a study 
of firms in Chapter II and a control sample of healthy firms, Khanna and Poulsen 
find acquisition and expansion announcements to be associated with negative but 
insignificant returns for Chapter II finns but positive and SigniricaM returns for 
healthy firins. They attribute this as evidence that managcrs of Chapter II finns 
make significantly worse decisions than healthy control finns. As intcrnal capital 
expenditure is seldom announced as a separate event, in the UK, only the 
shareholder wealth impact of acquisition announcements will be examined in this 
research. 
5.4.4 Effectiveness of financial restructuring 
5.4.4.1 Dividend cut/omission 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) and John et al. (1992) empirically find 
large finns respond to financial distress with rapid and aggressive dividcnd 
reductions. Overall, extant studies reveal significant nCgatiVC reactions to 
announcement of dividend cuts or omissions. These results lend support to the 
negative information content or cash flow signalling theory (Bljij atid Vijh, 1990; 
Christie, 1994; Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1994; Jensen and Johnson, 1995; 
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Michaely, Thaler and Womack, 1995), dividend clientcle theory (Denis, Denis 
and Sarin, 1994) and over-investment or agency costs theory (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989) of cuts or omissions in dividends. The cash flow signalling 
model predicts that dividend changes convey information about future cash flows 
i. e. a dividend increase (decrease) conveys favourable (unfavourable) infonnation 
about the current and/or future cash flows of the firm. The dividend clientele 
hypothesis suggests that price reactions to dividend change announconctit are 
influenced by the yield preference of the marginal investor in that firm's shares. 
Investors in low dividend yield firms, who have a rchitivcly high avcrsion to 
dividends, will view an increase in dividends negatively, whilst invcstors, in high- 
yield fmns, who place a Wgber value on dividends, will rcact positivcly. The ovcr. 
investment hypothesis is premised on the argument that dividend cliangc may 
convey infonnation regarding a finn's future investments. According to this 
hypothesis, a dividend increase by a finn with free cash flow problcms will rcdticc 
the market's estimate of the amount of cash that will be wastcfully invcstcd, 
thereby increasing the firm's value. Similarly, a dividend dccrcasc will signal that 
more negative NPV projects will be undertaken, causing a decrease in finn value. 
In swnmaiy, extant evidence appears to suggest that the stock markct takes 
a grave view of dividend cut/omission by declining finns. Among the thrcc 
contending perspectives, the signalling flicory appears to rcccivc the widcst 
support. In spite of stock market's disfavour of dividend cuts/omissions, casli. 
strapped firms may have little choice but to implemcnt cut/omission in dividends 
to preserve scarce cash and avoid becoming insolvent. 
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5.4.4.2 Equity issues 
The announcement effects of equity issues are largely negative. On average 
the market value of issuing firm drops significantly around the anti ou ticement of 
seasoned equity offerings (Smidl, 1986; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; and Masulis 
and Korwar, 1986; Levis, 1994) although several studies on private equity 
offerings show overall positive announcement effect (e. g. Wruck, 1989). Cooney 
and Kalay (1993) attribute negative/positive effects to signalling effccts of 
negative/positive net present value projects to be financed from the proceeds. 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find rights issue used to repay debts have greater 
reduction in share prices than those that raise equity for capital cxpciiditurc 
purposes. They attribute the fortner to reduction in lcvcragc and the lattcr to 
favourable signals. However, die only study on equity issue by distressed firnis by 
Khanna and Poulsen (1995) Teports ncgative but insignificilm cffccts oil 
announcement of equity issues. 
5.4.4.3 Debt restructuring 
Since debt restructuring frequently involves lenders sacrificing sonic of 
their rights, and the fact that successful debt restructuring allcviatcs bankniptcy 
risks and signals confidence by lenders in the finn's prospect debt rcstnicturing 
must be greeted positively by the market. On the othcr hand, lcndcrs also 
frequently call on owners to share part of the finaticial burdcii of rcstructuritig 
such as providing fresh capital via rights issues. However, dcbt restructuring 
effectively reduces the exercise price on the finn's call option ie. equity. 
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Improvement in the option value of equity brougbt about by debt restructuring and 
alleviation of financial distress is expected to exceed costs of owner sacrifice. 
No prior study, except for Khanna and Poulsen (1995), has specifically 
examined the impact of debt restructuring on stock returns in distressed firms. 
They examine a subset of debt restructuring i. e. debt-equity swaps, and find 
positive but insignificant abnormal returns from announcements of debt equity 
swaps by both Chapter 11, and a control sample of healthy, firms. One reason for 
the lack of significance may lie in the small number of cases examined (19 and 4 
for Chapter 11 and control sample respectively), a problem caused by the rarity 
of formal debt restructuring in the US. This problem is even more acute in the UK 
than in the US, as there are far fewer fonnal or public debt restructuring in the 
UK. 
5.4.5 Summary of perspectives on shareholder wealth impact of restructuring 
strategies 
A summary of the shareholder wealth impact of restructuring strategies is 
shown in table 5.1 below. The effectiveness of managerial restructuring from the 
stock market's perspective is mixed. Operational restructuring is not only seen as 
costly, as it consumes cash in the short term, but its announcement may also signal 
to the market the firm's dire fillancial state. Consequently, tile market marks down 
the finn's econon& worth on such an annowicement. In contrast, asset divestment 
is largely seen as a generic recovery strategy and is greeted positively by the 
market. 
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Conversely, investments which invariably consume scarce cash resources 
in distressed fmns are frowned upon by the market. The market reacts negatively 
to cut/omission in dividends as it signals to the market tile bad state of tile firm's 
financial healdi, and that is financially painful to shareholders". On the same basis 
as dividend cut/omission, equity issue is greeted negatively by the market. Debt 
restructuring is expected to be greeted positively by the market as lenders' 
willingness to restructure their lending signals to the market that the firm is worth 
backing. Debt restructuring almost invariably involves lenders forgiving certain 
debts and/or interest and allowing extension of maturity terms (Gilson, 1990). On 
the other hand, debt-equity swaps frequently mean dilution of shareholders' 
I 
ownership of the finn. However, as improvernent in option value of equity 
following alleviation of financial distress is probably greater than the pain of 
dilution, debt restructuring is expected to be greeted positively by the market. 
5.5 Strategy effectiveness: Impact of restructuring strategy and control 
variables on recovery from performance decline 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in response to pcrforniance decline, management 
may take no action, a classic cause of failure (Schendcl ct a], 1976; Bibcault, 
1982) or adopt various corporate restructuring strategies which may or may not be 
appropriate to recovery from performance decline. In consequence, performance 
"The other perspectives apart from signalling e. g. dividend clientele and agency cost 
perspectives, support negative reaction to dividend cut/omission announcement. 
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decline firms can recover from their decline, deteriorate precipitously into distress 
or decline more gradually into failure or bankruptcy (see Figure 2.1). 
Effectiveness of a particular strategy can therefore be tested via examining 
the impact of restructuring strategy on the extent of corporate recovery from 
perfonnance decline. In other words, effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a 
strategy can be represented by a positive or negative relation between adoption of 
that strategy and corporate recovery from performance decline. 
The empirical literature (e. g. Grinyer et. al, 1988) also suggests uitability 
and effectiveness of turnaround strategy as dependent on certain internal and 
external factors. Severity of decline dictates both the pace of restructuring and 
effectiveness of particular actions. For example, asset investment or acquisitions 
may be unsuitable for more severely distressed firms as they consuinc scarce cash 
resources and as their immediate priority is survival and not growth. 
Economic and industry conditions also may influctice cffcctivcness of 
strategy. For example, where the industry as a whole is depressed, asset sales and 
divestments may not raise as much cash as otherwise (Schleifer and Visliny, 
1992). Industry specific factors are found in the literature to be important 
explanatory factors in finn bankruptcy. For example, Lang and Stulz (1992) find 
the announcement of bankruptcy by one finn in an industry leads to a negative 
wealth impact on the remaining firms in the same industry. During an economic 
downturn, operational cost cutting actions would be effective but equity issues 
may not be appropriate as tile stock market would be depressed. Size of the firm 
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is a proxy for both the flexibility and internal slack available to the declining firm. 
Also, certain strategies uch as acquisitions, divestment, and debt restructuring are 
more appropriate for large than small finns. For example, a large firm may be able 
to negotiate debt restructuring more effectively. 
Where the firm's performance decline has been caused by internal, fin-n- 
specific factors such as bad acquisitions or poor financial control, any 
restructuring has to reverse the firm specific causes. Again the cffectiveness of 
restructuring will be dictated by die existence of internal causes of decline. 
This alternative approach of measuring strategy cffcctivctlcss ie. examining 
the impact of restructuring strategy on the extent of corporate recovery, 
complements the first measure based on event-study described earlier. Whilst the 
first approach tests for die impact of individual strategy on shareholder wealth and 
hence measures the stock market perceived effectiveness of that strategy, the 
second approach tests for the impact of individual strategy, controlling for other 
strategies and contextual factors, on the eventual outcome or degree of recovery 
from performance decline. 
5.6 Impact of implementation on effectiveness of restructuring strategies 
Corporate tumaround is widely attributed to swift managerial actions to 
estop the bleeding' and 'nip the problem in the bud' (Bibeault, 1982). Corporate 
failure, on the other hand, is claimed to be caused by managerial inaction or 
inappropriate actions (Hoffman, 1989; Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989; Makridakis, 
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1991). However, to date no large sample empirical investigation has been 
conducted to verify this view. Given the large body of knowledge emanating from 
decades of turnaround research, it is inconceivable that managers of failed firms 
are not aware of restructuring remedies prescribed in the literature. 
However, adoption of a turnaround strategy in itself is no guarantee of 
recovery. For a strategy to be effective in contributing to recovery, it has to be 
carried out swiftly and intensively (Slatter, 1984, pg. 129). For example, swift and 
deep, rather than a tardy and superficial, cost cutting is instruinctital to cfficicncy 
improvements and eventual turnarounds. 
However, we argue that swift and intensive actions may not necessarily 
guarantee success either. Ultimately, the success of any well chosen or excellent 
strategy lies in the quality of its implementation (Slatter, 1984, pg. 12 1). The most 
appropriate strategy may simply prove futile if it is implemented poorly. Indeed, 
poor implementation of turnaround strategies has been claimed to exacerbate 
decline (Cameron, Sutton and VAletten, 1988; Freeman and Cameron, 1993) Also, 
Barker III and Mone (1994), in their critique of Robbins and Pearce 11's (1992) 
study, contend fliat how managers retrench could be more important than whether 
managers retrench at all. Similarly, Hoffman (1989) suggests that the difference 
between successful and failed turnarounds lies more in the strategy 
implementation process than in its content. Likewise, Stopford and Baden-Fuller 
(1990) find failing mature firms to take similar actions to firms that successfully 
rejuvenate. However, failing firms do only part of the task, and underplay the 
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importance of innovation in strategy and building organisations that are responsive 
from top to bottom (ie. implementation). 
The overall effectiveness of a strategy can be measured by the stock 
market's reaction to announcement of its implementation. The wealth impact of 
strategy announcement captures the stock market's total assessment of the 
strategy, its timing, intensity and expected implementation success. As 
effectiveness of strategy implementation is incapable of direct measurement, it can 
be deduced indirectly from stock market reaction. Equally, strategy 
implementation can be inferred from tests of flic association between restructuring 
strategies and corporate recovery from performance decline. 
5.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we review the strategic management and finance literatures 
for measures ofeffectiveness of restructuring strategies. We uncover flaws in the 
research methodologies used by strategy researchers, and decide on using 
measures found in the finance literature for this rescarch. We discuss the finance 
and corporate restructuring literatures for effectiveness of restructuring strategies 
ranging from operational to asset, managerial and financial restructuring. 
We aim to assess flie effectiveness of strategies in two ways. One, we use 
stock market reaction to strategy announcement as an indircct measure of strategy 
effectiveness. Two, we test for strategy effectiveness through examining the 
association between adoption of a restructuring strategy and corporate recovery 
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from performance decline. 
Extant research on effectiveness of restructuring strategies yields somewhat 
mixed results. Few have specifically examined die effectiveness of these strategies 
in a turnaround context. Existing studies also appear to emanate largely from the 
US. UK-based studies are few and far in between. 
Corporate downward spiral to failure is attributed by past rcscarchers to 
managerial inaction or poor timing, lack of intensity and poor implementation of 
restructuring strategies. Empirical evidence, based on large scale analysis, is 
however, limited. This research aims to fill these crucial empirical gaps. 
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Chapter6 METHODOLOGY AND DATA: POOR PERFORMING AND 
DISTRESSED SAMPLES 
6.1 Introduction 
Ofek (1993), in the first study that empirically examines the impact of 
lenders and owners on restructuring strategy choice, employs a two-group logit 
discriminant model. The binary dependent variable represents firms that employ 
a specific strategy and those that do not. 
However, Ofek's model is incomplete as it does not employ a 
compreliensive agency model and fails to control for the iinpact of the external 
environment on a firm's restructuring strategy choice. Specifically, Ofek onlittcd 
to include governance variables such as dual CEO, non-executive Chainnan and 
the influence of outside directors. 
A more serious flaw in Ofek's methodology lies in his analysis of only one 
year's strategy 
- 
the decline year. A one year analysis is hardly sufficient to 
capture the restructuring process. Focusing only on the decline year is also 
unsatisfactory since decline could start anywbere from the beginning to the end of 
that year. 
Potentially, the cause and effect of decline can be mixed in the decline year. 
For instance, operational restructuring may well be the cause of stock market 
decline as it signals to die market the firm' dire financial health. Thcrefore, instead 
of restructuring following decline, it may well precede decline in stock market 
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retums. 
However, as firms are theoretically argued (Jensen, 1989), and empirically 
shown (Ofek, 1993), to react speedily to decline, we decide to include the decline 
year in the first stage of our analysis ie. in examining the determinants of strategy 
choice. As discussed later in this chapter, the examination of tile determinants of 
strategy choice employs pre-decline year explanatory variables to examine decline 
and post-decline years' strategy clioice. Hence, the problem of causality is not an 
issue at this stage of the analysis. Admittedly, not all the strategies we call 
restructuring strategies in the first year are strictly so, since some of them may 
well be decline inducing strategies. However, analysis of restructuring in the year 
of decline also enables us to compare our results with the only other study of this 
nature by Ofek (1993), who examines only the decline year strategies. 
In view of the potential causality problem, we restrict our second stage 
analysis i. e. examining the effectiveness of stnitggies to post-decline year 
strategies. Intuitively, only post-decline strategies should be used to measure 
effectiveness of recovery measures from the point of decline i. e. end of the year 
of decline. 
This research employs a comprehensive agency model and incorporates 
control variables vital to separate tile effects of agency monitoring from other 
internal and external impact on managerial strategy choice (see Figure 4.1). Also, 
we examine three years of restructuring, including the year of decline. 
In a turnaround context, no prior study has propcrly explored the 
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effectiveness of restructuring strategies in contributing to recovery from 
perfonnance decline (see Section 5.2 and 5.3). In this research, we aim to test the 
effectiveness of strategies using standard event study methodology. We also test 
for the overall impact of strategies in bringing about a turnaround using logit and 
OLS regressions methodology. These methodologies are described below. 
6.2 Methodology 
6.2.1 Definition of poor performance and financial distress 
Poor performance 
Ofek (1993) defines perfonnance decline in tenns of the change in the 
annual stock return ranking of a firm among all the firms in the market from. being 
in the top 67% in one year (the base year) to flie bottom 10% in the following year 
(the decline year). This decline may range from a maximum of 100% (from the 
hundredth percentile to zero percentile) to a minitnum of 23% (frorn the thirty 
third percentile to the tenth percentile). Ofek regards this steep fill in value as 
sufficient to trigger various restructuring actions by tile poor perfonnance finns. 
We employ a definition broadly similar to Ofek's but arguably more 
stringent. A fmn is defined as having experienced poor perfonnancc when it falls 
in annual stock return ranking of all firnis in the London Stock Exchatige to the 
bottom 20% in a year (the decline year) after having been in the top 50% in each 
of the two preceding years. In the decline year the maximum decline is 100% 
(from the hundredth percentile to zero percentile) and the minimum is 30% (from 
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the fiftieth percentile to the twentieth percentile). With this definition, in contrast 
to Ofek's, the fall in rank has to be much steeper for inclusion in our sample. 
Furdier, the fall is from a stable Wgli performance. This condition avoids sampling 
companies whose performance decline is due to short term volatility of their share 
prices". 
Financial distress 
Altman (1968) popularised die Z score as a measure of a firm's bankruptcy 
likelihood. In the UK, a popular Z score model used by banks and industrial firms 
is developed by Taffler (1984). With the Tafflcr model, firms with negative Z- 
scores are classified as potential failures, as their financial profilcs resemble those 
of previously bankrupt finns. 
The model, developed using linear discriminant techniques, takes the 
following fonn: 
=c xx Z O+Cl I+C2 2+cx 33 +c4X4 
where xl... x4 denote the financial ratios, and c,... C4 the coefficients. 
" The literature on stock price overreaction (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985) (see discussion 
in Sections 2.3.3. and 2.3.4). raises the concern that a stock return based measure of performance 
decline may merely represent a correction for the earlier overreaction. Tile condition of two 
consecutive years' good performance preceding the decline which we have applied in our 
sampling mitigates this problem. Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that stock market 
performance decline is not greeted with inertia and indiffierence by managers who smugly attribute 
such decline to the stock market whims such as overreaction. It appears that such performance 
decline is a cause for managerial concern and triggers remedial action including corporate 
restructuring. Indeed, Barker (1996) finds corporate managers to give great importance to City 
views. 
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There are two UK versions of the discriminant model employed in this research, 
made available by Syspas, a City financial analysis services firm. Tile first is used 
to analyse listed manufacturing and construction companies and has component 
ratios (with Mosteller-Wallace percentage contribution measures in brackets): 
profit before tax/current liabilities (53%), current assets/total liabilities (13%), 
current liabilities/total. assets (18%) and no-credit interval" (16%). Tile second 
variant is used to rate listed retail enterprises and has ratios: cash flow/total 
liabilities (34%), debt/quick assets (10%), cuffent liabilities/total assets (44%) and 
no-credit interval (12%). 
Taffier (1995) tracks the performance of these models from their 
development. Overall, they have had better than 98% success rate in classifying 
subsequently bankrupt companies as potentially insolvent (z<O) based on their last 
accounts prior to failure, and thus exhibit very high ex ante predictive ability. 
For the purpose of our paper, a finn is in financial distress if it has a 
negative Z score for at least one year after a minimum of two consecutive years 
of positive Z scores. The purpose of imposing two year positive Z scores prior to 
decline is to capture the exact timing of decline. 
6.2.2 Testing for the impact of stakeholder dominance 
We divide our sample into two groups 
- 
one stakeholder dominated and the 
'This measures the number of days the company can continue to trade if it can no longer 
generate revenues (see Fadel and Parkinson, 1978, for discussion). 
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other non-dominated by that stakeholder. For each stakeholder group 
- 
lenders, 
manager-owners, dual-CEO, block sbareliolders and collective board of directors 
- 
we examine the likelihood of a given strategy being chosen. The difference in the 
proportions of sample firms in the dominated and non-dominated groups choosing 
a strategy is tested for statistical significance using the non-parametric Mann- 
Whitney Wilcoxon test statistic. Any significant difference rcflects the influence 
of the dominant stakeholder. 
6.2.3 Testing for the combined impact of agency and control variables on 
strategy choice 
We employ the following model to examine the impact of agency 
monitoring and control variables on the choice of restructuring strategy. 
CRS 
=f (Agency monitoring and control variables) 
where 
CRS = Corporate restructuring strategy 
Agency monitoring variables= Leverage (bank, short, unsecured debt), 
ownership (managerial, institutional, 
associate and unassociated non- 
institutional sharcholding) and 
governance (Chainnan cum CEO, non- 
executive C iainnan and proportion of 
outside directors). 
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Control variables= Internal cause of decline, economic condition, 
industry condition, firin size and severity of decline. 
6.2.4 Testing for strategy effectiveness: Event study of strategy 
announcements 
Effectiveness of restructuring strategies is measured by the shareholder 
wealth impact of strategies around the announcement period and their long term 
contribution to effecting turnaround. 
Shareholder wealth impact is estimated using the conventional event study 
methodology. A detailed description of this methodology is provided in Appendix 
1. Risk adjusted retums are estimated from the market model using daily data 
(Brown and Warner, 1985). Similar to Klianna and Poulsen (1995), the estimation 
period is the Day-170 to Day-21 centred on the event day (Day 0). The estimated 
parameters are flien used to calculate flie abilonnal returns over the announcement 
period, Days 
-5 to +5 relative to Day 0. 
Estimation of the market model parameters is done with the thin trading 
adjustment method suggested by Dimson (1979). On the basis of maximum 
average sample beta, four leads and four lags are included in the OLS regression. 
Returns are logarithmic returns and the market index is the Financial Times All 
Share Index. To ensure robustness to model specification, abnormal returns are 
also measured using the market, size and mean adjusted models. Market adjusted 
returns are returns afler deducting the returns to the FT-All Share Index for 
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comparable periods. Size-adjusted returns are returns after deducting returns to 
similar sized firms. To form size portfolios, we rank all companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (the Official List, the Unlisted Securities Market and 
Third Market 
-until 1990) covered by Datastream International, on their market 
capitalisation at 3 14 December, from 1986 to 1994. These companies are sorted 
into five deciles 
- 
the first decile forming the portfolio with the smallest 20% of 
listed firms, the second the next smallest 20% and so on. Portfolio log returns are 
then computed on an equally weighted basis for the following year. These 
portfolio returns flius forra five size indices. At the end of each year the portfolios 
are rebalanced with the same procedure described earlier. Mean adjusted returns 
are returns after deducting the mean returns in the estimation period Day- 170 to 
Day-21 centred on flie event day (Day 0). Significancc of daily average abnonnal 
returris of all four models is then tested using the dependence inethod suggested 
by Brown and Warner (1985). 
For the distressed sample, both distress and turnaround are measured in 
terms of accounting numbers from annual accounts. Hence, event study analysis 
is not feasible (see 6.3.1 below for a full discussion). 
6.2.5 Testing for impact of strategy and control variables on corporate 
recovery 
Next, logit and OLS regressions of recovery on restructuring strategies are 
run to test the effectiveness of restructuring strategies in achieving turnaround, two 
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years post-decline. Logit regression tests for the impact of explanatory variables 
on recovery versus non-recovery whilst OLS regression captures their impact on 
the extent of recovery. Non-strategy variables, discussed in section 5.5, are 
included in our regressions as control variables. 
The model employed takes the following form: 
Recovery =f (Restructuring strategies and control variables). 
where 
Recovery =I. Return to top 50% in two-year 
cwnulativc stock returns ranking in the 
market (poor perfonning sample). 
2. Retum to positive Z-scorc (distressed 
sample). 
both over two post-decline years. 
Restructuring strategies= Operational, asset, managerial and financial 
restructuring strategies. 
Control variables Internal cause of decline, economic and 
industry condition, severity of decline and 
finn size. 
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6.3 Derinitions of dependent variables 
6.3.1 Testing for the combined impact of agency and control variables on 
strategy choice 
We focus on whether distressed finns adopt a turnaround strategy 
independent of the size in monetary terms. Hence, each restructuring action is 
coded as a dummy variable in the regression model of strategy choice on agency 
and control variables in both the poorly pcrfonning and distressed samples. 
The various restructuring actions declining finns choose are the dependent 
variables for the logit regressions. These actions fall into the four generic 
strategies 
- 
operational, asset, managerial and financial. Ofek (1993) distinguishes 
between actions resulting in short term cash inflow and those with no such cash 
inflow since cash generation to meet the firm's financial commitments may be 
necessary to alleviate financial distress and avoid default on thein. Accordingly, 
we define combinations of restructuring strategies which generate cash and those 
which do not. For the distressed sample, strategies are based on accounting 
reports, as opposed to news reports for the poor pcrfonning sampic. Hence, we 
discuss the dependent variables for poor performing and distressed finns 
separately. 
Poor performing firms 
Panel A of Table 6.1 shows flie definition of restructuring strategies for the 
poorly performing sample. Operational restructuring covers cost rational isation, 
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layoffs, closures and integration of production and other facilities. Asset 
restructuring includes both asset divestments and investments. Asset divestment 
comprises sell-off, management buy-out, spin-off, sale and leaseback, and other 
asset sales. Investment includes acquisitions and internal capital expenditures. 
Internal capital expenditure is measured by significant expenditure in plant and 
machinery, exceeding routine asset replacements. Since routine replacements, 
proxied by sample firms annual depreciation charge, averages 6.5%, internal 
capital expenditure is deemed to take place when such expenditure exceeds 10% 
of the pre-decline year total assets. Data on capital expenditure is based on 
company reports and accounts. For company reports and account-bascd values, 
values reported in accounting periods ending prior to I' of May are deeined to 
relate to the previous year. Likewise, values reported in accounting periods ending 
on or after the I' of May are deemed to relate to the current year. This 
classification is similar to that adopted by Syspas Limited. 
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Table 6.1: Definition of restructuring strategies 
Panel A: Poor perforrning firms 
Restructuring strategies cIcctcd by firms experiencing stock rcturn performance decline are 
identificd and dcfincd. Information on stratcgics is from prcss rcleascs to the London Stock Exchange 
which arc documcnted by Extcl Financial Ncws Summary from 1987, with the cxccption or capital 
cxpcnditurc. Capital cxpcnditure is Mined as significant cxpcnditurc in cxccss of 10% of prior ycar 
asset value. The 10% limit is intended to capture cxpcnditurc significantly above routine assct 
replacement. Routine asset replacement, proxicd by sample firms' depreciation charge, amounts to an 
average of 6.5% of prior year asset value. All strategies arc dichotomous with the value I whcrc adopted 
and value 0 where not adopted. Supplementary information is also collected from Ilambro/Andcrscn. 
Corporate Register and Company Guide, Datastream International, and Company Rcports and Accounts. 
Thesc altcrnativc sourccs arc also used for cross-chccking information rcportcd in the Extcl Financial 
Ncws Summary. 
Strategy Definition 
Operational restructuring 
Operational restructuring Cost rationalisation, layoffs, closures and integration of 
business units. 
Asset restructuring 
Asset sales Divestment of subsidiaries, management buy-outs, sale-and- 
leascback, and other asset sales. 
Acquisitions Acquisitions leading to full or partial control of businesses. 
Internal capital expenditure Significant cash expended on fixed asset investments such as 
in plant and machinery, in excess of routine replacement of 
depreciated assets (at least 10% of prc-distrcss year total 
assets). 
Managerial restructuring 
Managerial restructuring Replacement of Chairman or Chief Executive Officer 
(includes Managing Director). Retirement under the age of 
65 is treated as removal. 
Financial restructuring 
Dividend cut or omission Omission or reduction of dividends per share from prc- 
decline year level. 
Equity issue Significant cash raised from issue of new equity (excluding 
cash raised from routine exercising of share options and 
those with proceeds less than I% of prc-dcclinc year total 
assets and those where proceeds are applied specifically for 
financing acquisitions). 
Debt restructuring Debt refinancing involving cxtcnding maturity, converting (dcbt-cquity swap) or forgiving of debt and interest. 
Combination strategies 
Cash generative actions Asset sales and/or cash equity issue. 
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Table 6.1: Definition of restructuring strategies (Contd. ) 
Panel B: Distressed firms 
All strategies are dichotomous with the value I where adopted and value 0 where not adopted. Source: 
Infonnation on stmtcgics from company's annual reports and accounts. Supplementary information also 
collected from Hambro/Andcrscn Corporate Register and Company Guide and Dalastream International. 
Strategy Definition 
Operational restnicturing 
Operational restructuring Expended cash on cost rational isation, layoffs, closures and 
integration of business units. 
Asset restructuring 
Asset sales Significant cash raised from sale of fixcd assets and 
subsidiaries (at least 5% of pre-distrcss year total assets). 
Acquisitions Significant cash expended on full and partial acquisitions of 
businesses (at least 5% of prc-distrcss year total assets). 
Internal capital expenditure Significant cash expended on fixed asset investments such as 
in plant and machinery, in excess of routine replacement of 
depreciated assets (at least 10% of prc-distrcss year total 
assets 
- 
see Panel A above). 
Managerial restructuring 
Managerial restructuring Removal of Chainnan or Chief Executive Officer (includes 
Managing Director). Retirement under the age of 65 is 
treated as removal. 
Financial restructuring 
Dividend cut/omission Cut/omit dividend per share relative to prc-distrcss year 
level. 
Equity issue Significant cash raised from issue of new equity (excluding 
cash raised from routine exercising of share options and 
those with proceeds less than 1% of pre-distrcss year total 
assets and those where proceeds are applied specifically for 
financing acquisitions). 
Debt restructuring Debt refinancing involving extending maturity, converting 
(debt-cquity swap) or forgiving of debt and interest. 
Combination strategies 
Cash generative actions Asset sales and/or equity issue. 
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Managerial restructuring covers replacement of Chairman or Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO). CEO covers the title Managing Director where the title 
CEO is not used. Retirement under the age of 65 is treated as removal as under- 
performing managers are sometimes forced to take early retirement (Warner, Watts 
and Wruck, 1988). Financial restructuring refers to both equity and dcbt-based 
strategies. 
Equity issues and dividend cuts and omission are part of equity 
restructuring. Equity issues not made specifically for restructuring the firm's 
finances and alleviate financial distress eg. those for financing acquisitions, and 
routine exercising of sbare options and issues less than 1% of pre-decline year 
total assets are excluded. Dividend cut/omission refers to cut/otnission in 
dividends per share relative to the pre-decline year. Debt restructuring includes 
debt refitiancing and renegotiation of die terms of existing debt and debt for equity 
swaps. Cash generating strategies include asset sales and equity issues. Actions are 
identified from company announcements and news reports. 
Distressed firms 
Panel B of Table 6.1 shows the definition of restructuring strategies for the 
distressed sample. For distressed firms, we employ purely accounting report- 
based defmition of restructuring actions, as opposed to news announcements used 
for poor stock performance firms, for two important reasons. First, the use of an 
accounting-based Z score computed from annual accounting reports necessitates 
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the classification of strategies over the same period. Though strategy 
announcement is swiftly reflected in stock returns it is not speedily reflected in Z 
., Y. 
- 
scores. Put differently, there exists a serious mismatch between strategy 
announcements (which impact upon stock returns immediately) and actual 
financial movements reported in accounting periods (which impact upon the Z 
score). For example, if a divestment is announced in December 1993, its impact 
is reflected in stock returns in the same month. However, the actual financial 
impact of the divestment may be reported over many accounting periods. 
Significantly, since it is the actual accounting impact of a strategy and not its 
announcement that the Z score captures, the use of accounting-based proxies for 
turnaround strategies is imperative in this study. Secondly, of great interest is 
whether strategies extracted from accounting reports can predict changes in Z 
scores 
- 
scores based on composite accounting ratios. A model which predicts 
recovery in Z score from actions disclosed in accounting reports is tlicrcforc a 
potentially valuable complement to the Z score bankruptcy prediction model. 
Operational restructuring covers the situation where cash is expended on 
costs rationalisation, layoffs, closures and integration of business units. Asset 
restructuring includes both asset divestment and new investment. Asset sales cover 
the situation where significant cash is generated from sale of fixed assets and 
sub sidiaries/associates, in excess of 5% of pre-distress year total assets. The 
choice of 5% is arbitrary, but similar to that used by Ofek (1993) to define asset 
restructuring. The objective is to filter out insignificant routine managerial actions 
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which may be unconnected to performance decline. Investment covers the 
incidence of significant acquisitions (in excess of 5% of pre-distress year total 
assets) and significant internal capital expenditures (in excess of 10% of pre- 
distress year total assets). 
As with the poor performing sample, managerial restructuring covers the 
replacement of Chairman or CEO. Again, the tenn CEO includes Managing 
Director where the title CEO is not used in a firm. Financial restructuring refers 
to both equity and debt-based strategies. Equity restructuring comprises equity 
issues and dividend cuts and omissions. Equity issues not made specifically for 
restructuring the firm's finances and alleviate financial distress eg. financing 
acquisitions, and routine exercising of share options and issues less than 1% of 
pre-decline year total assets are excluded. Dividend cut/omission refers to 
situations where there is a cut/omission in dividends per share relative to the pre- 
distress year level. Debt-based strategy refers to the incidence of debt 
restructuring. Debt restructuring covers situations from debt refinancing to 
renegotiation of the terms of existing debt and debt for equity swaps. Cash 
generating strategies refer to the adoption of either asset sales or equity issues or 
both strategics. 
6.3.2 Testing for the impact of strategy and control variables on corporate 
recovery 
As discussed in section 6.2.4, logit regression tests for the impact of 
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independent variables on recovery and non-recovery whilst OLS regression 
captures their impact on the extent of recovery. 
Poor performing sample 
In the logit regressions, the recovery or non-recovery to pre-decline stock 
returns ranking in the market i. e. 50th percentile or higher, in terms of two post- 
decline years' cumulative stock returns, is die dependent variable. As such, 
recovery is codcd I and non-rccovcry is codcd 0. The objective is to test the 
effectiveness of restructuring strategies over two post-decline years in effecting 
recovery. 
In the OLS regression models, the two post-decline years' cumulative stock 
returns ranking in the market, is the dependent variable. 
Distressed sample 
In the logit regressions, the recovery or non-recovery to positive Z scores, 
two years post-decline, is the dependent variable. They are again coded I for 
recovery and 0 for non-recovery. Similar to the poor performance sample, the 
objective is to test the effectiveness of restructuring strategies over two post- 
distress years in effecting recovery". 
In the OLS regressions, the change in Z score over two years post-decline 
from the pre-distress year is the dependent variable. 
'Z score is a measure of financial health and bankruptcy risk and not a returns measure. 
Therefore, the Z score at the end of the second year post-distress reflects the impact of 
restructuring strategies in the intervening two years post-distress. A return to positive score is 
indicative that the restructuring strategies have been effective. 
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6.4 Definitions of explanatory variables 
6.4.1 Testing for the combined impact of agency and control variables on 
strategy c oice 
The main explanatory variables, agency monitoring variables representing 
different aspects of leverage, share ownership and board composition are 
summarised in Table 6.2. Leverage is the ratio of book value of total debt to book 
values of debt and equity". Leverage is further decomposed into three forms 
defined by ownership i. e. bank leverage, maturity i. e. short term leverage and 
security of debt i. e. unsecured leverage (all as a proportion of debt and equity). 
The leverage variables are not entirely mutually exclusive. For example, there may 
be an overlap between short term and bank leverage. This implies that when all the 
leverage variables arc included in a regression, the empirical result has to be 
interpreted with caution. 
Share ownership is proxied by directors' shareholding and block 
shareholding. Block shareholding is total of each individual holding of 5% or more 
(3% or more since 3 1' May 1990, see Companies Act 1989). Block shareholding 
is divided into shareholding by institutional (financial) and noti-institutional 
holding. The latter is further split into associated and unassociated blocks. 
Associated blocks are held by families or trusts associated with tile directors and 
company pension schemes. 
"The choice of book, rather than market, value of equity reflects the predominant use of 
the former measure in bank loan covenants (Lasfer et. al, 1996). 
165 
Table 6.2: Definition or agency monitoring and control variables 
The table defines three groups of variables representing firms' agency monitoring mechanisms 
which are expected to influence the choice of restructuring strategies by poor performing firms. 
Debt structure is based on accounting information provided by Datastrcarn Intemational and Extel 
Company Research. Ownership and governance data are extracted from Hambro, Corporate 
Register, Hambro, Company Guide and Annual Reports and Accounts. Block shareholding is total 
of each individual holding of 5% or more (3% or more since 31 st May 1990) as disclosed in the 
company annual reports, Internal causes of decline arc per company press release and annual 
reports. GDP growth rates and Financial Times Actuaries (FTA) industry/scctor returns are 
extracted from Datastrcam International. 
Variable Definition 
Debt stnicture 
Leverage Total book debt/( total book debt and equity). 
Short term leverage Short term debt/(total book debt and equity). 
Bank leverage Bank debt/(total book debt and equity). 
Unsecured leverage Unsecured debt/(total book debt and equity). 
Owitership stnicture 
Managerial shareholding Shareholding by members of the board of directors. 
Affiliated block shareholding Shareholding by family members or trusts of members of 
the board and company pension plans. 
Institutional block Shareholding by institutional investors. 
shareholding 
Non-institutional unaffiliated Shareholding by non-institutional blockholders 
block shareholding unaffiliated to management. 
Governance structure 
CEO-duality Combined role of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
(Chairman cum CEO) 
Non-executive Chairperson Chairperson in non-executive capacity. 
Outside directors Non-executive directors as a percentage of total number 
of directors. 
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Table 6.2: Derinition of agency monitoring and control variables (Contd. ) 
Control variables 
Severity of decline Stock returns ranking (or Z score) in the year of decline 
Internal causes of decline Reported internal causes such as project failures, bad 
acquisitions or poor financial control. 
Economic condition GDP growth rate in the year of restructuring. 
Industry condition FTA industry average log return (Z score of median firm 
in distressed firm's industry sector) in the year of 
restructuring. 
Size Log of market value of equity (log of total assets) in the 
pre-decline year. 
Board composition is proxied by three variables: proportion of outside or 
non-cxecutivc dircctors on the board, whetlicr the board is chaircd by a non- 
executive director, and CEO curn Chainnan (CEO duality) where the two posts are 
held by the same person. 
As discussed in Section 4.4, the empirical literature suggests that 
turnaround strategy choices are also dictated by non-agency monitoring factors. 
These additional variables 
- 
severity of decline, economic and industry downturn, 
and fmn-specific cause of decline 
- 
are included in our regressions as contextual 
control variables. As the definitions for control variables may differ between the 
poor performing and distressed samples, due to difference in choice of 
performance measure, the definition for the latter group is included in parentheses, 
where such difference arises. 
Severity of decline is measured by the stock returns rankings (Z score) in 
the year of decline. The lower the firm's stock returns ranking (Z score) the more 
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severe would the perfonnance decline be. Firin-specific causes of decline are 
identified from company press release and directors' comments in annual reports 
and accounts. Economic condition is measured by the GDP growth rate whilst 
industry condition is represented by the firm's Financial Times-Actuaries [FTA] 
industry log return (Z score of median firm in the distressed firm's industry 
sector). Size of the fmn is a proxied by log of market value of equity (total assets) 
in the pre-decline year. Internal cause of decline, CEO duality and non-executive 
Chairmen are each represented by a dummy variable (I where it exists and 0 if 
otherwise). 
6.4.2 Testing for the impact of intensity of strategy and control variables on 
corporate recovery 
The main explanatory variables are the intensity of restructuring strategies 
finns adopt to turnaround their performance. Intensity of restructuring is measured 
using accounting and cash flow data relative to their pre-decline deflator or value" 
and is surnmarised in Table 6.3. 
"The choice of pre-decline values is based on the need to avoid contamination by severity 
of decline. For example, severe decline firms by construct will have a more severe drop in assets. 
Thus, a $10 million asset sales by similar-sized firms in the pre-decline period, may be artificially 
more intensive for the severe decline firms than for the less severe decline firms. If measured 
relative to post-decline value of such firms. 
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Table 6.3: Definition of intensity of restructuring strategies 
Sourccs: Extcl Financial Ncws Summary, Company Rcports and Accounts and Datastrcam 
Intcrnational. 
Strategy Definition 
Operational restructuring 
Operational restructuring Costs of rationalisation, layoffs, closures and 
integration of business units/pre-decline year total 
assets. 
Asset restructuring 
Asset sales Value of divestment of subsidiaries and other asset 
sales/pre-decline year total assets. 
Acquisitions Costs of full and partial acquisitions of 
businesses/pre-decline year total assets. 
Internal capital expenditure Capital expenditure on fixed assets such as plant 
and machinery/pre-decline year total assets. 
Managerial restructuring 
Managerial restructuring Number of changes in executive and non-executive 
directors/pre-decline year total number of 
directors. 
Financial restructuring 
Dividend cut or omission Percentage change in dividend per share from pre- 
decline year's (omission is equal to 
-100%). 
Equity issue Cash raised from equity issue/pre-decline year 
total assets. 
Operational restructuring is measured by the ratio of cost of restructuring 
as reported in the company accounts to pre-decline year total assets. Where 
information is available, only costs related to operational restructuring such as 
redundancy, closures, integration and operating asset writeoffs ie. stocks and 
debtors, are included. Care is taken to exclude any items unrelated to operations 
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such as provisions for loss on sale of assets or businesses. Asset reduction, 
acquisition and capital expenditure are measured by the cash flows expended 
deflated by pre-decline year total assets. 
Management changes are represented by the number of changes in 
executive and non-executive directors as a proportion of pre-decline year total 
number of directors. We take the opinion that board turnover provides a richer 
measure of the intensity of management changes than merely changes in Chairman 
and CEO. However, due to the lack of detailed news on cbanges in directors otber 
than the Chairman and CEO prior to 1987 (first year such information is published 
by Extel), we are not able to compute intensity of management changes for the 
distressed sample. 
Dividend change is the percentage change in current year dividends from 
the pre-decline year's. Equity issue is measured by cash raised by equity issue as 
a proportion of pre-decline year total assets. Debt restructuring e. g. forgiving of 
debt and interests, is difficult to measure, and is therefore included only as a 
dummy variable ie. I if the strategy is adopted and 0 if otherwise. The above 
intensity definitions are swmnarised in Table 6.3. As discussed in Section 5.4, the 
literature also suggests that turnaround strategy effectiveness is also conditional 
upon other control factors. These additional variables i. e. severity of decline, 
economic and industry downturn, and firm-specific cause of decline, are included 
as control variables (see Table 6.2 for their definition). 
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6.5 Data 
6.5.1 Poor performing firms sampling 
Determinants of corporate restruc uring s ra egies 
As stated earlier in Section 6.2.1, sample firms are those which experience 
a sharp decline in their relative stock return performance. On a ranking of log 
annual stock returns (capital gains and dividends) of all London Stock Excliange 
listed firms, firms which fall into the bottom 20% in a year (decline year) after 
having been in the top 50% in the previous two years (base years) are sampled. 
This sampling criterion is called the 50: 50: 20 rule. The sample covers the period 
1985-93, with 1985-91 as the base years and 1987-1993 as the decline years. The 
reason for 1987 as the first decline year is that the main source for restructuring 
news i. e. Extel Financial News Summary, was first published in 1987. 
Datastream International is the data source for annual stock returns. An 
initial sample of 415 declining firms satisfying our 50: 50: 20 rule is assembled 
from a total of 3706 firms covered by Datastrearn over the period 1985-1993". 
Sampling excludes fightly regulated financials and utilities, and firms with a 
market capitalisation of less than 110m. Small firms are excluded for want of 
sufficient data on their restructuring. 
Data on the sample firms' restructuring activities and on the explanatory 
variables are collected from Datastrcam. International, company annual reports and 
3'High variance in returns does not appear to cause the performance decline in our 
sample fmns. Indeed, the sample betas are not unusual (mean and median values are both 
less than 1) and unlikely to cause the stock returns decline. 
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Extel Annual News Summaries. Such data are not available for all companies 
defined as poor performing. The final sample consists of 297 poor performing 
finns. 
Effectiveness of corporate restructuring strategies 
Turnaround is defined, in this research, as recovery to pre-decline 
performance over two years post-decline. As 1994 is the last year of publication 
of Extel Annual Financial News Summary, firms experiencing a performance 
decline in 1993 are excluded. The reduced sample, before allowing for takeovers 
and failures, for the purpose of examining effectiveness of strategies, consists of 
229 poor performing finns. 
6.5.2 Distressed firms sampling 
Determinants of corporate restructuring strategies 
As stated earlier in Section 6.2.1, sample finns are those which experience 
a sharp decline to a negative Z score after having had a positive Z score for at least 
two consecutive years. This sampling criterion is called flie ++- (plus, plus, minus) 
rule. The sample covers the period 1983-93, with 1983-91 as the base years and 
1985-1993 as the distress years. Z scores are provided by Syspas Limited" 
. 
Due 
to the choice of accounting report-based strategy definition for the distressed 
sample (see section 6.3.1), the sample period is not limited to the publication of 
Extel's Annual Financial News Summary which commences in 1987. Further, 
I'Syspas is an acronym for System Performance Analysis Services. 
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using a longer sampling period allows the sampling of distressed firms under a 
wide range of economic conditions. 
An initial sample of 245 distressed firms satisfying our ++- rule is 
assembled from a total of 976 FT-All Share firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange in the period 1983-1993. The restriction to FT-All Share firms is due to 
the fact that at flie time of the study, a complete database of Z scores dating back 
to 1983 was only available for FT-All Share firms. Sampling excludes tightly 
regulated financials and utilities, and firms widi a market capitalisation of less than 
110m. Small firms are excluded for want of sufficient information on their 
restructuring. 
Due to the different sampling periods and definitions of performance 
decline, the poor performing and distressed samples are expected to have few 
overlap in memberships. One is not necessarily a subset of the other. 
Data on the sample firms' restructuring activities and on the explanatory 
variables are collected from Datastream International, company annual reports and 
Extel Annual News Sununaries. Such data were not available for all distressed 
companies. The final sample consists of 201 distressed firms. 
Effectiveness of corporate restructuring strategies 
Again, turnaround is defined, in this research, as recovery to pre-distress 
performance over two years post-distress. Due to incomplete post-distress 
accounting data, firnis experiencing afinancial distress in 1993 are excluded. The 
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reduced sample, for the purpose of examining effectiveness of strategies, consists 
of 166 distressed firms with a minimum of two years post-distress restructuring 
data. 
6.6 Sample characteristics 
6.6.1 Poor performing firms 
Table 6.4 provides tile descriptive statistics for tile sample of poor 
performance firms. From Panel A, the mean (median) annual returns for the 
sample in the base and distress years are: 42% (36%) (base year 
-2), 33% (28%) 
(base year 
-1) and -51% (-38*/o) (decline year). The returns to the Financial Times 
All Share (FTA) Index in the same years are: 16%, 15% and 16% respectively. 
The sample firms clearly outperform. the market in the base years (except 
for returns in the year 1989)" and underperform it in the decline year. Moreover, 
the decline in performance for the sample is also very steep. This pattern of steep 
decline is repeated for each of the sample decline years 1987 to 1993. The sample 
median returns in the base years range from 
-6% in 1990 (decline year 1991), a 
recession period, to 53% in 1986 (decline year 1988). In the decline years the 
median return ranges from 
- 
12% in 1993 to 
- 
112% in 1990. 
"It should be borne in mind that although the Financial Times All-Share Index covers 
around 800 firms, it is not a full market index. In addition, it is a value weighted index whilst our 
average returns are equally weighted. Hence, it is not surprising that, occasionally, a firm ranked 
among the top 50% in stock returns term, underperform the Financial Times All-Share Index. 
174 
Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics of sample firms' financial performance: 
Poor performance sample 
Panel A shows the sample firms' stock returns in the two years prior to and including the year of decline. 
Return on the Financial Times All Share Index (FT-All), a valuc-wciglited index based on around 800 
firms covering in excess of 90% of stock market capitalisation on the London Stock Exchange, is 
provided for comparison. All returns are log returns (capital gains and dividends). Panel B shows changes 
in accounting based performance in the year of decline. PBIT =profit before interest and tax. Earnings 
per sharc(EPS) = profit after tax, minority interests and preference dividends but before extraordinary 
items / the average number of shares in issue in the year. Return on equity - prorit attributable to 
shareholders / share capital and reserves less intangibles. Return on assets - profit before interest and 
tax/ total assets less current liabilities. PBITD = profit before interest and tax plus depreciation (proxy 
for cash flows). Total debt is the total of all intcrcst-bcaring debt i. e. short, long and subordinated debt. 
Capital employed is the sum of book debt plus book equity. Beta is based on figures computed by the Risk 
Measurement Service of the London Business School, at the beginning of the year prior to decline, Size 
is market capitalisation at the beginning of die year of decline. In Panel B the mean and median arc tested 
using die t-test and the non-parainctric Mann-VAiitncy Wilcoxon test, *** indicates significance at 1%. 
Sources: Datastrcain International, Extel Financial, and London Business School. 
Panel A: Annual stock returns (%) in the year of, one and two years prior 
to, decline 
Returns in decline Returns in decline Returns in decline 
No. 
year-2 
Mean Med. 
year- I 
Mean Med. 
year 
Mean Med. 
Total sample 297 42.2 35.56 32.63 28.07 
-51.12 -37.87 
FT-All Share 16.15 14.59 16.29 
Decline year, 1987 41 40.3 33.65 50.2 41.2 
-30.1 -23.97 
FT-All Share 18.3 24.3 7.7 
Decline year, 1988 55 61.1 52.85 49.2 40.49 
-39.7 -33.41 
FT-All Share 24.3 7.7 11 
Decline year, 1989 54 44.1 39.46 28.7 23.61 
-50.2 -41.72 
FT-All Share 7.7 11 30.8 
Decline year 1990 32 38.4 35.14 32.7 25.98 
-131 -112.31 
FT-All Share 11 30.8 
-10.3 
Decline year, 1991 28 23.9 20.58 
-7 -6.19 -59.2 -54.03 
FT-All Share 30.8 
-10.3 18.9 
Decline year, 1992 19 1.6 2.79 36 24.88 
-95.7 -80.53 
FT-All Share 
-10.3 18.9 18.7 
Decline year, 1993 68 47.2 40.51 27.1 23.06 
-20.4 -11-58 
FT-All Share 18.9 18.7 25.1 
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Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics of sample firms' financial performance: 
Poor performance sample (Contd. ) 
Panel B: Changes in profitability and cash flows in the year of decline from 
the base years 
Average of two Decline 
pre- decline years year 
Mean (0/o) Mean (1/o) t stat. z stat. 
PBIT/Sales 10.72 7.05 4.23*** 9.30*** 
Earnings per share growth 29-15 -26.93 18.88*** 13.15 *** 
Return on equity 19.12 13.87 5.06*** 7.04*** 
Return on asset 22.65 15.3 8.26*** 9.02*** 
PBITD/Capital employed 30.1 23.69 6.94*** 7.27*** 
PBITDfFotaI Debt 140.45 53.82 13.50*** 11.36*** 
Min Max Stdev Mean Median 
Risk (beta) 0.05 1.49 0.21 0.95 0.96 
Size (IM) 10 344.2 54.8 
Panel B of Table 6.4 gives the perfonnance statistics based on accounting 
variablcs. Both profitability and cash flows dctcriorate significantly in the declinc 
year from the average of the two base years. The fall in mean values for tile 
profitability measures 
- 
operating margin, earnings per share, return on equity and 
return on assets 
- 
ranges from 28% (return on equity) to 192% (earnings per share 
, cwth), all significant at 1%. Fall in mean values of operating cash flows - profit ffo 
before interest tax and depreciation (PBITD) deflated by capital employed and 
total debts 
- 
are 21% and 62% respectively, both significant at 1%. 
The accounting-based performance measures thus reflect the stock return 
176 
decline. Our sample thus captures both operating performance and stock return 
performance decline. The similarity of performance decline in both stock return 
and accounting terms suggests that the stock return decline is no fteak caused by 
correction of stock market overreaction in the base years unrelated to underlying 
operating performance (see Section 2.5). Excess volatility due to high beta stocks 
in the sample does not appear to cause the perfon-nance decline in our sample 
firms. Indeed, the sample betas are not unusual (mean and median values are bodi 
less than 1) and unlikely to cause the stock returns decline. 
Figure 6.1 provides a graphical presentation of sample firms pre- and post- 
decline median annual and cumulative stock returns. Focusing on the cumulative 
market-ad usted returns (MAR), sample firms enjoyed returns 37% in excess of Ii 
the market two years prior to decline. However, the decline is significantly steep 
bringing the three-year cumulative MAR returns to 
-2 1% in the decline year. 
The decline is clearly not a short term market anomaly as tile median firm 
continues to slide in performance for two years resulting in five years cumulative 
market-ad usted losses of 56% two years post decline. Therefore, the 50: 50: 20 Ii 
sampling criterion is robust. 
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Agency monitoring mechanisms and restructuring strategies 
Panel A of Table 6.5 provides descriptive statistics on the leverage, share 
ownership and governance structure in base year 
- 
1. The median leverage, total 
book debt to book debt and equity, is 27% and median short term debt, bank debt 
and unsecured debt as proportions of book debt and equity are in the range 12% 
to 
Median directors' shareholding is 9.5% and associated block holding is 
negligible. Institutional ownership amounts to a median value of 6.9%. Non- 
institutional but unassociated block holding has a median of 0% (but a mean of 
7%). 
Comparison with the only other study by Ofek (1993) that examines the 
determinants of restructuring strategy choice during performance decline reveals 
interesting differences in agency mechanism between US and UK finns. Ofek 
reports median leverage, managerial shareholding and outside (non-managerial) 
shareholding of 3 P/o, 22% and 6% respectively. This compares with our sample's 
27%, 9.5% and 6.9% (to maintain clarity of table 6.5, outside shareholding, per 
Ofek's definition, is not shown in the table). 
As regards board composition, in 44% of sample finns one person plays the 
dual roles of Chairman and CEO. Non-executive Chainnen preside over the board 
in 25% of the companies. The median proportion of outside directors in the sample 
boards is 22%. 
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Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics for independent variables: Poor 
performance sample 
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in the prc-dccline year. For 
definitions of the variables see Table 6.2. Pancl B shows the distribution of corporate restructuring actions 
in the year of decline and first and sccond years post-dccline. In Pancl A Chairman cum CEO, and Non- 
executive Chairmcn arc dummy variables coded as I when either is the case and 0 if othcrwisc. For thcsc 
two variables mean is the sample proportion of firms with code value 1. In Panel B, internal cause of 
dccline is a dummy variable coded as I when thcrc is an internal cause of decline and 0 if otlicrwisc. For 
definitions of the variables see Table 6.2. Sampic size declincs in Panel B due to failure of firm, takeover 
or where no data arc available i. e. firms declining in 1993 (68 firms) arc excluded from decline ycar+2 
analysis. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for agency variables 
Agency variables Mean Med. 
Capital structurc 
Leverage 0.29 0.27 
Short tenn leverage 0.13 0.12 
Bank leverage 0.18 0.16 
Unsecured leverage 0.16 0.12 
Owncrship stmatirc (1/o) 
Managerial shareholding 19.90 9.5 
Associated block shareholding 0.71 0.0 
Institutional block shareholding 12.2 6.9 
Non-institutional unassociated block 
shareholding 7.1 0.0 
Governance stnicture 
Chairman cum CEO 0.44 
Non-executive Chairman 0.25 
Proportion of outside directors (%) 20.0 22.0 
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Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics for independent variables: Poor 
performance sample (Contd. ) 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for control variables 
Mean Median 
Control variables 
Internal cause of decline 0.30 
Severity of decline 
Size (IM) 
10.8 10.9 
344.2 54.8 
Decline year Decline year+ 1 Decline year+-2 
Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. 
Economic condition 2.27 2.34 2.08 2.34 0.68 0.70 
Industry condition 7.80 11.29 3.60 7.80 
-32.75 -16.88 
According to Chairmen and directors' report, one in three cases of poor 
performance is caused by an internal firm-specific problem. Admittedly, this 
figure can be higher as some managers may be reluctant to admit that there is an 
internal cause of decline, perhaps to avoid blame for the decline. Sample firms' 
severity of decline proxied by stock returns ranking in the market in the year of 
decline unsurprisingly averages 10%. The average size of sample firms is $344m 
but the median size is only $55m. Sample firms appear to enjoy good economic 
and industry condition until two years after decline. Hence, adverse industry and 
economic conditions do not appear to be a cause of decline. However, it biglilights 
the importance of controlling for external environment during the post-decline 
restructuring period. 
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Frequency of turnaround strategies 
Panel A of Table 6.6 reports the frequencies of sample firms undertaking 
different turnaround strategies in the decline year and in the two post-decline 
years. We find that the most frequent form of restructuring is operational with 
59% of the sample firms undertaking it in the decline year and 47% and 52% of 
the firms in the two following years. This is comparable to Ofek's 53% for the 
decline year. 
Asset sales are carried out by between 27% and 38% of the finns in those 
years. This is much higher than the 15% rate reported by Ofek (1993) for the 
decline year. Surprisingly, acquisitions do not cease when finns hit trouble and 
they are carried out by nearly 50% of the sample firms in the decline year and by 
36% and 27% of the finns in the post-dcclinc years. Internal capital expenditure, 
again surprisingly, does not cease but is incurred by 62% of firms in the decline 
year and by 50% and 48% in the following years. 
Removal of top management is observed in 20% (in the decline year) to 
26% (in decline year+l) of die sample firms. Again, Ofek (1993) reports a similar 
21% of top management replacement in the year of decline. 
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Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables: Poor performance 
sample 
This table shows the distribution of corporate restructuring actions in the year of 
decline, one year, and two years post-decline. Frequency is the proportion of sample 
firm adopting the strategy. For definition of variables see Table 6.1. Sample size 
declines in post-decline years due to failure of firm, takeover or where no data is 
available i. e. firms declining in 1993 (68 firms) are excluded from decline year+2 
analysis. Source: Company press releases and Company Reports and Accounts. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for restructuring s(rategies in the year of, first 
year after, and second year after decline 
Decline Decline Decline Any of 
year year+ I yeari-2 the three 
years 
Sample size 297 270 188 188 
Restructuring strategy Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency 
(0/0) (0/0) (0/0) 
Operational restructuring 
Cost rationalisation, layoffs, 58.6 46.7 51.6 83.5 
closures and integration of 
business units 
Asset restnicturing 
Asset sales 26.6 37.8 35.6 61.2 
Acquisitions 50.2 35.9 27.1 70.7 
Internal capital expenditure 61.6 50.4 47.9 74.5 
Managerial restructuring 
Replace top management 19.5 25.9 21.8 49.5 
Financial restructuritig 
Dividend cut or omission 23.6 27.0 34.0 54.3 
Equity issue 20.2 10.4 13.3 39.9 
Debt restructuring 2.4 3.3 7.4 11.7 
Cash gmeralive actims 40.1 44.1 43.6 71.3 
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Panel B: Frequency or restructuring strategies pursued by UK listed firms 
during the period 1989-1994. 
Frequency is the annual average of strategies taken. Asset sales cover divestments, 
management buy-outs and other asset sales. Acquisitions represent full and partial 
acquisitions. Dividend cut/ornission refers to cut/omission in dividends per share over the 
previous year. Rights issue encompasses rights issue, rights offer, offer for sale, open offer 
and placing of firm shares vvith institutions and financial intermediaries. Source: FT Extel 
Company Research. 
Average Asset sales Acquisitions Dividend Rights issue Cash 
no. of firms cut/omission generative 
actions 
1521 19.6 34.5 20.8 15.2 31.6% 
Debt restructuring is quite infrequent with only 2% of sample firms in the 
decline year and 3% and 7% in the following years respectively taking recourse 
to it. In contrast Ofek (1993) finds 11% of his sample firms restructure their debt 
in the year of decline. Debt restructuring appears to be more common among US 
than UK fmns (only 4% of fmns declining to the bottom 10% i. e. 50: 50: 10 firms, 
adopt it in the decline year). Equity issues are made by 20% of sample firms in the 
decline year but by only about 10% in the following years. The most frequently 
employed financial restructuring device is dividend cut or omission. The 
proportions of firms adopting this strategy in the three years are: 24%, 27% and 
34%. 
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Over the three-year period, from decline to two post-decline years, in 
excess of 80% of sample firms restructure their operations. About 70% of firms 
adopt cash generative actions 
- 
61% sell assets and 40% make equity issues. 
Similar proportions (70% and 74%) make acquisitions and internal capital 
expenditure. Nearly half of sample firms replace their Chairman or CEO in the 
three year period. About 54% of firms resort to dividend cut/omission to stave off 
financial crisis. However, only 12% need to, or succeed in, restructuring their 
debts. 
An interesting question to ask is how does the frequency of strategies 
followed by performance decline firms compare with that in tile population of 
firms listed in the UK. Do tlicse frequencies differ from the population 
benchmarks and why?. Panel B of Table 6.6 provides answers to these questions 
where population data are available. From an extensive search of financial news 
reported by fmns and reported by Extel in their Company Research CD-ROM, we 
manage to compile the average number of firms in the population adopting asset 
sales, acquisition, dividend cut/on-tission, rights issue and cash generative actions, 
during die period 1989-1994. The period coincides mostly with the period under 
study, and the year 1989 is the first year covered by the Company Research CD- 
ROM. 
Unsurprisingly, higher proportion of our sample firms (33% 
- 
average of 
three years) sell their assets than the average firm in the population (201/o)", from 
"'The population figure is the average of the population for the period 1989-1994. The 
same benchmark population is used in the rest of this section. It should be noted that the 
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the year of decline to two years thereafter. In the case of acquisitions, sample firms 
clearly overtake the population with 50% versus 35% of firms in the population 
making acquisitions in the year of decline. However, with the onset of decline, 
sample firms reduce their rate of acquisitions to the population rate one year after 
decline. Two years post-decline, far fewer sample firms seek acquisitions 
compared to the population. A similar pattern is observed with regard to equity 
rights issue. More sample firms tap the market than the population at large, 20% 
in the decline year, versus 15% in the population. However, sample firms are 
likely to be less successful in raising finance from equity investors subsequent to 
performance decline, than the average firm in die population. Finally, more sample 
firms resort to cash generative actions than the population with an annual average 
of 41% of sample firms taking it compared to only 32*/o of firms in the population. 
Overall, our sample of declining firms carries out various restructuring activities 
more intensively than the population at large. 
Correlations among explanatory and control variables 
Table 6.7 reports the correlation matrix among the explanatory and control 
variables. Out of a total 105 pairwise correlations among 15 variables, only 8 
exceed 0.30 and only 4 equals or exceed 0.20. The two largest correlations are 
between bank leverage and short tenn leverage (0.36), non-executive Chairman 
and Chainnan cum CEO (-0.5 1). 
population includes the sample firm. Hence, comparison is not between two independent groups. 
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The high positive relation between bank leverage and short term leverage 
is typical of UK firms as they tend to have significant amounts of short term bank 
borrowings in the form of bank overdrafts and short term loans. The negative 
correlation between non-executive Chairman and Chairman cum CEO is less than 
1.00 as executive Chainnanship may be jointly held by CEO or independently held 
by a separate person. 
Interestingly, managerial shareholding is negatively related to size (-0.36), 
institutional shareholding (-0.32) and proportion of outside directors (-0.26). The 
inverse relationship between managerial sharebolding and firm size may lie in the 
declining ability of managers to subscribe to large equity stakes as firms get larger. 
Also, large firms are traded and followed more frequently by analysts, lience the 
larger presence of institutions. An alternative explanation, consistent with the 
agency model, is that where managers' shareholding is low, and managers' 
incentives are potentially weakly aligned to those of shareholders, managers are 
kept on their toes by greater monitoring by institutional shareholders and outside 
directors (Bathala, Moon and Rao, 1994). 
Taking the agency view again, where the Chairman is in a non-executive 
capacity, governance is enhanced by a higher proportion of outside directors. 
However, where the Chairman is also the CEO, board monitoring is further 
weakened by the tendency to have a lower proportion of outside directors in the 
board. This highlights the potential detrimental effects of an entrenched Chairman 
cum CEO. The power of the Chairman cum CEO appears to be premised on or 
reinforced by high managerial shareholding. 
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Finally, larger fmns appear to have a higher proportion of outside directors 
than smaller fmns. This may reflect the substitution of outside director monitoring 
for managerial-incentive alignmentý due to managers' small shareholding, in large 
fmns. Alternatively, large finns' attraction of institutional shareholders and in turn 
institutional shareholders' preference for outside director monitoring may give rise 
to higher proportion of outside directors in big than in small firms. 
Given the above weak correlations, collinearity may not be a problem in the 
regression models discussed earlier. However, we shall run regressions based on 
simplified explanatoty variables such as one leverage variables i. e. total leverage, 
and two equity shareholding i. e. inside and outside shareholding, instead of four, 
to ensure robustness of results and mitigate flie impact of multi-collinearity. Inside 
shareholding comprises managerial and manager-associated shareholding. Outside 
shareholding is made up of institutional and non-institutional unassociated, 
shareholding. To test for the impact of lender and ownership types on restructuring 
strategy choice, we shall rerun all the regressions with the three lender types and 
four shareholder types described in Section 4.2. 
Poor performing firms' financial status two years post-decline 
Table 6.8 shows flie financial status of sample firms two years after decline. 
Over that period, more than a third recover whilst nearly half of sample firms do 
not recover to their pre-decline performance. The remainder of sample firms is 
either taken over (12.2%) or become insolvent (5.7%). A firm is declared insolvent 
when an administrator or receiver is appointed to the firm. The rate of recovery 
fluctuates between a low of 22% to a high of 49%. 
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Table 6.8: Financial status two years post-decline: Poor performance 
sample 
This table shows the financial status of sample firms two year's post- 
decline. Over that period, firms may be taken over, become insolvent, recover, 
deteriorate into severe decline or merely survive. Recovery is defined as the return 
to top 50% rank in two years' cumulative stock returns on the market whilst severe 
decline is defined as remaining in the bottom 20% rank in the market two years 
post-decline. Mere survivors are firms which recover in their returns to above the 
20% rank threshold but have yet reached their pre-decline perfonnance i. e. top 
50% rank. Finns in severe decline or merely surviving are collectively termed 
non-recovery firms. 
Non recovery leading to 
Decline Taken over Insolvent Recovery . ............................ ......................... 4 : Total Severe decline " : Mere survival 
.............. ...................... ........ ............ 
1 .......... . .......... 1. .............. ............ 1 ............. ............ ................. ...... Year No. No. %:: No. No. No. W No. % 
.............. ...................... 
4 
........ ............ 
4 
.......... . .......... . .............. ............ ............. ............ ................. ...... 87 7 17.1: 20 48.8: 7 17.1: 7 17.1: 41 17.9 
.............. ...................... 88 7 12.7:: ........ 1 ........... 1.8:: 12 21.8:: 14 25.5:: 21 38.2:: 55 24 
.............. 89 ...................... 7 13.0:: ........ 5 ............ ........... 9.3:: 17 ......... . 315: .............. 12 ............. 22.2:: ............. 13 ............ 24.1: ................. 54 ...... 23.6 
.............. 90 ........... 4 ......... 12.5: .......... 5 ............ ........... 15,6:: 9 ......... 28.1:: 11 34A: 3 9A: 32 14 
.............. 91 ........... 3 ......... 10.7:: .......... 1 ............ ........... 3.6: 11 ......... . 39.3:: .............. 4 ............ 14.3:: ............. 9 ............ 32.1: ................. 28 ...... 12.2 
.............. 
92 
........... ........... .......... 
1 
.............. ............ 
5.3 8 
........... . 
42.1: 
.............. 
6 
............. 
31.6: 
.......................... 
4 21.1: 
................. 
19 
...... 
8.3 
.............. rotal ....................... 28 12.2:: .......... 13 ............. .......... 5.7: 77 .......... ............... 33.6: 54 ........... 23.6: .......................... 57 24.9: .................... 229 100 
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It is clear that firms that decline prior to or during an economic downturn 
(distress years 1988-1990) have a much tougher tumaround job i. e. smaller chance 
of recovery, than do firms that decline in other economic conditions. The final 
sample of recovery and non-recovery firms, excluding those taken over or 
becoming insolvent, comprises 188 firms, with a minimum of two years post- 
decline restructuring data. 
Figure 6.2 shows sample firms' pre- and post-decline annual and 
cumulative market-adjusted log returns respectively. Returns are median returns 
in the sample groups. Both groups out perform tile market in the two years 
preceding decline, and underperfonn flie market in the decline year. Non-recovery 
firms, however, continue to underperfonn the market by a wide margin whilst 
recovery firms surge ahead of die market consistently in die two-year post-decline. 
In terms of five year cumulative returns, recovery and non-recovery firms 
underperform the market by 16% and 106% respectively. 
A similar pattern is observed in operating performance two years' post- 
decline, as shown in Table 6.9. Recovery firms record marked improvements in 
operating performance, based on two year average post-decline performance 
compared to the decline year. All six performance indicators register 
improvements, although only four are statistically significant based on either the 
t statistic or non-parametric Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon tests or both. They are 
earnings per share growth, return on equity, return on assets and debt cover i. e. 
operating cash flow to total debt. 
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Figure 6.2: Recovery and non-recovery firms median annual and cumulative market-adjusted 
log rcturns from two years prc-dccline to two years post-dccline: Poor performance sample 
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Table 6.9: Descriptive statistics of sample firms' post-decline financial 
performance: Poor performance sample 
Changes in profitability and cash flows two years post-decline from the 
year of decline 
The table shows the changes in profitability and cash flow perfonnance two years 
post-decline from the decline year. The post-decline performance is a two year 
average. For definitions of variables refer to Table 6.4. Sources: Datastream 
International and Extel Financial. The mean and mcdian arc tested using tile Mest 
and the non-parametric Mann-VAitney Wilcoxon test. indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectivel 
Average of 
two post 
Decline year decline years 
Mean Mean (%) t stat. z stat. 
Recovery firms 
PBIT/Sales 7.72 8.68 
23.4 
0.49 
Earnings per share growth 
-21.86 5.34*** 4.46*** 
Return on equity 13.58 18.34 1.68* 2.25** 
Return on assets 15.92 17.54 1.35 1.65* 
PBITD/Capital employed 24.6 25 0.29 0.65 
PBITD/Total Debt 60.84 112.84 5.39*** 4.66***_ 
Sample size 77 
Non-recovery firms 
PBIT/Sales 6.16 
Earnings per share growth 
-31.39 
Return on equity 12.43 
Return on assets 13 
5.49 0.37 2.98*** 
-17.94 1.76* 1.03 
6.08 1.75* 3.58*** 
7.99 3.56*** 3.55*** 
PBITD/Capital employed 20.72 15.37 2.97*** 2.80*** 
PBITD/Total Debt 43.11 52.8 1.26 0.56 
-Sample size 
III 
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In contrast non-recovery firins register significant deterioration in four out 
the six indicators tested. These firms continue to slide in perfonnance measured 
in terms of PBIT/Sales, return on equity, return on asset and cash flow (PBITD) 
to capital employed. Earnings per share (EPS) growth continues to be negative. 
Debt cover (PBITD/Total debt) improves, although the improvement is 
insignificant". The results further confirm the robustness of the recovery 
definition based on stock returns ranking for the poor performance sample. 
6.6.2 Distressed firms 
Sample characteristics 
Table 6.10 provides tile descriptive statistics for tile sample. From Panel A, 
the mean (median) Z scores for the sample in the pre-distrcss and distress years 
are: 4.22 (3.6 1) (Distress year 
-2), 3.14 (2.17) (Distress year - 1) and - 1.86 (-1.25) 
(Distress year). The sample firms are clearly financially healthy in the pre-distress 
years. The steep decline is evident for each of tile sample distress years 1985 to 
1993. 
A total of 55 distressed firms, or 27% of the sample, are also poorly 
performing between 1987-1993, and thus are included in the performing sample. 
Panel B of Table 6.10 gives the perfonnance statistics based on accounting 
variables. Profitability and cash flows deteriorate significantly in the distress year. 
"The improvement appears to be a reflection of decline firms' pre-occupation with 
debt reduction. 
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Table 6.10: Descriptive statistics of sample firms financial performance: 
Distressed sample 
Panel A shows the sample firms' Z scores in the two years prior to and in the year of decline. Panel B 
shows percentage change in accounting based performancc in the year of decline. PBIT - profit before 
interest and tax. Earnings per share (EPS) - profit after tax, minority interests and preference dividends 
but before extraordinary items / the average number of shares in issue in the year. Return on equity - 
profit attributable to shareholders / share capital and reserves less intangibles. Return on assets - profit 
before interest and tax / total assets less current liabilities. Size is the log of total assets at the beginning 
of the year of decline. In Panel B difference in means is tested using the t-tcst and the non-pan, metric 
Mann-VVhitncy Wilcoxon test. indicates significancc at IYo, 5% and 10% respectively. Z score 
is supplied by Syspas Limited, London. 
Panel A: Z score two years prior to, one year prior to and year of, distress 
Z score in 
Distrcss ycar-2 Distrcss ycar- I Distrcss ycar 
No. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. 
Total sample 201 4.22 3.61 3.14 2.17 
-1.86 -1.25 
Distress year, 1985 15 3.81 2.74 2.26 1.9 
-1.62 -0.92 
Distress year, 1986 16 4.72 4.67 3.52 2.77 
-1.46 -1 
Distress year, 1987 12 2.84 2.19 2.63 1.69 
-2.21 -2.14 
Distress year, 1988 28 4.54 4.52 2.79 2.01 
-1.6 -1.28 
Distress year, 1989 29 4.18 4.09 3.61 2.64 
-2.07 -2 
Distress year, 1990 30 5.21 4.16 4.13 2.17 
-1.84 -1.35 
Distress year, 1991 33 4.03 3.66 2.75 2.24 
-1.99 -1.18 
Distress year, 1992 25 3.32 2.67 2.62 2.14 
-1.38 -1.06 
Distress year, 1993 13 4.75 4.25 3.64 2.65 
-2.97 -1.28 
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Panel B: Changes in financial performance measures in the year of distress 
Average of two 
pre-distress 
years Decline year 
Mean(O/, o) Mean (1/0 t stat. z stat. 
PBIVSales 9.54 4.64 6.25*** 7.22*** 
Earnings per share 35.94 
Return on equity 24.96 
Return on assets 18.38 
PBITD/Capital employed 14.2 
PBITD/Total debt 74.39 
-26.7 6.38*** 5.65*** 
5.9 7.22*** 7.06*** 
8.88 7.06* 7.36*** 
3.37 8.14*** 8.00*** 
6.36 12.72*** 11.26*** 
Mean Median 
Size (LM) 373.12 69.8 
All six profitability and cash flow measures 
- 
operating margin (PBIT/sales), 
earnings per share growth, return on equity and return on assets, operating cash 
flow to capital employed (PBITD/Capital employed) and operating cash flow to 
total debt 
- 
register significant drops (at 1%, except return on assets) in tenns of 
mean of the two pre-distress years' figures to the distress year. The univariate 
accounting ratios thus closely reflect the negative composite Z scores. 
196 
Agency monitoring mechanisms and turnaround strategies 
Panel A of Table 6.11 provides descriptive statistics on the leverage, share 
ownership and governance structure in the pre-distress year. The median leverage, 
total book debt/book debt and equity, is 30%. This is similar to the 27% in a 
sample of 297 poorly performing firms examined earlier (Table 6.5). In the 
following discussion, comparative statistics from that sample are provided in 
parentheses. Median short term debt, bank debt and unsecured debt as proportions 
of book debt and equity are in the range 10% to 19% (12% to 16%). 
Median directors' shareholding is 2.56% (9.5%) and associated block 
holding is again negligible. Median institutional ownership is 5.6% (6.9%). Non- 
institutional but unassociated blockholding has a median ownership of 0%, but a 
mean ownership of 3.8% (median 0%, mean 71/o). Evidently, directors' 
shareholding and non-institutional unassociated block shareholding in distressed 
firms are lower than in merely poorly performing firms. Tile former may possibly 
be due to removal of incumbent shareholder-managers post-decline to poor 
performance 
- 
nearly 50% of managers are removed in the three-year period from 
and including the year of decline (see Table 6.6). The latter may be due to lack of 
institutional shareholder support for distressed firms. Indeed, insfitutional investors 
have been accused of cutting their losses and selling out on the first sight of 
financial trouble (Pound, 1988). 
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Table 6.11: Descriptive statistics for agency and restructuring strategy 
variables: Distressed sample 
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in the prc-distrcss year. For 
definitions of the variables see Tables 6.1 and 6.3. Panel B shows the distribution of corporate 
restructuring actions in the year of distress and over two years post-distrcss. In Panel A Chairman cum 
CEO, and Non-exccutivc Chairmen arc dummy variables coded as I when citlicr is the case and 0 if 
otherwise. In Panel B frequency is the proportion of sample firm adopting the strategy. Sample size 
declines in Panel B due to failure of firm, takeover or where no data arc available e. g. firms entering 
distress in 1993 (13 firms) are excluded from distress ycar+2 analysis. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for agency variables 
Agency variable Pre-distress year 
Mean Median 
Capital stniclure 
Leverage 0.31 0.30 
Short term leverage 0.16 0.14 
Bank leverage 0.21 0.19 
Unsecured leverage 0.17 0.10 
Owiership structure 
Managerial shareholding 11.03 2.56 
Associated block shareholding 1.33 0.00 
Institutional block shareholding 11.96 5.60 
Non-institutional unassociated block shareholding 3.82 0.00 
Goveniance structure 
Chairman cum CEO 0.37 
Non-executive Chairman 0.19 
Outside directors 0.22 0.24 
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Table 6.11: Descriptive statistics for agency and dependent variables: 
Distressed sample (Contd. ) 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for control variables 
Mean Median 
Control variables 
Internal cause of decline 0.30 
Sevcrity of decline 10.8 10.9 
Size (LM) 344.2 54.8 
Decline year Decline ycar+1 Decline ycar+2 
Mcan Med. Mean Mod. Mean Mcd. 
Economic condition 2.27 2.34 2.08 2.34 0.68 0.70 
Industry condition 7.80 11.29 3.60 7.80 -32.75 -16.88 
190 Panel C: Descriptive statistics for restructuring strategies in year of, 
first and second year post-distress. 
Distress Distress Distress Any of the 
year year+ I ycar+2 three years 
Sample size 201 191 166 166 
Restructuring strategy Frequency of sample finns undertaking strategy (%) 
Operational restructuring 
Costs rationalisation, closures 
and integration of business units 
Asset restructuring 
Asset sales 
Acquisition 
Internal capital expenditure 
Managerial restructuring 
Replace top management 
Financial restructuring 
Equity issue 
Dividend cut/omission 
Debt restructuring 
Cash generative actions 
53.7 39.8 34.9 75.9 
35.8 43.4 41.6 66.3 
49.3 31.9 30.1 60.8 
53.7 49.2 42.8 62.6 
32.8 28.8 25.9 67.5 
17.4 23.6 15.1 38.6 
27.4 41.9 43.4 47.6 
6.0 7.8 6.6 16.3 
45.3 50.8 48.2 71.7 
As regards board composition, in 37% (44%) of sample firms one person 
plays the dual roles of Chairman and CEO. Non-executive Chairmen preside over 
the board in 19% (24%) of the companies. The median proportion of outside 
directors in the sample boards is 22% (22%). Interestingly, both financial distress 
and poor performance firms suffer from low levels of outside directors' 
monitoring. 
In the case of control variables, internal cause of distress is reported by 
management in 30% of sample firms. Economic and industry conditions appear 
to be reasonably good in the distress year, suggesting economic or industry 
condition is an unlikely cause of decline. 
Panel C of Table 6.11 reports the frequencies of sample firms undertaking 
different turnaround strategies in the distress year and in the two post-distress 
years. Again, we find that the most frequent form of restructuring is operational 
with 54% of die sample firms undertaking it in Ole distress year and 40% and 35% 
of the finns in the two following years. Asset sales are carried out by between 
35% and 43% of the firms in those years. Again, acquisitions do not cease when 
firms hit trouble and they are carried out by 49% of the sample firms in the 
distress year and by around 30% of tile finns in the two post-distress years. 
Internal capital expenditure, again surprisingly, does not cease but is incurred by 
54% of finns in the distress year and by 49% and 43% in the following years. 
Replacement of top management is observed in 26% to 33% of the sample 
fmns in the distress and post-distress years. Debt restructuring is quite infrequent 
200 
with only 6% of sample firms in the distress year and 8% and 7% in the following 
two years respectively taking recourse to it. Equity issues are made by 17% sample 
firms in Ole distress year climbing to 24% in tile year after but decline to 15% in 
the third year. The most frequently employed financial restructuring device is 
dividend cut or omission. The proportions of firms adopting this strategy in the 
three years are: 27%, 42% and 43%. 
Over the tbree-year period, from distress to two post-distress years, in 
excess of 75% of sample firms restructure their operations. About 72% of firms 
adopt cash generative actions 
- 
66% sell assets and 39% make equity issues. Over 
60% make acquisitions and internal capital expenditure. Nearly 68% of sample 
finns replace their Chainnan or CEO in the three-year period. Just under half of 
sample firms resort to dividend cut/omission to stave off financial crisis. Finally, 
only 16% need to, or succeed in, restructuring their debts. 
Comparison of restructuring strategies between poor performing and 
distressed samples 
Table 6.12 shows the difference in proportions of firms in both samples 
adopting a particular restructuring strategy. In the year of pcrfonnance decline 
significantly fewer distressed finns invest in capital expenditure than the poorly 
performing firms. In contrast, significantly more distressed firms sell their assets, 
sack their management or restructure their debts than the poorly performing firms. 
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This trend is repeated in first and second year post-performance decline. In 
the first year post-decl ine/di stress, significantly more distressed firms have to 
restructure their finances i.e. cut/omit dividends, raise equity issue and restructure 
their debt than poorly perfonning ones. In the second year post-decline/distress, 
significantly more distressed firms have to cut/omit their dividends. However, in 
the second year, significantly more poor performing firms are beginning to 
restructure their operations than distressed ones. 
Correlations among explanatory and control variables 
- 
Distressed sample 
Table 6.13 reports flie correlation matrix among the explanatory and control 
variables. Out of a total 105 pairwise correlations among 15 variables, only 7 
equal or exceed 0.30 and 12 equal or exceed 0.20. The two largest correlations are 
between bank leverage and unsecured leverage (0.51), and bank leverage and 
short tenn leverage and (0.45). We shall concentrate our discussion on the five 
coffelations in excess of 0.30. 
As discussed earlier in section 6.6.1, the high positive relation between 
bank leverage and short term leverage is typical of UK finns. The high positive 
correlation between bank leverage and unsecured leverage is interesting, as it 
counters the typical assumption that all bank debts are secured in the UK. 
Also, the high negative coffelation between dual CEO and non-executive 
Chainnan is expected (see Section 6.6.1). 
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Economic condition is highly negatively correlated with an internal cause 
of decline, suggesting that when economic condition is good, financial distress is 
likely to be caused by an internal firm-specific problem. Finally larger firms tend 
to be associated with higher levels of unsecured leverage. This reflects larger 
finns' access to the wider source of finances such as the unsecured corporate bond 
market. 
Collinearity, therefore, may not pose a problem in our regression models 
reported in the following chapters.. However, we shall run regressions based on 
simplified explanatory variables 
- 
one leverage variables i. e. total leverage, and 
two shareholding variables i. e. inside and outside shareholding, to ensure 
robustness of results and avoid potential multi-collinearity problems. As with the 
poor performing sample (Section 6.6.1), to test for the impact of lender and 
ownersb. ip types on restructuring strategy choice, we shall rerun all the regressions 
with the three Icnder types and four shareholder types described in Section 4.2. 
Distressed firms' financial status two years post-distress 
Table 6.14 shows tile financial status of sample finns two years after 
distress. More than a third recover whilst nearly half of sample firms do not 
recover to their pre-distrcss perfonnance (i. e. positive Z score), two years post- 
distress. The remainder of sample firms is either taken over (9.01/o) or become 
insolvent (2.7%). 
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The annual rate of recovery fluctuates between a low of 32% and a high of 75%. 
It is clear fliat firms that enter distress immediately prior to an economic downturn 
(distress years 1988-1989) have a much tougher turnaround job than do firms that 
enter distress in other economic conditions. The final sample comprises 166 
recovery and non-recovery finns. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we formulate logit and OLS regression models to reflect the 
relationship between restructuring strategy choice and agency monitoring 
framework and control variables, for both the poorly performing and distressed 
samples. For the poorly performing sample, tile event study methodology to 
measure stock markets' assessment of die effectiveness of strategy implementation 
is discussed. 
For bodi samples, we describe tile criteria used to select sample firms and 
define the explanatory and dependent variables. We examine the characteristics 
of sample firms in terms of their financial performance, agency and control 
variables and choice of restructuring strategies. 
The Pearson correlation coefficients among tile explanatory variables 
indicate that only a few explanatory variables have high pairwise correlations 
terms, thus potentially mitigating any multi-collinearity in our regression models. 
The financial status two years post-decline are analysed, and the financial 
characteristics of recovery and non-recovcry firms are contrasted. We also 
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compare the strategy choice between the poorly perfonning and distressed 
sampIcs. 
In the next chapter, we sliall present and discuss die empirical results on the 
impact of lender, owner and governance structure on restructuring strategy choice, 
for the poorly performing sample. Also, in Chapter 8 we shall examine and discuss 
the results on the cffectiveness of restructuring strategies for the poorly 
performing sample. In Chapter 9, we repeat the analyses in Chapter 7 and 8 for a 
sample of distressed firms. 
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Appendix 6.1: Event study methodology 
Abnormal return 
We define abnonnal return AR,, as 
ARIt = Rit - Cit 
Ri, is the continuously compounded (log) return on day t (dividend plus capital 
gains) for finn i. This is calculated as 
R,, =Log 
Pit + Dit 
Pi. t-l 
Pi, = Price of company i's share at the end of trading on day t. 
Di, = Dividends received on day t. 
Ci, = control rate of return which is what company i's return would have 
been in the absence of the event. In order to ensure that our results are not 
sensitive to the models used in specifying the control rate of return, we use three 
altemative models to deten-nine Ci, 
Model 1: The market model 
Clf 
= a, + PfRmr +E It 
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where 
R. t = continuously compounded return on day t for the market index. 
I= regression constant obtained from regressing R,, on 
k, This 
measures the mean return over the estimation period which is not explained by the 
market. 
pi 
= regression co-efficient obtained from regressing P,,, on R, 
Ej. an crror tcnn with a mcan of zcro and a constant variancc. 
The values of ai and ci are obtained by regressing R,, on R., for the 150 
trading days (if returns data are available) or fewer observations (with a minimum 
of 120 days) beginning at t= -170, where t=0 is the event day. 
Model 2: The market adjusted model 
The control rate of return for any firm in the event period" is the return on 
the market index i. e. FT All Share Index, for that day. 
Cit 
= 
Rmt 
This model is equivalent to flie market model where for all firms ai =0 and Pi =1. 
Model 3: The size adjusted model 
Sin-dlar to Model 2 except that the control rate of return for any finn for a 
42 Event period rcrcrs to the number of days over which abnormal returns ecntred on the event day are 
ctunulated in orxk-T to estimate the impact of the event on shareholder wealth. In this thesis event period is 
-5 to 
+5 days centred on the strategy announcement date. 
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day in the event period is the mean daily return of firms in a similar-sized 
portfolio. Size portfolios are formed by ranking all companies listed in the 
Official, Unlisted and Third Market (unfil 1991) by year end market capitalisation. 
Size quinfiles are formed with the lowest 20% given rank 1, next lowest 20% rank 
2, and so on. Subsequent year equally weighted average returns of each quintiles 
are used as the size adjusted benchmark. Size quintile portfolios are then 
rebalanced every year. 
Model 4: The mean adjusted model 
The control rate of return for any finn for a day in the event period is the 
mean daily return of the firm over tile estimation period (ie, -170 to -21days 
centred on the event day). 
1=-21 
E Rif 
Cit 1=-170 
150 
This model assumes that Ole expected return for company i is a constant but it can 
vary across firms. The model would be accurate if the risk free rate, risk prernia 
and a company's systematic risk are constant over time. 
Cumulative abnormal returns 
For each day in the event period, the abnormal returns are averaged across 
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firms to produce the sample average abnormal return for that day AIR, 
N 
ARi, 
ARt 
N 
Where N is the number of firms in the sample. 
Tlie average cumulafive abnonnal returns (CAR) for N firms over a number 
of days from tl to Q is calculated by summing AR, over the period from tI to t2. 
1=12 
CAR, l, t2 
E ARt 
1=11 
The null hypothesis examined under the event study is that AR, =0 and CAR,,,, 2 
= 0. The test statistic under the null hypothesis is based on the assumption of 
cross-sectional dependence in the abnormal returns (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
Test statistics assuming cross sectional dependence 
The test statistic for event day t is 
DEP ARt SAR( 
SD(AR) 
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where 
-21 E (ARt 
- 
; i-l? )2 
SD(AR) 1=-170 
149 
and 
1=-21 
E ARt 
A T? 1=-170 
150 
For tests over the multi day interval tI to t2, the test statistic is 
SCAR DEP =- 
CARtJ, 
t2 
tl, t2 SD(AR) * V12 
- 
11 +I 
The problem of thin trading 
The market model estimates of beta can be subject to a downward 
estimation bias if shares are thinly traded. In other words, price recorded at the end 
of a trading day for a security actually relates to a transaction occurring before that 
trading day. Dimson (1979) shows that the estimated betas of infrequently traded 
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securities rise as the returns measurement interval rises"'. This implies that when 
using daily returns the market model estimates of beta for thinly traded shares have 
a downward bias, while for frequently traded shares the bias is upward. Biased 
beta estimates will result in biased estimates of abnormal returns and consequently 
mis-specified results in an event study. A number of approaches have been 
suggested in the literature to correct for such thin trading bias (Scholes and 
Williams, 1977; Dimson, 1979; Fowler and Rourke, 1983). 
Scholes and Williams (1977) show that under the assumption that a 
transaction tak-es place in every measurement interval (ie, a security does not have 
any missing observation between day 
-I and +1) a consistent estimate of beta is 
Psw p- I+ PO + 
P+j 
I+2P, 
where 
P*I = slope coefficient in a simple regression of P.,, against F.,,., 
P0= slope coefficient in a simple regression of R,, against R,, 
P +1 = slope coefficient in a simple regression of Ri, against R,,,, +, 
Pi = first order serial correlation of the market index. 
The Dimson (1979) aggregated coefficient estimator does not require that 
a transaction take place in every measurement interval. The Dimson estimator is 
43 ie, betas calculated using monthly returns are higher than betas calculated using daily returns for 
infrequently traded shares. 
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obtained by regressing the security return on day t against leading, synchronous 
and lagged returns of the market index, in order to obtain a set of slope 
coefficients, P, which are then summed to give an unbiased estimate of true beta. 
n 
PDW Pt 
where P, t= 
-n,..., O,..., n are slope cocfficients in an OLS regression of the return 
on the security in period t against the return on the market index in period t- 
n,..., O,..., t+n. 
Fowler and Rourke (1983) suggest a correction to the Dimson aggregated 
co-efficient method to equate it to the Scholes and Williams estimator. Fowler and 
Rourke show that when a security skips a single price observation, the correct beta 
estimate is 
PM 
_ 
p-2 + p- I+ PO + p+l + p+2 
I+ 2(p, + P2) 
where 
Pn= slope co-efficient in a simple regression of the security return in period 
t on the return on the market in period t+n. 
PI = first order serial correlation coefficient of the market index. 
P2 = second order serial correlation coefficient of the market index. 
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The PFR expression can be generalised for securities that skip two or more 
consecutive observations. 
PFR 
= 
P-n + P-n+l +.... + PO + P, +.... + pn 
I+ 2(p, + P2 + 
""+ 
Pn) 
To correct for thin trading in this study, we tried the correction procedures 
suggested by Dimson (1979) and Fowler and Rourke (1983) using combinations 
of lead and lagged market return tenns to represent from one to five missing 
transactions. This means one lead and one lag to test for one missing transaction 
(per Scholes and Williams / Fowler and Rourke) till five leads and five lags for 
five missing transactions. The results of five various combinations are compared 
below. 
Number of 
Leads Lags Dimson Fowler and Rourke 
1 1 0.763 0.662 
2 2 0.787 0.693 
3 3 0.845 0.710 
4 4 0.847 0.802 
15 51 0.843 1 0.833 
The final model was selected on the basis of maximum average sample beta 
- 
the Dimson correction procedure using four lags and four lead terms. The 
corrected betas in our sample is therefore 0.847. 
216 
Chapter 7. DETERMINANTS OF RESTRUCTURING STRATEGY 
CHOICE OF POORLY PERFORMING FIRMS: RESULTS 
OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the relationship between agency 
monitoring and restructuring strategy choice. We report and discuss the impact of 
single stakeholder dominance on restructuring strategy choice. We employ logistic 
regressions to model the joint impact of lender types, ownership pattern and 
governance structure of poorly perfonning finns on their choice of restructuring 
strategies. The range of strategies explored and the explanatory variables 
employed are the most comprehensive of the turnaround studies to date. The 
results will contribute significantly to our knowledge of determinants of 
restructuring strategy choice in a turnaround context. In turn, an improved 
understanding of how turnaround strategy choice is detennined contributes to 
improved turnaround management and success. 
7.2 Impact of stakeholder dominance on turnaround strategy choice 
As discussed in Section 6.2.2, we divide our sample into two groups 
- 
one 
stakeholder dominated and the other non-dominated by that stakeholder. For each 
stakeholder group 
- 
lenders, manager-owners, block shareholders, dual-CEO and 
collective board of directors 
- 
we examine the likelihood of a given strategy being 
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chosen. The difference in the proportions of sample firms in the dominated and 
non-dominated groups choosing a strategy is tested for statistical significance. Any 
significant difference reflects the influence of the dominant stakeholder. 
Table 7.1 shows the proportions of sample firms pursuing a given strategy 
in the decline and two post-declme years when die differences in these proportions 
between dominant and non-dominant groups are significant. Sample firms are 
lenders dominated when their leverage is in the top quartile of all sample firms and 
they are in severe decline (bottom 50% in sample stock return ranking in the year 
of decline). Lenders under such circumstances are likely to have high stakes in 
recovery and to exercise their priority rights. Sample firms are manager dominated 
when they are not lenders dominated according to the above definition and the 
managerial and manager-associated shareholdings are in the top quartile of all 
sample firms. 
VAiere neither lenders nor manager-owners are dominant according to die 
above d61nitions and the unassociatcd block shareholding is in the top quartilc of 
all sample firms, the firms are deemed block shareholders dominated. Finally, 
when the sample firms not dominated by lenders, manager-owners and block 
shareholders, they are deemed to be under the control of the board of directors. In 
tum, the board may be dominated by a dual-CEO or collectively by the board 
members. 
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Comparison of predicted with actual impact of stakeholder dominance 
The results in Panel A to E of Table 7.1 is summarised in Table 7.2. Table 
7.2 also presents, for comparison purposes, the predicted impact of individual 
stakeholder dominance as discussed in Section 4.3 and presented in Table 4.2. 
From Table 7.2. lenders dominated firms are more likely to opt for 
operational restructuring, cash generative actions (both asset sales and equity 
issues), dividend cut/omission and debt restructuring. They are less likely to 
approve of a cash-consuming strategy such as capital expcnditurc. The results 
show potential beneficial effects of lender monitoring. Lenders' insistence on 
operational restructuring, aimed at stopping 'the bleeding or cash haemorrhage', 
can be value-enbancing in the long run. Operational restructuring actions such as 
layoffs, closures and integration of facilities are often associated with large 
charges against earnings and cash outflow in the short term, but they can reduce 
costs and increase profitability and cash outflows in the long run. 
On the other hand, lenders' tight financial reigns through discouraging 
investments can cause an under-investment problem. Lenders may not only be 
depriving firms of vital resources necessary to compete and reverse decline but 
also weaken their strategic health by favouring short tenn cash generative 
measures to facilitate debt repayment. Lenders' behaviour matches most 
predictions made in Table 4.2 except for the lack of influence in replacing top 
managers. Perhaps, sample firms' financial decline may not yet be severe enough 
to allow lenders to instigate top management clianges. 
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Alternatively, managers may be succeeding in 'buying-out' lenders through 
by undertaking cash generative actions aimed at debt repayment. It is worth noting 
that lenders' strong positive association with debt restructuring confirms our 
alternative prediction made in Section 4.3.1, in that the positive relation exists by 
construct as highly geared finns have a higher probability of debt restructuring. 
Manager-owners dominated firms are more likely to undertake capital 
expenditure and less inclined to pursue operational restructuring, asset sales, 
acquisitions and equity issues. They are also less likely to sack their top 
management!. Dual-CEO dominant board influence is also limited. 
Declining firms dominated by their dual-CEOs prefer capital expenditure 
but disfavour dividend cut/omission. Dominant dual-CEOs understandably reduce 
the chances of managerial restructuring. In summary, the behaviours of dominant 
owner-managers and dual role CEOs are similar to predictions made earlier, 
except for the lack of impact on debt restructuring. Perhaps, we have to look at the 
logistic regressions later in the chapter for pointers. It is interesting to note the 
preference for capital expenditure but not acquisitions by owner-manager 
dominated firms. However, in Table 6.7 we note that managerial shareholding 
(inherently hih in owner-manager dominated firms) is negatively associated with 
size. Small fmns, due to their size, are likely to go for internal capital expenditure 
rather than acquisitions. 
When firms are dominated by blockholders, their influence is less 
pronounced and limited to three strategies. These shareholders make operational 
restructuring, asset sales and capital expenditure less likely. The actual impact is 
somewhat weaker than that predicted in Section 4.3. The resistance to operational 
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restructuring may be premised on the huge cost and 'pain' of operational 
restructuring. Frequently, restructuring costs outstrip operating profits in the 
restructuring year and cause a dent on the firms' balance sheet value. Cash often 
has to be expended to meet redundancy and closure costs, putting pressure on cash 
flows available for dividends. A call for equity funds can be made imminent when 
large restructuring costs are incurred. Dominant block holders' disfavour of 
divestments and investments are as predicted. However, the predicted impact on 
the other strategies uch as resistance to equity issues and instigation of managerial 
restructuring is not observed. Again, we have to look at the logistic regressions 
later for pointers. 
Collective board dominance influences only four strategies. With little 
conflict of interests in die board, operational restructuring, asset sales, acquisitions 
and cash generative actions are favoured by the board collectively. All the positive 
impacts are as predicted in secfion 4.3. However, the consensus nature of decision 
maldng means potentially controversial managerial restructuring is avoided. Again, 
we have to look at the logistic regressions later for pointers as to why there is a 
lack of influence on dividend cut/omission and debt restructuring. 
Having explored the impact of stakeholder dominance on restructuring 
strategy choice, we examine the impact of individual agency monitoring 
mechanisms on strategy choice. 
7.3 Impact of individual agency monitoring mechanisms on turnaround 
strategy choice: Logit regressions 
Tables 7.3 to 7.5 report the model coefficients for the logistic regressions 
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of corporate restructuring strategy choices on the agency and control variables. A 
separate regression is run for each strategy and for each of the following years: 
year of performance decline (the decline year), the year after the decline year 
(decline year + 1) and the second year after the decline year (decline year + 2)". 
We model the strategy choices in each year, rather than over a single period 
covering the three years, to examine whether there is a time lag in the incidence 
and impact of agency and control variables. It is plausible that certain drastic 
strategies like top managerial cbange or asset reduction may be undertaken after 
less controversial 'first measure' strategies uch as operational restructuring. 
7.3.1 Strategy choices and their determinants in the decline year 
In flie decline year, in Table 7.3, the logistic models are significant (based 
on the chisquare statistic at at least 10%) in all except where managerial 
restructuring, equity issues and debt restructuring are the dependent variables. 
Significance of the individual variables is tested for using the Wald statistic" The 
explanatory power of the models, measured by McFadden's R ', ranges from 4% 
to 24%. 
It appears that in the decline year itself significant restructuring begins to 
take place and the impact of several agency and control variables is felt. Lenders 
increase the probability of cash generative actions such as asset sales, and debt 
restructuring. They, however, disfavour capital expenditure. 
"We have not pooled strategies over the three years as it would lose the impact of timing 
and sequence of strategies. 
" To simplify the tables, the Wald statistic is not reported and only its level of significance 
indicated when it is significant at least at the 10% level. 
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Inside shareholders ignificantly influence the choice of several strategies. 
Thcy rcducc the probability of the dcclining finn pursuing opcrational 
restructuring, cash generative actions such as asset sales, and cash-consuming 
acquisitions. Similar to inside shareholders, outside sbarebolders resist asset sales 
in the year of decline. 
As regards the governance structure, declining firms with dual-CEOs are 
more likely to increase capital expenditure and reduce the probability of cash 
generative actions. Non-executive Chairmen make equity issues less likely. The 
proportion of outside directors on the board has little influence in the choice of 
turnaround strategy, at least in the decline year. 
The control variables have varying impact on strategy choice. Wiere firm. 
decline coincides with an economic downturn, firms react with several strategies. 
They resort to more operational restructuring, managerial restructuring and 
dividend cutlomission. However, cash generative actions such as asset sales, and 
investments are less likely during an economic downturn. 
On the other hand, if die whole of their industry suffers decline, the sample 
firms are more likely to increase their capital expenditure perhaps to gain 
productivity improvements and competitive advantage, cut/omit their dividends 
and restructure their debts. Where decline has resulted from firm specific internal 
problems, operational restructuring is more likely. 
The more severely declining finns (represented by low ranking on stock 
returns in the decline year) are more likely to go for operational restructuring, top 
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management replacement, dividend cut/omission and debt restructuring. Finally, 
large companies are more likely to avoid the need for dividend cut/omission. 
In summary, lenders, shareholders and Chairman cum CEOs are active in 
the year of decline. Control variables such as economic condition, industry 
condition and severity of decline have a strong and almost dominant influence on 
the choice of restructuring strategy in the year of decline. 
7.3.2 Strategy choices and their determinants: Year after decline 
Strategy choice models for the second year of decline are shown in Table 
7.4. All logit models are significant at better than the 5% level except for 
managerial restructuring. McFadden's W ranges from 7% to 27% and for most of 
the models the explanatory power is much higher than with their counterparts in 
the decline year in Table 7.3. It appears that agency and control variables exercise 
their influence more strongly in the second year of decline suggesting delayed 
reaction to the onset of decline. 
Unsurprisingly, lenders continue to press for cash generative actions, both 
asset sales and equity issues. They are also more likely to agree to debt 
restructuring. 
Ownership continues to influence strategy choices in the second year. 
Inside shareholders decrease the probability of operational restructuring and cash 
generative actions such as asset sales. Thus, management-associated shareholders' 
resistance to these strategies in the decline year is reinforced in the second year. 
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Interestingly, inside shareholders esist debt restructuring. This is consistent 
with discussion in Scction 4.3 that managcr-owners would prcfer not to rcstructure 
their firms' debts due to the heavy demands placed by lenders, in particular the 
instigation of management changes. 
Outside shareholders make operational restructuring less likely, a behaviour 
observed earlier in the case where blockholders dominate the firm's decision 
making process (see discussion in Section 7.2). 
CEO-duality continues to increase the chances of capital expenditure but, 
unsurprisingly, reduces the probability of managerial restructuring. Non-executive 
Chainnen make cash generative actions such as asset sales, and debt restructuring 
less likely but capital expenditure more likely. Non-executive Chairmen's 
behaviour is consistent with earlier discussion in Section 4.2.3, which suggests 
that they go along with managers on policy decisions and potentially perpetuate 
managerial entrenchment. 
In the second year, the beneficial effects of outside directors' monitoring 
are felt. More outside directors mean greater chances of cash generative actions 
such as asset sales, and managerial restructuring. Outside directors' activism in the 
second year is in stark contrast to their passivity in the decline year. 
The effects of economic downturn are equally significant in the second 
year. It continues to increase the probability of operational restructuring and 
dividend cut/omission. It also increases debt restructuring, but reduces the 
probability of investments. 
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Industry downturn makes operational restructuring, dividend cut/omission 
and debt restructuring more likely. However, the chances of successfully raising 
equity funds are much reduced. Reduction in equity issues during an industry 
downturn is comprehensible as the stock market may be less than enthusiastic 
about the prospects of furns, in that industry. Internal cause of decline increases the 
need for asset sales in the second year of decline. Severity of decline impacts 
further in the second year. It continues to make operational restructuring, dividend 
cut/omission and debt restructuring more likely. In addition, the more severely 
declining finns are also less likely to undertake acquisitions. Finally, size increases 
the probability of investments in the form acquisitions and capital expenditure. 
This supports the discussion in Section 4.3 that large firms are more resourceful 
and therefore have the option of investing in more profitable products/markets to 
reverse their decline. 
7.3.3 Strategy choices and their determinants: Second year after decline 
The logit models of strategy choices made in the third year of decline 
(decline year + 2) are shown in Table 7.5. In contrast to the model for the previous 
year in Table 7.4, only five of the diird year models are significant at least at 10% 
level. McFadden's W ranges from 5% to 27%. The third year models thus 
generally have less explanatory power than the models for the first year after 
decline. It appears that the influence of the agency and control variables on 
strategy choices is waning. Nevertheless, some of these variables continue to exert 
significant impact. 
Lenders continue to restrict capital expenditure. Debt restructuring is again 
made more likely by lenders. Inside shareholders stubbornly resist cash generative 
strategies, specifically asset sales, for the third consecutive year. 
231 
1 
.-IA IN -A t *0 
4. )
i 
.zAP2Aý 
,e§8g81 4) 'Tj 0 
416 
" 
8 
CA 
.4 
4 -; 
-0 g 1, 
E to i- 
" 
78 
.0rIý,!! t9 
23 t4 
* 
m 
,-0 
mi 
10 2 r 
121 
a 
2 
88 
0 
.' 
U 
6 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
- 
* 00 
00 
o 0 - 9 0 . 0 d 
* 
* 
9 0 0 9 
W) C14 cs 
en 1.0 -4 t- eq 
en 00 
-1 8 8 a 
C; C; 0 9 
t- -1 1-0 110 8 wl "t 
,: ý in fý 
- 
ei q llq ""i "t 
. 
w , 
ci 9 9 9 
. 9 9 
00 r- 
9 9 q 9 
00 tn W) eq %, q in wl en 1 Cý 0 ci e4 6 6 C; ci 
t- 10 eol 
Q 0 eol C) 6 q; C; C; '? 
%0 * 
o - 0 
- 
0 
p 
in in 
I 
0 
0 
- 
" 
0 
U 
U 
i 0 
U 
Z 
0 
I- 0 
0 PW 40 
9 ?, i 8 e-i 1-4 v 
'o 
"It C5 It in 
-4 0 
vo 00 w! a% 
t-ý 0; 
W, 
eq 
0; c; 
0 tn 8 
wi 6 
-4 en 0 
0 
Outside shareholders also join inside shareholders in resisting cash 
generative strategies in the third year. 
As regards governance structure, dual CEOs persist with their preference 
for capital expenditure for the third consecutive year. Non-executive Chairmen, 
however, are largely inactive. With more outside directors declining firms are 
more likely to undertake not only more cash generative actions such as asset sales, 
but also acquisitions and capital expenditure, perhaps to expand the firm after two 
years of restructuring. 
The impact of external environment is still important in the third year. 
Economic downturn still increases the probability of operational restructuring and 
dividend cut/omission, and reduces the probability of acquisitions and capital 
expenditure. If the industry is depressed in the third year, sample firms would need 
to continue selling assets, cutting/omitting dividends and restructuring their debts. 
However, they are also inclined to remove their top management and restructure 
their operations. Presumably, where the external industry condition is 
unfavourable there is less need for firm specific remedial strategies, and hence 
operational restructuring is less likely. The converse can be said of favourable 
industry condition which renders any remedy for performance decline to be firm 
specific. Consequently, operational restructuring is more likely. 
Sample firms are still constrained in their strategy by the existence of an 
internal cause of decline and severity of the initial decline. Firms with an internal 
cause of decline are still more likely to restructure their operations and make asset 
sales. Severe decline firms are still more likely to need dividend cut/omissions. 
Firm size, however, ceases to have any impact in the third year. 
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7.3.4 Strategy choices and their determinants: A three-year summary 
Impact of agency monitoring mechanisms 
Table 7.6 summarises the results of the logit models of turnaround strategy 
choice reported in Tables 7.3 to 7.5 and highlights the impact of each agency or 
control variable on the probability of choosing or avoiding different strategies. 
In Table 7.7,. a comparison between the predicted impact shown in Table 
4.3 and the actual impact reported in Table 7.6 is presented. The following 
discussion refers to both Tables 7.6 and 7.7. 
Lenders prefer cash generation and object to investments such as capital 
expenditure. This behaviour is as predicted earlier. However, lenders are also 
inclined to restructure their lending, confirming our alternative prediction made 
earlier. It suggests that a positive association exists rather by definition than choice 
as high leverage finns are bound to experience more debt restructuring than low 
leveraged ones. 
Inside shareholders do not favour any strategy but disfavour operational and 
debt restructuring, acquisitions and cash generative actions. Again, this behaviour 
confinns earlier predictions in Section 4.3.2. 
Outside shareholders appear to support inside shareholders in resisting 
operational restructuring and cash generative actions. The resistance to operational 
restructuring is unexpected as this strategy is most uncontroversial of the lot. 
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Table 7.6: Summary of the effect of each explanatory variable on the choice of 
restructuring strategies [Poor performance sample] 
This table summariscs the results in Tables 7.3 to 7.5. The multiple influences of each 
explanatory variable on the probability of various restructuring actions occurring arc highlighted. 
Variables that are significantly positivcly(ncgativcly) related to particular strategies [i. e. 
incrcasing(decrcasing) the probability of those actions occurring] in the logistic regression models in 
Tables 7.3 to 7.5, are separately listed. 
Explanatory variable 
Probability of restructuring action 
Increased Decreased 
Leverage Asset sales Capital expenditure 
Debt restructuring 
................................................. 
Cash generative actions 
............................................. .............................................. Inside shareholding Asset sales 
Acquisitions 
Operational restructuring 
Debt restructuring 
................................................. ............................................. 
Cash generative actions 
..................................................... Outside shareholding Operational restructuring 
Asset sales 
................................................. ............................................. 
Cash generative action 
..................................................... Chairman cum CEO Capital expenditure Managerial restructuring 
................................................. ............................................. 
Cash generative actions 
..................................................... Non executive Chairman Acquisitions Asset sales 
Equity issues 
Debt restructuring 
................................................. ..................................................... 
Cash generative actions 
.................................................... Proportion of outside Asset sales 
directors Acquisitions 
Capital expenditure 
Managerial restructuring 
................................................. 
Cash generative actions 
..................................................... .................................................... Economic downturn Operational restructuring Asset sales 
Dividend cut/omission Acquisitions 
Debt restructuring Capital expenditure 
................................................. ..................................................... 
Cash generative actions 
.................................................... Industry downturn Capital expenditure Operational restructuring 
Dividend cut/omission Asset sales 
Managerial restructuring Equity issues 
................................................. 
Debt restructuring 
..................................................... 
Debt restructuring 
.................................................... Internal problem Operational restructuring 
.................................................. 
Asset sales 
............................. Severe decline ................ Operational restructuring .................................................... Acquisitions 
Managerial restructuring 
Dividend cut/omission 
.................................................. 
Debt restructuring 
............................................. ...................................... Size Acquisitions ......... Dividend cut/omission 
Capital expenditure 
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However, as discussed earlier in section 7.2 under blockholder dominance, 
this resistance to operational restructuring may be premised on the huge cost and 
'pain' of operational restructuring. Briefly, cash is often expended to meet 
redundancy and closure costs, putting pressure on cash flows available for 
dividends. 
Chairmen cum CEOs resist managerial restructuring and cash generative 
actions and favour capital expenditure. Again, this behaviour confirms our earlier 
prediction in Section 4.3.2. 
The focus of dual CEOs appears to be 'survival' i. e. keep their jobs, 
spending to get out of trouble and resist attempts to downsize through cash 
generative asset sales. 
Similarly, non-executive Chairmen resist cash generative actions and favour 
acquisitions. They also resist debt restructuring. Barring the absence of a few 
predicted associations, most of the tendencies are as predicted in section 4.3. A 
non-executive Chairman structure indeed reinforces managerial entrenchment and 
leads to managerial inertia. 
Only outside directors do not disfavour any particular strategies, and favour 
both cash generating and cash-consuming actions, and more important, instigate 
managerial restructuring. Again, behaviour of outside directors matches earlier 
predictions. This lends support to the effectiveness of the governance structure 
characterised by a substantial independent director presence. This contrasts with 
lenders, who appear to be primarily concerned only with conserving or 
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augmenting the cash position of declining firms. 
Impact of control factors 
Declining firms react differently to deterioration in the business 
environment. To keep the following discussion simple, we focus only on economic 
(industry) downturn. However, an economic (industry) upturn will simply mean 
the reverse impact applies. Faced with an economic downturn, declining firms 
resort to operational restructuring, dividend cut/omission and debt restructuring. 
Cash generative actions, however, are also more difficult in depressed economic 
climates. With difficulty in rasing funds, investments are also less likely in harsh 
economic conditions. In contrast, when their industry as a whole experiences a 
downturn, declining firms pursue capital expenditure, dividend cut/omission, 
managerial and debt restructuring. Operational restructuring, however, is less 
needed during an industry downturn. This may be due to the external cause of 
decline which may have little to do with the firms internal operational efficiency. 
Finns with an internal cause of decline are obviously more likely to restructure 
their operations. Finns facing a severe decline in perfonnance resort to 
operaflonal restructuring, dividend cut/otnission, debt restructuring and a reduction 
in acquisitions. More interestingly, management replacement is also more likely 
in such firms. This suggests that top managers are able to fend off attempts to 
replace them until the finn's financial situation deteriorates perilously. Large 
firms, being more resourceful, are less likely to resort to dividend cut/omission and 
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are more able to afford investments. 
7.3.5 Joint impact of explanatory variables on strategy choice: A three-year 
summary 
Table 7.8 summarises the joint impact of one or more agency or control 
variables on the probability of choosing or avoiding a particular strategy. It 
answers the questions 'which factors make a given restructuring strategy more 
likely and which factors make it less likelyT and 'is there a coalition of 
stakeholders bearing on the adoption of a given strategy? ' 
None of the strategies is favoured by all the stakeholders. A striking feature 
of the results is that certain stakeholder groups seem to act in similar ways to 
reduce or increase the probability of certain restructuring actions. 
Inside and outside shareholders jointly resist operational restructuring. 
However, the strategy is made imperative when the economy is facing a downturn 
and when the finn faces a severe decline associated with an internal cause. 
Industry downturn, however, means less pressure to restructure the firm's internal 
operations. 
Asset sales are jointly resisted by both shareholders and non-executive 
Chairmen whilst lenders and outside directors combine to press for it. Bad 
industry condition and the existence of an intemal problem also make asset sales 
more likely. However, poor economic condition means a poor market for asset 
sales. 
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Table 7.8: Joint impact of explanatory variables on individual restructuring 
strategy choice [Poor performance sample] 
As explanatory variables collectively influence the choice of restructuring 
strategies, their combined impact on the choice of a specific restructuring strategy 
is summarised from the results reported in Tables 7.3 to 7.5. Explanatory variables 
that are significantly positively/negatively related to a specific strategy, in the 
logistic regression models in Tables 7.3 to 7.5, increase/decrease the probability 
of that action occurring. 
Explanatory variables 
Restructuring strategy Probability increasing Probability decreasing 
Operational restructuring Economic downturn Inside shareholding 
Severe decline Outside shareholding 
Internal problem Industry downturn 
........................................................................................................................................................................... 
Asset sales Leverage Inside shareholding 
Proportion of outside 
directors 
Industry downturn 
Outside shareholding 
Non-executive Chainnan 
Economic downturn 
Internal problem 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Acquisitions Non-executive Chairman Inside shareholding 
Proportion of outside 
directors 
Severe decline 
Economic downturn 
Size 
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Table 7.8: Joint impact of explanatory variables on individual restructuring 
strategy choice (contd. ) 
Explanatory variables 
Restructuring strategy Probability increasing Probability decreasing 
Capital expenditure Chairman cum CEO Leverage 
Proportion of outside Economic downturn 
directors 
Industry downturn 
...................................................... 
Size 
.................................... ............................................... Managerial restructuring Proportion of outside Chairman cum CEO 
directors 
Economic downturn 
Industry downturn 
...................................................... 
Severe decline 
..................................................... .... . . Dividend cut/omission Economic downturn . ...................................... Size 
Industry downturn 
...................................................... 
Severe decline 
..................................................... ................ Equity issues .......................... Non-executive Chairmen 
...................................................... ..................................................... 
Industry downturn 
.................................................. Debt restructuring Leverage Inside shareholding 
Economic downturn Non-executive Chairman 
Industry downturn Industry downturn 
...................................................... 
Severe decline 
.....................................................  ..... Cash generation Leverage ............................. .......... Inside shareholding 
Proportion of outside Outside shareholding 
directors Chairman cum CEO 
Non-executive Chairman 
Economic downturn 
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Similarly, Chainnen cum CEOs, non-cxccutivc Chairmcn and outsidc 
directors jointly prefer investments. In the case of acquisitions, non-executive 
Chairmen and outside directors' preference for them is matched by inside 
shareholders' resistance to the same strategy. Large firms also favour acquisitions. 
However, a severe decline in performance and the existence of an economic 
downturn depress the incidence of acquisitions. In the case of capital expenditure, 
Chairmen cum CEO and outside directors'joint preference for it is opposed by 
lenders. Again, large fmns tend to adopt a spending strategy, perhaps due to their 
slack resources. Spending on internal capital expenditure to improve internal 
efficiency is also made compelling when flie industry is facing a downturn. 
However, an economic downturn reduces the likelihood of capital expenditure. 
Managerial replacement is made more likely by outside directors, but it is, 
predictably, opposed by Chairmen cum CEOs. However, a case for changing firm 
leadership is enhanced when the firm faces a severe decline or when the economy 
or the industry is facing a downturn. 
Only large finns appear to have the financial clout to avoid a dividend 
cut/omission. Similar to managerial restructuring, a case for dropping dividends 
is enhanced when the firm faces a severe decline or when the economy or the 
industry is facing a downturn. 
As for equity issues, the chances of successfully raising funds via the stock 
market are reduced when the firm's industry sector is facing a downturn. 
Surprisingly, non-executive Chainnen, perhaps in support of owner-managers who 
242 
may suffer financially, appear to resist equity issues. 
Inside shareholders and non-executive Chairmen jointly resist debt 
restructuring whilst lenders make it more likely. Firms facing a severe decline or 
an industry downturn are also more likely to restructure their debt. Industry 
downturn, however, appears to have mixed impact on debt restructuring. 
Cash generative actions such as asset sales are favoured or opposed by 
different coalitions of interests. While bank creditors push for cash generative 
actions, they are supported by outside directors but the coalition of inside and 
outside shareholders, Chairman cum CEO and non-executive chairmen makes it 
less probable. Also, the existence of an economic downturn makes it less likely. 
Our results thus reveal shiffing coalitions of stakeholders vis a vis different 
turnaround strategies. The results based on logit regression models are largely 
consistent with those discussed earlier under stakeholder dominance (see Section 
7.2) and thus add to the robustness of our conclusions about the impact of lenders, 
ownership and governance variables on restructuring strategy choice. 
7.4 Impact of lender and ownership types on restructuring strategy choice 
In our analysis so far we have, however, aggregated the different lender and 
shareholder types, for reason of mitigating any multi-col linearity problems. The 
question then is which type of lenders and owners favour which type of strategy. 
To test for the impact of these individual types, we rerun all the regressions in 
Tables 7.3 to 7.5 with three types of lenders instead of one, and four types of 
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shareholders instead of two. They are short tenn lenders, bank lenders and 
unsecured lenders, and manager shareholders, manager-associated block 
shareholders, institutional block shareholders and non-institutional unassociated 
block shareholders. To maintain clarity of presentation, only the summary results 
are shown in Tables 7.9 to 7.10. The results of the individual logit regressions are 
included as Appendices 7.1 to 7.3 to this chapter. The results must be interpreted 
with caution as we noted earlier in Section 6.7 that there exists significant 
correlations between certain leverage variables. Nevertheless, they contribute 
significant insight into the differing impact of individual types of lenders and 
shareholders on finns' strategy choice during periods of poor pcrfonnance. 
7.4.1 Impact of lender types 
Table 7.9 surnmarises the effect of each explanatory variable on 
restructuring strategy choice shown in Appendices 7.1 to 7.3. The results show 
that short tenn and unsecured lenders press for operational restructuring. This is 
in contrast to the neutral impact of combined lenders on operational restructuring 
earlier. 
Bank and short term lenders jointly press for cash generative actions. 
Unsecured lenders are also able to make dividend cut/omission more likely. 
However, only bank lenders have the clout to demand asset sales and restrict 
finns' capital expenditure. 
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Table 7.9: Summary of the effect of each explanatory variable on restructuring 
strategy choice: Individual variables [Poor performance sample] 
This table surnmariscs the results in Appendix 7.1 to 7.3. The multiple influences of each 
explanatory variable on the probability of various restructuring actions occurring arc highlighted. 
Variables that arc significantly positivcly/ncgativcly related to particular strategies (i. e. 
incrcasing/decreasing the probability of those actions occurring) in the logistic regression models in 
Appcndix 7.1 to 7.3, arc scparatcly listcd. 
Probability of restructuring action 
Explanatory variable Increased Decreased 
Short term leverage Operational restructuring 
Cash generative actions 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Bank leverage Asset sales Capital expenditure 
Cash generation 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Unsecured leverage Operational restructuring 
Dividend cut/omission 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Managerial shareholding Operational restructuring 
Assct saics 
Acquisitions 
Cash gcncrativc actions 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Institutional sharcholding Opcrational rcstructuring 
Assct salcs 
Cash gcncmtivc actions 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Non-institutional unassociated Managerial restructuring Operational restructuring 
shareholding Dividend cut/omission Asset sales 
Cash generative actions 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Manager-associatcd Acquisitions 
shareholding Managerial restructuring 
......................................................................................................................................................................... Chairman cum CEO Capital expenditure Managerial restructuring 
Cash gcncrativc actions 
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Table 7.9: Summary of the effect of each explanatory variable on restructuring 
strategy choice: Individual variables [Poor performance sample] (Contd. ) 
Probability of restructuring action 
Explanatory variable Increased Decreased 
Non executive Chaimian Acquisitions Asset sales 
Capital expenditure Cash generative actions 
.......................................................................................................................................................................... Proportion of outside Asset sales 
dircctors Acquisitions 
Capital cxpcnditurc 
Managcrial rcstructuring 
Cash generative actions 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Economic downturn Operational restructuring Asset sales 
Managerial restructuring Acquisitions 
Dividend cut/omission Capital cxpcnditurc 
Cash generative actions 
........................................................................................................................................................................ Industry downturn Capital expenditure Operational restructuring 
Dividend cut/omission Equity issues 
Managerial restructuring 
Debt restructuring 
......................................................................................................................................................................... Internal problem Operational restructuring Dividend cut/omission 
Asset sales (dcclinc year + 2) 
Cash gcnerative actions 
.......................................................................................................................................................................... Scverc declinc: Opcrational rcstructuring Acquisitions 
Managefial rcstructuring 
Dividend cut/omission 
......................................................................................................................................................................... Size Acquisitions Operational restructuring 
Capital cxpcnditurc Dividcnd cut/omission 
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7.4.2 Impact of ownership types 
Manager shareholders resist operational restructuring, cash generative 
(including asset sales) and acquisition strategies. Conversely, manager-associated 
block shareholders prefer acquisitions and surprisingly, in a show of 
independence, managerial restructuring. Institutional block shareholders and non- 
institutional unassociated block shareholders ie. outside shareholders, jointly resist 
operational. restructuring and cash generative actions such as asset sales. However, 
non-institutional block shareholders also make managerial restructuring more 
likely. They are also supportive of declining finns, in tenns of accepting the need 
for dividend cut/omission. 
7.4.3 Resulting impact on other agency and control variables 
It is also interesting to note the impact of offier agency and control variables 
on strategy choice resulting from replacing the combined lender and ownership 
variables with their individual components". The individual impact of dual CEO 
and outside directors is similar. In the case of non-executive Chairmen, their 
previous negative association with equity issues and debt restructuring is lost. 
The impact of external environment is largely die same. The exceptions are 
economic downturns which make managerial and not debt restructuring more 
likely, and die previous negative associafion between industry downturn and asset 
'This is not strictly true for lenders as short, bank and unsecured lenders are not mutually 
exclusive. 
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sales and debt restructuring is now lost. The existence of an internal problem now 
additionally and strangely reduces the probability of a dividend cut/omission (in 
the diird year of decline). Severe decline no longer makes debt restructuring more 
likely and large firm size now makes operational restructuring less likely. 
7.4.4 Resulting impact on coalitions of stakeholders 
With a few exceptions, the joint impact or coalitions of agency variables 
bearing on the adoption of a given strategy, shown in Table 7.10, is broadly 
similar to earlier results generated from combined lender and ownership variables. 
Lenders, short and unsecured, are now observed to press for operational 
restructuring. Manager-associated sbarellolders, favour acquisitions and non- 
executive Chairmen support capital expenditure. Non-institutional unassociated 
shareholders and, surprisingly in a show of independence, manager-associated 
shareholders join outside directors to demand managerial restructuring. Unsecured 
lenders' demand for dividend cut/omission is supported by non-institutional 
unassociated shareholders. Non-executive Chainnen no longer influences equity 
issue decisions, and so are lenders with respect to debt restructuring. 
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Table 7.10: Joint impact of explanatory variables on individual restructuring 
strategy choice: Individual variables [Poor performance sample] 
As explanatory variables collectively influence the choice of restructuring 
strategies, the combined impact of explanatory variables on the choice of a specific 
restructuring strategy is summarised from the results reported in Appendix 7.1 to 7.3. 
Explanatory variables that are significantly positively/negatively related to a specific 
strategy, in the logistic regression models in Appendix 7.1 to 7.3, increase/decrease the 
probability of that action occurring. 
Explanatory variables 
Restructuring strategy Probability increasing Probability decreasing 
Operational restructuring Short term leverage Managerial shareholding 
Unsecured leverage 
Economic downturn 
Severe decline 
Internal problem 
Institutional shareholding 
Non-institutional 
unassociated shareholding 
Industry downturn 
Size 
........................................................................................................................................................................... 
Asset sales Bank leverage Managerial shareholding 
Proportion of outside 
directors 
Intemal problem 
Institutional shareholding 
Non-institutional 
unassociated shareholding 
Non-executive Chairman 
Economic downturn 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Acquisitions Manager-associated Managerial shareholding 
shareholding 
Non-executive Chairman 
Proportion of outside 
directors 
Size 
Severe decline 
Economic downturn 
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Table 7.10: Joint impact orexplanatory variables on individual restructuring strategy 
choice: Individual variables [Poor performance sample] 
Explanatory variables 
Restructuring strategy Probability increasing Probability decreasing 
Capital expenditure Chairman cum CEO 
Non-executive Chairman 
Proportion of outside 
directors 
Industry downturn 
Bank leverage 
Economic downturn 
Size 
.......................................................................................................................................................................... Managerial restructuring Non-institutional Chairman cum CEO 
unassociated shareholding 
Manager-associated 
shareholding 
Proportion of outside 
directors 
..................................................... 
Dividend cut/omission 
Economic downturn 
Industry downturn 
Severity of decline 
................................................ Unsecured leverage 
Non-institutional 
unassociated shareholding 
Economic downturn 
Industry downturn 
. ............................................................ 
Internal problem 
Size 
Severity of decline 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Equity issues Industry downturn 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Debt restructuring Industry downturn 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Cash generation Short term leverage Managerial shareholding 
Bank leverage 
Proportion of outside 
directors 
Internal problem 
Institutional shareholding 
Non-institutional 
unassociated shareholding 
Chairman cum CEO 
Non-executive Chairman 
Economic downturn 
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7.5 Summary and conclusions 
Firms which experience performance decline may choose a variety of 
alternative methods of restructuring themselves to restore their financial health. 
These restructuring strategies for poorly performing companies include 
operational, asset, financial and managerial restructuring. However, any 
restructuring strategy has different and often conflicting, welfare implications for 
the different stakeholders in finns 
- 
shareholders, lenders and managers. Within 
the agency model of the firm the strategy choices made by managers may benefit 
one group of stakeholders at the expense of the other groups. However, managerial 
cboices are also constrained by the agency monitoring embodied in the firms. 
Agency monitoring may be derived from the rights of lenders, the power and 
influence of large block shareholders or in the oversight function and 
independence of the board of directors. The choice of recovery strategies is, 
tberefore, determined by the complex interplay of the ownership structure, 
corporate governance and lender monitoring of the firms in decline. 
For a sample of 297 poorly performing firms, we examine the impact of 
agency monitoring and control variables on restructuring strategy choice. Our 
results show that turnaround strategy choices arc significantly influenced by both 
agency variables and control variables. VAile there is agreement among 
stakeholders on certain strategies there is also evidence of conflict of interests 
between lenders and managers and between managers and some block 
shareholders. Lenders' preference for cash generative actions is in direct conflict 
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with shareholders' preference. Weak governance structure helps entrench 
managers and perpetuate their self-serving behaviour resulting in less restructuring 
particularly top management replacement. Non-institutional rather than 
institutional shareholders appear to be active monitors and influential in instituting 
top management changes. However, all types of shareholders disfavour any type 
of costly strategy such as operational restructuring or option value-destroying 
strategies such as asset sales. Boards of directors, however, seem to be effective 
in their oversight of managers, as they intensify adoption of turnaround strategies. 
There is evidence of shiffing coalitions between lenders and directors in tile choice 
of recovery strategies. Institutional shareholders generally seem to go along with 
management shareholders. Response of non-executive Chairmen and CEO cum 
Chairman to tumaround is broadly similar. 
The results also show the effects of dominance by certain stakeholder 
groups. Dominant lenders instigate operational restructuring, cash generative 
actions, dividend cut/omission and debt restructuring. They are less likely to 
approve of a cash-consuming strategy such as capital expenditure. The results 
show potential beneficial effects of lender monitoring as lenders' insistence on 
operational restructuring, aimed at 'stopping the bleeding' or 'avoiding cash 
haernorrhage', can be value-enhancing in the long run. However, lenders' tight 
financial reigns through wholesale ban on investments can cause an under- 
investment problem. Lenders may not only be depriving firms of vital resources 
necessary to compete and reverse decline but also jeopardising their long-term 
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health by favouring short term cash generative measures to facilitate debt 
repayment. It raises the question if banks are too keen to pull the plug on ailing 
finns which lack short term cash generation ability in spite of their healthy long 
term potential. Entrenched managers appear to be resistant to change in the wake 
of performance decline. Their refusal to remove themselves, restructure 
operations, cut dividends and support cash generative actions may lead a 
downward spiral to failure. They also tend to spend scarce resources in internal 
capital expenditure and hope to grow out of their predicament. Blockholders have 
a weak influence on a limited range of turnaround strategies. They disfavour costly 
operational restructuring, cash consuming and cash generative actions. However, 
board of directors not dominated by dual CEOs do intensify restructuring 
including managerial restructuring. Potenfially, corporate failures can be explained 
by poor agency monitoring during decline, resulting in a low appetite for 
appropriate tumaround strategies. 
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Chapter 8. EFFECTIVENESS OF RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES BY 
POORLY PERFORMING FIRMS: RESULTS OF 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we find that agency monitoring and control 
variables exert significant impact on management's choice of restructuring 
strategies. What then are the consequences of adopting those strategies? Are they 
effective, and are they instrumental to corporate recovery from performance 
decline? 
In this chapter, we test for the difference in choice, timing, and intensity of 
restructuring strategies between recovery and non-recovery finns for pointers to 
what drives recovery. We also examine the shareholder wealth impact of strategy 
announcement, and use it to proxy for stock market perceived effectiveness of a 
strategy. Effectiveness of a strategy is a function of the appropriateness of the 
strategy choice, its timing, intensity and success of implementation. Therefore, 
from the wealth impact of a strategy announcement and its choice, timing, and 
intensity, we can infer the stock markets' perception of the implementation 
success. 
We also employ a complementary method based on logit and OLS 
regressions of recovery on intensity of restructuring strategies to test for the 
effectiveness of those strategies in delivering recovery. 
The results will contribute significantly to the cxtant knowledge of the 
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effectiveness of generic strategies prescribed in the literature (see Chapter 5). For 
corporate managers undertaking turnarounds our results will identify those 
strategies which are effective, and shed light on the turnaround process which 
distinguishes failed from successful turnarounds. Turnaround process in this 
context encompasses adopting the right strategy, and implementing it timely, 
intensively and successfully. 
8.2 Financial characteristics of recovery and non-recovery firms 
As defined earlier in Section 6.2.4, recovery is measured by the return by 
the poor performing firm to the top 50% in two year cumulative stock returns 
ranking in the market. The final sample for the purpose of examining the 
effectiveness of strategies consists of 188 firms which are not taken-over or 
insolvent, and have two complete years of post restructuring data (see Section 
6.6.1). 
Table 8.1 shows difference in stock returns, profitability and cash flows 
between the recovery and non-recovery finns in the pre-decline, decline and post- 
decline period. Panel A of Table 8.1 shows the raw log returns in the two years 
prior to decline and the decline year, and the profitability and cash flows in the 
decline year for the recovery and non-recovery firms. Non-recovery firms 
significantly outperform their recovery counterparts in stock returns in the two 
years prior to decline whilst they underperform. the latter by a significant margin 
in the decline year. 
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Table 8.1 Financial characteristics of recovery and non-recovery firms 
[Poor performing sample] 
This table shows the financial performance of recovery and non-recovery firms 
before and after decline, and their size and risk characteristics. The mean difference is 
tested using the t-statistics and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon tests. 
indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Panel A: Pre-decline and decline year performance 
Non- 
Recovery recovery 
firms firms 
Sample size 77 111 
Mean Mean t-stat. z stat. 
(0/0) N 
Stock performance 
Annual stock returns in 34.14 
decline year-2 
Annual stock returns in 29.4 
decline year- I 
Annual stock returns in 
-51.1 
decline year 
Profitability and cashflows in the decline year 
PBIT/Sales 
-24.02 
Earnings per share 
Return on equity 
Return on asset 
-8.38 
45.7 2.50** 2.17 
37.3 1.94* 1.36 
-60.7 1.55 2.12 
-38.27 
-14.5 
-24.28 -31.87 
1.84* 1.94* 
0.66 0.83 
0.6 1.17 
-20.37 -25.22 0.63 1.07 
PBITD/Capital employed 
-13.34 -20.55 0.98 1.79* 
PBITD/Total debt 
-17.82 -28.72 1.1 1.51 
Risk and size in the pre-decline year 
Risk (beta) 0.94 0.95 0.35 0.21 
Size (; EM) 355.6 100.1 2.85*** 3.15*** 
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Table 8.1 Financial characteristics of recovery and non-recovery firms 
[Poor performing sample] (Contd. ) 
Panel B: Post-decline performance 
Non- 
Recovery recovery 
Mean Mean t-stat z-stat 
Stockperforniance 
Two year cumulative stock 58.78 
-56.66 10.15*** 8.45*** 
returns post-decline 
Profitability and cashfloivs 
- 
average of Avo years post decline 
PBIT/Sales 8.65 5.49 1.14 3.86*** 
Earnings per share 
Return on equity 
Return on asset 
PBITD/Capital employed 
PBITD/Total debt 
23.47 
-17.01 6.35*** 6.24*** 
18.34 6.08 2.63*** 4.29*** 
17.54 7.99 4.56*** 4.91*** 
25.03 15.37 4.16*** 4.09*** 
112.83 58.08 4.27*** 5.57*** 
However, only two out of six operating performance indicators i. e. 
PBIT/Sales and PBITD/Capital employed, are weakly (significant at 10% only) 
different between die two groups. There is no difference in risk (beta) between the 
two groups. Non-recovery firms, however, are significantly smaller in size, as 
measured by pre-decline year market capitalisation, than recovery firms. 
Therefore, there is only weak evidence of differences in operating performance 
between non-recovery and recovery firms. But what about performance in the 
post-decline years? Do recovery firms actually achieve real gains in operating 
perfonnance vis-a-vis non-recovery firms? 
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Panel B of Table 8.1 shows the cwnulative stock returns of the two groups 
two year post-decline. Unsurprisingly, non-recovery firms register negative returns 
of nearly 57% whilst recovery firms rebound strongly by around 59% in two 
years' cumulative returns. Is the reversion in stock performance a market freak or 
are they related to underlying recovery in operating perfonnance? Second part of 
Panel B shows the average of two post-decline years' profitability and cash flows 
of the two non-recovery and recovery groups. In all six measures, recovery firms 
outperform non-recovery ones by a significant margin (all statistically significant 
at 1%). Therefore, recovery in post-decline stock returns ranking in the market is 
no market freak but due to real gains in sample firms' operating per. formance. 
Next we explore the difference in ways in which managers of recovery and 
non-recovery firms go about restructuring their stricken finns. We look at the 
choice of strategies, their timing and intensity of implementation and their 
effectiveness as viewed by the stock market. Finally, we test for the impact of 
intensity of restructuring strategies on post-decline recovery in finn performance. 
8.3 Frequency and timing of restructuring 
Table 8.2 shows the frequency and timing of restructuring strategies 
pursued by recovery and non-recovery finns for three years, beginning with the 
year of decline. In the year of decline, operational restructuring is undertaken by 
over 60% of firms in both groups. 
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Heavy asset investment by acquisition characterised both groups in the year 
of decline, indicating over-investment as a potential cause of their decline. 
Between 20 and 30% of sample firms appear to start selling their assets and 
cut/omit dividends in the decline year. Significant differences between recovery 
and non-recovery finns in terms of decline year strategies lie in capital expenditure 
and cash generative actions such as equity issues. More recovery firms spend on 
capital expenditure than non-recovery ones (75% versus 64%). 28% of non- 
recovery firms tap the equity market whilst only 9% of recovery firms do so. 
In the first post-decline year, restructuring intensifies, especially by non- 
recovery firms. Acquisitions though subside rapidly due presumably to liquidity 
constraints in both groups. Opcrational rcstructuring, dividcnd cut/omissions and 
debt restructuring are carried out by a significantly higher percentage of non- 
recovery than recovery finns. This trend is repeated in year two after decline 
where top management changes are also significantly more prevalent in non- 
recovery finns. Also, debt restructuring increases over time for non-recovery 
firms. The results clearly refute any suggestion that managers of non-recovery 
finns are inactive or sit on their backs in the wake of perfonnance decline. 
The efficacy of internal corporate control mechanisms is evident in the 
significant levels of managerial restructuring in firms that fail to recover two years 
post-decline. In contrast, for finns that recover within two years, asset investment 
features highly as a recovery strategy, significantly outweighing their non-recovery 
counterparts. This is consistent with the extant literature which suggests 
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investments as instrumental to the 'recovery stage' in corporate turnaround (e. g. 
Robbins and Pearce 11,1992; see Section 3.4.2). Managerial inaction is not an 
apparent cause of non-recovery as non-recovery managers restructure more 
intensively than recovery ones. Also, there is little timing difference between 
recovery and non-recovery firms. Non-recovery firms do not appear to lag behind 
their recovery counterparts in adopting restructuring strategies except for 
investments which they ill-afford. Therefore suggestions that non-recovery finns 
do not respond swiftly to decline are unsubstantiated. However, the lack of 
effecfiveness of earlier strategy implementation may potentially be tile reason for 
non-recovery firms taking significantly more restructuring actions than recovery 
ones. 
8.4 Intensity of restructuring 
In the previous section, we find little difference in the choice and speed of 
response to perfonnance decline between recovery and non-recovery firms. If 
choice and speed of strategy execution are not a distinguishing factor between the 
two groups, could it be the lack of intensity in restructuring actions? 
As discussed in Section 6.4.2, intensity of restructuring is measured using 
accounting and cash flow data relative to their pre-decline deflator or value and 
is summarised in Table 6.3. 
Operational restructuring is measured by the ratio of cost of restructuring 
as reported in the company accounts to pre-decline year total assets. Asset sales, 
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acquisitions and capital expenditure are measured by the cash flows 
received/expended deflated by pre-decline year total assets. Management changes 
are represented by the number of changes (all) in executive and non-executive 
directors as a proportion of pre-decline year total number of directors. Dividend 
change (all) is the percentage change in current year dividends per share from the 
prc-dccline year's. Equity issue is measured by cash raised by equity issue as a 
proportion of pre-decline year total assets. Debt restructuring is not examined due 
to the difficulty in quantifying the value of the restructuring package. 
Table 8.3 shows die intensity of restructuring by recovery and non-recovery 
fmns in response to perfomance decline. In the decline year, non-recovery finns 
appear to be more acquisitive than their recovery counterparts. However, non- 
recovery fmns also restructure more intensively than recovery ones as they remove 
more top management, raise more equity funds and cash generation, in general. 
Non-recovery finns also appear to restructure their operations more 
intensively than recovery ones one and two years post-decline. In the year after 
decline, non-recovery fwns restructure their operations and top management more 
intensively than recovery ones. They also spend less on capital expenditure and 
dividends, presumably due to their tighter cash position than recovery firms. 
Non-recovery finns are evidently required to continue restructuring two 
years post-decline due to lack of effectiveness in strategy implementation the 
previous year. 
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Table 8.3: Intensity of restructuring by recovery and non-recovery firms: 
Poor performance sample 
This table shows the intensity of restructuring by recovery and non-recovery firms. 
Operational restructuring is measured by the cost of restructuring, including costs of layoffs and 
closures, as reported by the firm, to prc-decline year total assets. Asset sales, acquisitions and 
capital expenditure are those reported by the firm and measured by cash flows generated or 
expended / pre-decline year total assets. Managerial restructuring is all reported change in 
executive and non-executive dircctors from pre-deche year total number of directors (percentage). 
Dividend change is percentage change in reported current year dividends over the prc-decline 
ycar's. Equity issue is reported cash raised by equity issue/ prc-declinc year total assets. Cash 
generative action is the sum of reported asset sales and equity issues. The sample size for recovery 
and non-recovery firms are 77 and III respectively. Difference in means between recovery and 
non-recovcry firms is tested using t and non-paramctric Mann-Whitncy Wilcoxon tests, and their 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% arc denoted by the symbols respectively. Sources: 
Company press releases, Extcl Financial and company reports and accounts. 
Recovery Non- 
firms recovery 
firms 
Restructuring strategy Mean Mean t-stat z-stat 
Decline ygar 
Operational restructuring 2.22 3.01 0.77 0.68 
Asset sales 4.58 7.85 1.31 1.14 
Acquisition 16.3 36.64 1.79* 0.25 
Capital expenditure 24.27 18.94 1.24 1.09 
Managerial restructuring 4.93 10.01 2.84*** 2.32** 
Dividend change 45.26 40.54 0.37 0.06 
Equity issue 5.31 17.68 2.27** 3.19*** 
Cash generative actions 9.89 25.53 2.65 3.02*** 
Decline year+ 1 
Operational restructuring 2.32 4.38 1.25 1.94* 
Asset sales 9.27 13.99 0.8 1.26 
Acquisition 9.01 19.99 1.24 1.59 
Capital expenditure 23.64 17.66 1.4 1.81* 
Managerial restructuring 6.82 14.08 3.48*** 2.58*** 
Dividend change 57.3 14.82 2.35** 3.48*** 
Equity issue 8.28 6.83 0.36 0.69 
Cash generative actions 17.55 20.82 0.45 0.81 
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Table 8.3: Intensity of restructuring by recovery and non-recovery firms in 
response to performance decline(Contd. )
Recovery Non 
recovery 
Mean Mean 
t-stat z-stat 
Decline year +2 
Operational restructuring 1.11 5.04 3.17*** 3.20*** 
Asset sales 6.33 12.62 1.45 1.66* 
Acquisitions 18.71 8.98 1.18 3.05*** 
Capital expenditure 26.36 31.41 0.36 3.89*** 
Managerial restructuring 2.89 16.75 7.04*** 5.86* 
Dividend change 73.5 
-17.33 4.32*** 6.01*** 
Equity issue 11.76 5.12 1.02 0.31 
Cash generative actions 18.09 17.74 0.04 1.15 
Decline y ears+] and +2 
Operational restructuring 3.43 9.41 2.85*** 3.21*** 
Asset sales 15.61 26.61 1.41 2.14 
Acquisition 27.72 28.97 0.09 2.25 
Capital expenditure 49.31 46.75 0.18 3.16*** 
Managerial restructuring 9.7 30.84 7.1 l*** 6.03 *** 
Dividend change 125.8 
-2.48 3.47*** 4.92*** 
Equity issue 20.04 11.96 0.81 0.12 
Cash generative actions 35.64 38.56 0.25 1.76* 
In the second year, there are significant differences in all strategies except 
for cash generative equity issues. Additionally, non-recovcry firms sell more assets 
and spend less on acquisitions than their recovery counterparts. Non-recovery 
managers appear to be following generic corporate turnaround strategies - 
restructure operations to cut costs, sell assets to raise cash or remove loss-making 
operations, and conserved cash via avoiding internal capital expenditure and/or 
acquisitions. Non-recovery firms' higher level of turnover in top management in 
267 
the third year of decline appears to be a result of further decline rather than a 
planned or premeditated strategy (the mean difference in top management changes 
in the last two years is also significant at 11/6). However, the efficacy of internal 
control mechanisms is clear and managers are not spared the chop when corporate 
recovery is not imminent even two years after decline. 
Mean dividend cliange is negative for non-recovery firms and positive for 
recovery ones two years post-decline. Unquestionably, dividend cut/omission is 
used intensively by non-recovcry finns to conserve scarce cash resources. 
However, dividend cuts are clearly delayed until the second year after decline. In 
the first year, non-recovery firins are still increasing their dividend payout albeit 
at a lower rate than recovery firms. Perhaps, if non-recovery finns had cut their 
dividends earlier and conserve vital cash resources, they might have had a better 
chance of recovery. There appears to be no significant difference in respect of 
equity issue between the two groups. 
Overall, over the two post-decline years, non-recovery firms do restructure 
more intensively than recovery firms. So, if non-recovery is not due to inaction, 
late action (except for dividend cut) or lack of intensity in actions, is poor strategy 
implementation the cause of non-rccovcry? It is plausible that managers of 
recovery firms are better at implementation than their non-recovery counterparts. 
We have to look at the shareholder wealth effects of strategy announcements for 
evidence of difference in implementation success. As discussed in Section 5.3, the 
wealth impact of strategy announcement captures the stock market's total 
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assessment of the strategy, its timing, intensity and expected implementation 
success. As effectiveness of strategy implementation is incapable of direct 
measurement, it can be deduced indirectly from stock market reaction". As we 
find earlier no evidence of difference in timing or intensity of strategies which 
could otherwise affect effectiveness, any difference in shareholder wealth impact 
between recovery and non-recovery firms can be deduced to stem from differences 
in strategy implementation. 
8.5 Shareholder wealth impact of restructuring strategies 
Taking a stock market perspective, Table 8.4 shows the frequency of news 
announcement made to the London Stock Exchange by the poor performance 
sample finns in the two post-decline years. Only post-decline announcements are 
examined due to need to avoid potential causality problems associated with 
announcements in the year of decline (see Section 6.1). Announcements in the 
decline year can be both the cause and effect of stock performance decline. We 
examine all stories reported for these years for all sample recovery and non- 
recovery firms. However, the number of stories examined is smaller than the 
actual announcements, as overlapping announcements are excluded to avoid 
contamination of wealth effects. Overlapping announcements are those reported 
within a two-week period (event window) of another announcement. The 
announcements relate to specific strategies under three generic strategies. Asset 
"We assume that the market has similar expectations across both groups. Hence, error 
in market anticipation, if any, is equal across both groups, and the unanticipated element of the 
news announcement relates exclusively to the effectiveness of the announced strategy. 
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restructuring comprises asset sales (divestment) and investment. Asset sales in turn 
are made up of sell-offs and management buyouts of subsidiaries, and otber asset 
sales. Managerial restructuring covers replacement of Chairman or Chief 
Executive Officer". Financial restructuring comprises rights issue, dividend 
cutlomission and debt restructuring. As discussed in Section 5.4, examination of 
the shareholder wealth impact of operational restructuring is not possible due to 
the rarity in the UK of firms announcing operational restructuring as a separate 
event. Also, as explained in Section 5.4.3.2, intemal capital expenditure is seldom 
announced as a separate event in the UK. Therefore, examination of the 
shareholder wealth impact of internal capital expenditure is not possible. 
Non-recovery firms report more stories than recovery firms except for asset 
investment and equity rights issue. Potentially these stories are biased towards 
large firms, as small firms' less complex structure results in lower frequency of 
actions. However, when we run regressions of frequencies of stories about asset 
sales, acquisition, management changes, rights issue, dividend cut/omission, and 
debt restructuring on firin size, only asset sales are significantly (positively 
- 
adjusted R' = 0.08) associated with firm size. Since the size-effect is very small 
in the case of asset sales, we can tA-e the view that the potential problem of a size 
bias is minimal. 
"Managerial restructuring is a term used throughout this thesis to refer to changes in top 
management ie. Chairman and CEO. The exception is when examining intensity of strategies, 
where it is more meaningful to investigate the percentage change in the board of directors than 
merely the Chairman and CEO. As changes in Chairmen and CEOs tend to be announced 
simultaneously, it is therefore not practicable to examine them individually. 
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Table 8A Frequency of announcements to the London Stock Exchange 
by recovery and non-recovery firms in two post-decline years: Poor 
performance sample 
The table shows the number of announcements made to the London Stock exchange on 
strategic actions, in two post-decline years by poor performance firms. The number of 
announcement or stories examined is smaller than the actual announcements, as overlapping 
announcements are excluded to avoid contamination of wealth cffccts. Overlapping announcements 
arc those reported within a two-weck period (event window) of another announcement. Source: 
Company press releases and Financial Times Extcl. 
Announcement details Type of news Recovery Non rccovcry 
story 
Asset sales 
Number of firms 37 58 
Number of stories 107 131 
Average per firm 2.8 2.6 
(median, minimum, maximum) (1,1,21) (1,1,15) 
Sell-offs 
Number of firms 31 43 
Number of stories 84 90 
Average per firm 2.7 2.1 
(median, minimum, maximum) (1,1,15) (1,1,13) 
Management Buy-out 
Number of firms 12 19 
Number of stories 21 28 
Average per firm 1.8 1.5 
(median, minimum, maximum) (1,1,6) (1,1,3) 
Other asset sales 
Number of firms 2 9 
Number of stories 2 13 
Average per firm 1 1.4 
(modian, minimum, maximum) 1) (1,1,3) 
Asset investment 
Number of firms 44 42 
Number of stories 108 75 
Average per firm 2.5 1.8 
(modian, minimum, maximum) 
-01119) 
(1,1,8) 
Managerial restructuring 
Number of firms 21 30 
Number of stories 30 54 
Average per firm 1.4 1.3 
(mod ian, minimum, maxi mum) (1.1.3) (1.1.3) 
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Table 8.4 Contd. 
Announcement details Typeofnews Recovery Non recovery 
story 
Replace Chairman 
Number of firms 9 17 
Number of stories 10 19 
Average per firm 1.1 1.1 
(median, minimum, maximum) 
Replace CEO 
Number of firms 14 33 
Number of stories 20 35 
Average per firm 1.4 1.1 
(modian, minimum, maximtim) (1.1.2) 
Equity/rights issue 
Number of firms 14 11 
Number of stories 16 1 
Average per firm 1.1 
(modian, minimum, maximum) (1,1,2) 1,1) 
Dividend cut/ornission 
Number of firms 18 66 
Number of stories 31 117 
Average per firm 1.7 1.8 
(modian, minimum, maximum) (1.5,1,3) (2,1,4) 
Dividend cut 
Number of firms 16 49 
Number of stories 27 70 
Average per firm 1.7 1.4 
(median, minimum, maximum) (1.5,1,3) (1,113) 
Dividend omission 
Number of firms 3 34 
Number of stories 
Average per firm 
(modian, minimum, maximum) 
4 47 
1.3 1.4 
(1,1,2) (1,1,3) 
Debt restructuring 
Number of firms 9 
Number of stories 10 
Average per firm 1.11 
(modian, minimum, maximum) 
--(1,1,2) 
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Table 8.5 shows the stock market's response to strategy announcements by 
both recovery and non-recovery firms. Panels A and B show the market and size 
adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding announcement of restructuring 
in the two post-decline years. Significance of abnormal returns is tested for using 
the dependence test described in Appendix 6.1. 
To increase focus, risk and mean adjusted returns are shown as Appendix 
8.1. Risk adjusted returns are used in the discussion for comparison purposes only. 
The reason is risk adjusted or market model returns potentially suffer from 
contamination caused by overlapping beta estimation periods (-170 days to 
-20 
days of announcement date) where there exist multiple announcements during the 
150 day estimation periods. Also, as results from the mean adjusted model arc 
similar to those from other models, and for reason of avoiding tile potential 
upward bias in mean-adjusted returns, due to flie negative returns in tile estimation 
period, they are not discussed. The following discussion is based on the market- 
adjusted model wMlst the size-adjusted model is used for checking the robustness 
of the market-adjusted results. Also, to increase focus, we present only results for 
the main category of strategies. For example, we show only asset sales but not the 
three specific types of asset sales ie. sell-offs, MBOs and other asset sales, in the 
main text. However, where the results from the specific strategies are interesting, 
there are footnoted. 
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In Panel A, market reactions to asset sales strategies for both groups are 
insignificant with CAR of 0.68% for recovery firms and CAR of 
- 
1.87% for non- 
recovery firms. Significantly, recovery firms outperform their non-recovery 
counterparts by a margin of 2.54% on asset saleS49. 
In Appendix 8.1, the market model results of CAR around 1.5% for asset 
sales announcements are lower than prior studies wbiCh report market model CAR 
from 3.55% (Hearth and Zaima, 1984) to 5.07% (Lang ct al, 1995). CARs from 
prior studies employing smaller event windows range from 0.85% (day 0, Afsliar 
et. al., 1992) to 1.27% (day 
-2 to 0, Lasfer et. al., 1996) to 2.14% (day -1 to 0, 
Brown et al, 1994). 
Recovery firms also appear to trump the non-recovery firms in terms of 
asset investment strategies. Tliey record a significantly positive CAR of 1.88% on 
announcements of acquisitions. This is in contrast to a significantly negative CAR 
of 1.92% for non-recovery firms. On average, recovery firms outperform non- 
recovery ones by a significant 3.80% when acquisitions are announced. Tile 
market model result for the recovery sub-sample, CAR of 2.07%, is significant and 
slightly higher than the 1.72% reported by Mianna and Poulsen (1995) for their 
control sample of healthy firms announcing acquisitions or expansions. Khanna 
and Poulsen find only a small but insignificant positive CAR for Chapter II firms. 
"rhe cause of the difference lies in the significant negative CAR of 6.01% for MBOs 
carried out by non-recovery firms. In fact, the difference in CARs between the two groups' MBO 
announcements is a significantly high 8.18%. 
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This is comparable to our market model results of a small but insignificant 
negative CAR of 0.11% on announcement of acquisitions by non-recovery firms. 
The effectiveness of managerial restructuring strategy is evidently captured 
by stock market reaction for non-recovery firms but not for recovery firms. 
Recovery firms increase their shareholder wealth by an insignificant 1.86% as 
compared to a significant decrease of 5.84% for non-recovery firms. The mean 
difference of 7.7% between the two groups is significant at less than IONP. Our 
market model results are a significant positive CAR of 2.99% and an insignificant 
CAR of 0.9% for recovery and non-rccovcry finns respectively. Conversely, 
Khanna and Poulsen find a significant (insignificant) CAR of -2.09% (-1.67%) 
on announcement of top management changes in Chapter II (control) firms in 
their study. However, in both studies tile recovery and healthy firms out perform 
the non-recovery and Chapter II firms respectively. 
In the case of financial restructuring strategies, both recovery and non- 
recovery groups register CARs of 
-3.95% and -4.26% respectively on 
announcement of rights issues. However, it is statistically significant only for the 
recovery group. The significant negative reaction is consistent with reaction to 
equity issues by all firms. As a comparison to the literature on seasoned equity 
offerings, the market model results, CAR of 
-4.4% and -3.9% for recovery and 
non-recovcry firms, are comparable to prior studies of market model CARs of 
"Significantly, non-recovery firms underperform recovery ones by a staggering 9.2% 
when their CEOs are replaced. 
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-3.5% (Schipper and Smith, 1986) to -4.68% (Mikkelson and Partch, 1986) for 
day-4 to day 0, the announcement day. 
In the case of dividend cut or omission announcements, non-recovery firms 
experience significantly negative CAR of 8.09% compared to an insignificant 
negative CAR of 0.36% for recovery firms5l. 
Barring a few exceptions, the results from the size-adjusted model in Panel 
B are quite similar to the market-adjusted model. Management changes in recovery 
firms generate a significantly positive CAR of 3.650/cP. However, the mean 
differences in CARs for asset sales are no longer significant, on a size-adjusted 
basis. 
The results provide strong evidence on the effectiveness of asset and 
managerial restructuring strategies but less so for equity-based strategies. Although 
dividend cutlomission is greeted indifferently (CAR of -0.36%) by recovery firm 
shareholders, non-recovery firm shareholders respond significantly negatively 
"Interestingly, dividend cut is viewed more gravely by the market than dividend omission. 
The market appears to be of the opinion that an omission is more appropriate than paying reduced 
dividends in view of the firms' bad financial shape. These results must be interpreted with caution 
as dividend cut and omission news in the main are contaminated by other information contained 
in company results released at the same time. However, the results contradict that of Marsh 
(1992). Marsh's study of dividend cuts (omissions) by UK firms between January 1989 and April 
1992 shows dividend cuts (omissions) to generate 
-4.3% (-7.4%) size-adjusted returns. This 
compares with our non-recovery firms size-adjusted returns of 
-7.33% and -6.07% for dividend 
cut and omission respectively. The mixed results could be due to Marsh's inclusion of non- 
performance decline induced cuts and, as qualified earlier, contamination caused by other 
information revealed during dividend announcements. The latter problem is also recognised by 
Marsh in his study. 
"CEO replacements contributing the bulk of the significant gains with mean CAR of 
4.201/6. Also, the previously significant negative CAR for MBOs in non-recovery firms is now no 
longer significant. 
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(CAR of 
-7.42%) to their firm's dividend cut/omissions. However, tile 
effectiveness of these actions may be confounded by the negative signals they 
convey to the market of the firms' future cash and earnings potential (dividend is 
normally announced at the same time as company results). Rights issue is also 
greeted by the market with the same contempt as dividend cut/omissions, although 
it is only significant for the recovery firms. Therefore, for firms aiming to recover 
swiftly to previous levels of market performance, equity-based strategies are to be 
discouraged, unless absolutely necessary. 
Summary of shareholder wealth impact of restructuring strategies 
Table 8.6 summarises the results in Table 8.5, and shows only results with 
significant CARs or where the difference between the recovery and non-recovcry 
groups' CARs is significant, across the two models- market- and size-adjusted 
models. Appendix 8.2 shows the same for the risk- and mean-adjusted models. 
In terms of asset restructuring, non-recovery managers are considered less 
effective ( market-adjusted CAR is 2.54% lower than for recovery firms) in their 
implementation, specifically MBOs and acquisitions". 
"However, in terms of sell-offs, non-recovery firms appear to perform better than 
recovery ones in terms of risk-adjusted and mean-adjusted returns. In both these models, non- 
recovery firms register significant positive CARs on announcement compared to insignificant 
positive CARs by their recovery counterparts. 
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Managerial restructuring when undertaken by non-recovery finns is 
considered inadequate or inappropriate". 
In the case of rights issue, the recovery firms suffer significantly negative 
CARs on announcement compared to insignificantly negative CARs for the non- 
recovery firms, across all four models. 
As regards dividend cut/omissions, three out of four models show non- 
recovery firms to suffer a negative CAR on announcements. In comparison, 
recovery firms are equally split 
- 
with two models reporting positive CARs and 
two models reporting negative CARs 
- 
all of which are insignificant. 
In summary, the empirical evidence shows turnarounds to be affected by 
effectiveness of implementation of restructuring strategies. Consequently, the 
results emphasise that incompetent managers contribute to continuing corporate 
decline and are the possible villains of corporate failures. Despite following the 
same restructuring strategies, and in greater intensity, than their recovery 
counterparts, they are perceived by Ole market to implement them less cffectively. 
The only exception is equity issues. In this case, tile adoption of equity issues by 
recovery firms is viewed with greater contempt by the market than that by non- 
recovery ones. 
'This is evidenced by significantly lower CARs on announcements of CEO replacement (in fact, negative) by non-recovery firms than recovery firms across all four models. 
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8.6 Restructuring and corporate turnaround 
As discussed in Secfion 6.2.5, corporate turnaround or recovery is defined 
as return to top 50% in two years cumulative stock returns ranking in the market. 
From the previous section, we find most restructuring strategies are 
effective in terms of increasing shareholder wealth (except for strategies such as 
dividend cut/omission and rigbts issues), provided they are perceived by the stock 
market to be implemented successfully. As discussed in Section 5.2, an alternative 
and indirect method for examining strategy cffcctivcncss is to test the association 
between restructuring strategy and the extent of corporate recovery from 
performance decline. This involves running a logit regression and an OLS 
regression of recovery, on two year post-decline intensity of restructuring 
strategies and control variables. The objective is to test for tile impact of post- 
decline restructuring intensity on recovery. As tile outcome of restructuring is 
recovery or non-recovery, logit regression measures the impact of explanatory 
variables on the likelihood of a firm recovering or not recovering. Recovery is 
restoration of the firm to top 50% ranking in two post-decline years' cumulative 
stock returns. OLS regression complements logit regression by capturing the 
degree of recovery as represented by two years' cumulative stock returns ranking 
in the market. 
Results of logit and OLS regressions 
Table 8.7 shows the results of logit and OLS regressions of recovery on 
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intensity of restructuring strategies and control variables. The signs of coefficients 
in both logit and OLS regressions are similar. The R' of bodi regressions is 
extremely high, proving that restructuring strategies and the contextual variables 
explain substanfially both recovery and firm's stock returns ranking in the market. 
Operational restructuring appears to have a significant and negative impact on 
corporate recovery. As in a prior study by Blackwell et al. (1990) operational 
strategies are greeted negatively by the market. In addition, as discussed earlier 
in Section 8.3, non-recovery firms appear to resort significantly more frequently 
to operational restructuring than their recovery counterparts. Repeated attempts 
at a strategy are interpreted by the market as failure on the part of managers to 
tackle effectively the cause of decline in earlier implernentation. 
Similarly, higber intensity of managerial restructuring is negatively related 
to recovery and stock returns ranking. Again, the market dislikes repeated 
replacements of top managers and views them with scepticism. 
Asset restructuring strategies 
- 
asset sales and acquisitions appear to be very 
much the common strategy adopted by both groups, resulting in a lack of 
significance in explaining recovery. Dividend change is positively related to 
recovery. In other words, dividend cuts or omissions are detrimental to stock 
returns recovery, corroborating earlier event study results. As discussed in section 
5.6.1, managers cut/omit dividends only as a last resort, when their efforts at 
tunung around the finn are not succeeding. Ilierefore, dividend cuts/omissions can 
both precede and induce stock returns decline, and lience recovery. 
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Table 8.7: Logit and OLS regressions of recovery and post-decline two year 
cumulative stock returns ranking, on intensity of restructuring strategies 
and control variables 
Coefficients of the logistic and OLS regressions of recovery and post-decline two 
year cumulative stock returns ranking in the market, on two year post-decline intensity of 
restructuring strategies and control variables are shown. See Tables 6.2 and 6.3 for 
definitions. Coefficients are tested for significance using the Wald / t-test statistic. p 
values for either test statistic are shown to indicate significance. Source: Datastream 
International, Company Reports and Accounts, Extel Financial, Hambro Company Guide 
and Hambro Corporate Register. 
ModeL RecoverylSlock returns ranking = f(Operational, asset, managerial and 
financial restnicturing hilensity, and control variables) 
Model 1 
Logit regression 
Model 2 
OLS regression 
Coefficients p Cocfficicnts P 
Operational restructuring 
-3.60 0.08 -16.31 0.09 
Asset sales 
-0.08 0.84 -2.30 0.40 
Acquisitions 0.08 0.74 0.88 0.60 
Managerial restructuring 
-0.05 0.00 -0.26 0.00 
Dividend changes 0.17 0.07 1.99 0.00 
Equity issue 0.48 0.28 5.28 0.04 
Debt restructuring 
-2.30 0.04 -14.77 0.00 
Internal cause of decline 
-0.09 0.87 -1.76 0.60 
Severity of decline 0.02 0.53 0.29 0.28 
Finn size 0.46 0.02 2.38 0.05 
Economic condition 
-0.02 0.73 -0.17 0.70 
Industry condition 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.00 
Constants 
-1.35 0.14 42.45 0.00 
McFadden's R-Square /Adj R' 46.9% 55.8% 
Chi-square /F statistic 119.20 19.20 
Regression p-value 0.00 0.00 
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The only inconsistency between the regression results and event study 
results lies in equity issue. Earlier, in Section 8.4, we found equity issue 
announcements, on average, to be accompanied by a significant decrease in stock 
returns. However, in the OLS regressions, the results show higher intensity of 
equity issue to be associated with a higher level of post-decline stock returns 
ranking in the stock market. The results suggest that in spite of stock market's 
dislike for equity issues, a successful equity issue brings in much needed cash to 
turnaround the declining firm. Similar to earlier event study results in section 8.4, 
debt restructuring is negatively associated with recovery and stock returns ranking. 
Finn size and industry conditions appear to exert a significant impact on the 
likelihood of recovery or stock returns ranking in the market. Large firms and 
firms facing good industry condition during the restructuring period are more 
likely to recover from performance decline. Economic condition, however, has no 
significant impact on recovery and stock returns ranking. T'licrefore, factors largely 
beyond management control such industry condition and firm size do influence 
finns' recovery prospects. 
Overall, the logit and OLS regression results confirm the results in Section 
8.3 on the intensity of restructuring strategies by the two groups of recovery and 
non-recovery firms. In that section, we find non-rccovery firms to restructure more 
intensively than their recovery counterparts. Hence, we find higher levels of 
operational and managerial restructuring, dividend cut/omission, and debt 
restructuring to be associated with non-recovery and lower levels of post-decline 
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stock returns ranking in the market. Also, the regression results confirm the event 
study results in section 8.4. In that section, we find the stock market to be able to 
discern between good and bad strategy implementation and rate strategy 
announcements accordingly. The shareholder wealth impact of strategy 
announcements is more positive in recovery than in non-recovery firms e. g. asset 
sales and managerial restructuring. 
Therefore, we can infer that the negative impact of high restructuring 
intensity (a hallmark of non-recovery firms) on recovery or stock returns ranking 
to stem from investors' lack of confidence in managers' ability to implement 
restructuring effectively. 
Finally, it appears from the regression results that there may be a potential 
causality problem, in that the cause and effect of strategies may be indeterminable. 
In other words, a strategy may be caused by the decline or the strategy itself may 
have caused the decline. Take the example of the strong negative association 
between dividend change and corporate recovery. Although adopting a dividend 
cut is a good recovery measure aimed at conserving scarce cash resources, it can 
also be a reflection of the severity of the finn's financial decline. In other words, 
dividend cut can both be a recovery strategy and a cause of decline in stock returns 
and non-recovery. Therefore, conclusions cannot be drawn solely on the 
regression results but rather used in conjunction with tile event-study, frequency, 
timing and intensity results. 
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8.7 Summary and conclusions 
In Chapter 5, we reviewed the extant studies on corporate turnaround and 
found a myriad. of factors contributing to corporate recovery and failure. Adopting 
a prescribed range of restructuring strategies with vigour and intensity was 
suggested, in past case study and small sample analyses, as central to recovery. 
Corporate downward spiral to failure was attributed to managerial inaction. We 
argue that manager's strategy implementation process rather than inaction is 
responsible for non-recovery. In other words, restructuring strategies are only as 
good as the people responsible for executing them. 
In this chapter, we set out to test the factors underlying strategy 
effectiveness. We examine the frequency of prescribed strategies by 188 recovery 
and non-recovery firms. We investigate the timing, intensity and shareholder 
wealth impact of restructuring strategies. Shareholder wealth impact is measured 
by abnonnal market-, size-, risk- and mean-adjusted returns around strategy 
announcements. The effectiveness of strategies in achieving turnaround is also 
examined by way of logit and OLS regressions of recovery, stock returns ranking 
in the market, on restructuring intensity and contextual factors. 
The results show no support for managerial inaction as a contributor to non- 
recovery from poor performance. Instead of being paralyscd by inertia, managers 
of non-recovery finns appear to take early and intensive restructuring actions. 
These firms even have a higher proportion of their top managers removed than 
their recovery counterparts. The evidence does not support timing as a cause of 
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non-recovery, as a higher proportion of non-recovery than recovery firms appear 
to restructure their operations in each of tile two post-decline years. Specifically, 
more non-recovery firms restructure their operations, remove their top managers, 
cut/omit dividends and restructure their debts. Non-recovery firms also appear to 
restructure more intensively than recovery ones except for investment strategies 
which they could ill afford. 
Our results suggest the root cause of non-recovery is in bad implementation 
of restructuring strategies. For similar strategies, non-recovcry firms' managers are 
perceived by the market to be far less effective in their implementations. in 
particular, the core rescue strategies of asset sales and managerial restructuring, 
and growth-oriented acquisition strategies pursued by such firins are significantly 
less well received by the market. Somehow, managers of non-recovery firms seem 
to have less credibility than their recovery counterparts in terms of strategy 
implementation. Higher restructuring intensity by non-recovery firms appears to 
be necessitated by failure of earlier strategy implementation. Instead of high 
intensity leading to higher recovery potential, it results in disillusioned investors 
marking the firm's potential considerably lower than their recovery counterparts. 
This is supported by logit and OLS regression results which show higher levels of 
restructuring to be associated with lower probability of recovery and lower levels 
of stock returns ranking. Significantly, restructuring strategies, firm size and 
industry condition appear to explain a very substantial part of cross sectional two- 
year post-decline returns of poor performing firms. 
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In conclusion, faithful and intensive adoption of prescribed restructuring 
strategies is an insufficient condition for corporate recovery from poor 
performance. Investors appear to be able to discern between effective and 
ineffective implementation and respond appropriately by marking up or down the 
firtn's recovery potential. Our results appear to suggest that some corporate 
managers are, perhaps, poor turnaround managers. Potenfially, there may be a case 
for engaging professional turnaround managers with diverse experience in turning 
around ailing firms to enhance strategy implementation success and hence 
recovery. Further research is necessary to identify and explore in-depth the role 
of professional turnaround managers and oflier factors aiding or impeding effective 
implementation of turnaround strategies. 
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Chapter 9. DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 
RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES BY DISTRESSED FIRMS: 
RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
9.1 Introduction 
We explored the determinants and effectiveness of restructuring strategies 
by poorly perfonning firms in Chapter 7 and 8. In this chapter, we repeat the 
analysis for a sample of distressed firms. The rationale for examining a sample of 
distressed firms is presented in Section 2.6. Poor perfonnance is but an early stage 
of a fmn's performance decline. It may lead to distress and eventually liquidation 
(see performance decline research framework illustrated in Figure 2.1). A 
complete analysis of the determinants and effectiveness of restructuring strategies 
necessitates the examination of the different stages of performance decline. We 
therefore examine the two stages of decline 
- 
poor performance and distress". As 
discussed in section 2.6, we use negative Z scores to proxy for financial distress. 
As discussed in Section 6.2.1, distressed firms are finns which experience 
a sharp decline in financial health i. e. to a negative Z score position after having 
been in a positive Z score position for at least two consecutive years. The sample 
consists of 201 finns declining into financial distress during the period 1983 to 
1993. Sample's descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.9. We employ 
similar methodology to that used for the poorly performing sample to test for die 
impact of agency and control variables on strategy choice and the effectiveness of 
strategies in contributing to turnaround. The exception is flie effectiveness analysis 
"There may be some overlap between the two stages of decline, hence, the two samples 
may contain some overlapping firms. 
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based on event study analysis of strategy announcements used in the poorly 
performing sample. For the distressed sample, both distress and turnaround are 
measured in terms of accounting numbers from annual accounts. Hence, event 
study analysis is not feasible (see Chapter 6 for discussion). 
9.2 Impact of stakeholder dominance on turnaround strategy choice 
As with the poorly performing sample (see Section 7.2), we divide our 
distressed fmn sample into two groups 
- 
one stakeholder dominated and the other 
non-dominated by that stakeholder. For each stakeholder group - lenders, 
manager-owners, block shareholders, CEO and collective board of directors - we 
examine the likelihood of a given strategy being chosen. The difference in the 
proportions of sample firms in the dominated and non-dominated groups choosing 
a strategy is tested for statistical significance. Any significant difference reflects 
the influence of the dominant stakeholder. 
Table 9.1 shows the proportions of sample firms pursuing a given strategy 
in the distress and two post-distress years when the differences in these 
proportions between dominant and non-dominant groups are significant. Sample 
firms are lenders dominated when their leverage is in the top quartile of all the 
sample firms and they are in severe distress (bottom 50% in sample Z score 
ranking in the year of distress). Lenders under such circumstances are likely to 
have high stakes in recovery and to exercise their priority rights. 
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Sample firms are manager-owner dominated when they are not lenders 
dominated according to the above definition and the managerial and manager- 
associated shareholdings are in the top quartile of all sample firms. 
Where neither lenders nor manager-owners are dominant according to the 
above definitions and the unassociated block shareholding is in the top quartile of 
all sample firms, the firms are deemed block shareholders dominated. Finally, the 
sample fmns not dominated by lenders, manager-owners and block shareholders, 
are deemed to be under the control of the board of directors. In turn, the board 
may be dominated by a dual-CEO or collectively by the board members. 
The results in Panel A to E of Table 9.1 is summarised in Table 9.2. Table 
9.2 also presents, for comparison purpose, the predicted impact of individual 
stakeholder dominance as discussed in Section 4.3 and presented in Table 4.2. 
9.2.1 Lender dominance 
From Table 9.2, lenders dominated firms are more likely to opt for dividend 
cut/omission and debt restructuring. They are less likely to approve of cash- 
consuming strategy such as capital expenditure. Lenders' impact, where 
significant, mostly matches predictions made in Table 4.2. However, lenders do 
not have any impact on operational restructuring and managerial restructuring, 
divestments and equity issues. As widi the poorly performing sample, tile positive 
rather than negative relation with debt restructuring is by construct, since lender 
dominance only exists in bighly geared firms, wbicb incidentally, are more likely 
to require debt restructuring. 
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9.2.2 Manager and dual-CEO dominance 
Manager-owner dominated firms are less inclined to pursue operational 
restructuring, and dividend cut/omission. Dual-CEO dominant board influence is 
extensive. Distressed firms dominated by their dual-CEOs prefer acquisitions, 
capital expenditure and equity issues. Dual-CEOs' preference for equity issues 
over all the three years is unexpected. They appear to be taking a high risk 
approach to alleviate distress. It appears that they are able to pacify shareholders' 
contempt for equity issues perhaps by tempting them with the chance of recovery 
through (risky) investments. Dominant dual-CEOs, predictably, reduce the 
probability of managerial restructuring. However, strangely, they also make 
management changes more likely, in the third year. Plausibly, dominant CEOs, 
through their expansionist policies, may have run down the firm to a state whereby 
their entrenched position no longer protects them from being sackedl In summary, 
the behaviour of dominant owner-managers and dual role CEO are close to 
predictions made earlier except for the lack of impact on divestment and dcbt 
restructuring. Perhaps, we have to look at the logistic regressions later in the 
chapter for pointers to their impact. 
9.2.3 Blockholder dominance 
When firms are dominated by blockholders, their influence is weak and 
limited to resisting cash generative asset sales. The actual impact is therefore much 
weaker than that predicted in Section 4.3. The lack of impact is perhaps 
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unsurprising. Since shareholders have low priority rights to capital repayment in 
the event of failure, their influence during distress, a stage close to failure, is 
understandably weak. So far the empirical evidence shows only lenders and 
managers to have significant influence over strategy choice when a firm is in 
financial crisis. Again, we have to look at the logistic regressions later for more 
evidence. 
9.2.4 Board dominance 
Collective board dominance influences is non-existcnt during financial 
distress. Again, we have to look at the logistic regressions later for more evidence. 
Having explored the impact of stakeholder dominance on restructuring 
strategy choice, we shall examine the individual and joint impact of agency 
monitoring mechanisms on such choice. 
9.3 Impact of individual agency monitoring mechanisms on restructuring 
strategy choice 
In this section, we employ the following empirical model to test for the 
impact of agency monitoring on restructuring strategy choice in distressed firms. 
CRS =f (Agency and control variables) 
Dcfinifions and dcscriptive statistics of dependcnt variabIcs arc containcd 
in Tables 6.1 and 6.10 and those of explanatory variables in Tables 6.3 and 6.10. 
Tables 9.3 to 9.5 report the model coefficients for the logistic regressions 
of corporate restructuring strategy choices on the agency and control variables. A 
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separate regression is run for each strategy and for each of the following years: 
year of distress (the distress year), the year after the distress year (distress year 
+ 1) and the second year after the distress year (distress year + 2). These years 
coincide with the accounting years of the sample firms. 
As with the poorly performing sample (see Section 7.3), we run all the 
regressions reported in Tables 9.3 to 9.5 using leverage and inside and outside 
shareholding, to avoid any multi-collinearity problem. Testing of the separate 
impact of lender and ownership types is reported later in this chapter. 
9.3.1 Strategy choices and their determinants in the distress year 
In the distress year, in Table 9.3, the logistic models are significant (based 
on the Chisquare statistic) except where managerial restructuring and equity issue 
are the dependent variables. Significance of the individual variables is tested for 
using the Wald statistic" The explanatory power of the models, measured by 
McFadden's R ',, ranges ftom 4% to 18% 
The impact of several agency and control variables is felt in the distress 
year. Lenders make debt restructuring more likely in the year of distress. As 
discussed earlier in Section 7.2, the relation can be positive by construct, since 
high leverage firms may have a higher probability of debt restructuring. Inside 
shareholders make operational restructuring less likely. Similarly, outside 
shareholders also disfavour operational restructuring. In addition, outside 
shareholders also disfavour asset sales, acquisitions, capital expenditure, equity 
issues and cash generative actions. 
' To simplify the tables, the Wald statistic is not reported and only its level of significance 
indicated when it is significant at least at the 10% level. 
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As regards governance structure, distressed firms with combined Chairman 
and CEO make acquisitions more likely. Non-executive Chairmen in turn reduces 
the likelihood of capital expenditure. Outside directors have little influence in the 
year of distress. 
The control variables have varying impact on strategy choice. The external 
economic condition has a significant impact on several strategies. Economic 
downturn means less opportunity to generate cash via asset sales and hence to 
incur capital expenditure. Dividend cut/Omission and debt restructuring, however, 
are more likely to be required under harsh economic conditions. Industry condition 
has little influence on strategy, at least in the year of distress. Mere distress has 
resulted from firm specific internal causes, debt restructuring is more likely. 
The more severely distressed firms (represented by below sample median 
Z scores in the distress year) are more likely to go for dividend cut/omission and 
debt restructuring. Finally, large companies are less likely to resort to operational 
restructuring and equity issue. Large firms' potentially large slack resources 
appear to enable them to withstand distress longer than small firms. 
9.3.2 Strategy choices and their determinants- Year after distress 
Regression of strategy choices made in the second year of distress are 
shown in Table 9.4. All logit models are significant at better than the 5% level 
except for operational and managerial restructuring. McFadden's R' ranges from 
6% to 29% and for most of the models the explanatory power is much higher than 
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for their counterparts in the distress year in Table 9.3. Agency and control 
variables exercise their influence more strongly in the second year of financial 
distress suggesting delayed response to the onset of distress. 
Lenders again influence the likelihood of debt restructuring. Inside 
shareholders esist equity issues in the second year. Outside shareholders continue 
to disfavour cash consuming acquisitions and capital expenditure. Outside 
shareholders also dislike asset sales that wipe out the option value of assets sold, 
and are also unlikely to support equity issues. However, they now appear to 
appreciate the need for, and support, dividend cut/omissions. CEO duality has 
little influence in the second year. As predicted, non-executive Chairmen make 
managerial restructuring less likely. Outside directors! activism emerges in the year 
after distress as they induce a higher probability of operational restructuring. The 
oversight role of outside directors does appear to intensify with length of distress. 
The effects of economic downtum are significant and identical to those in 
the distress year except for the impact on managerial and debt restructuring. 
Economic downturn reduces the chances of asset sales and capital expenditure, 
and increases the need for dividend cut/omissions and debt restructuring. 
Managers are also likely to be removed when the economy is performing badly. 
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In contrast to the distress year, industry condition has significant impact on 
strategy choice in the second year. Industry downturn calls for more asset sales" 
and cash generative actions and a reduction in acquisitions. 
After increasing the probability of debt restructuring in the distress year, 
internal cause of distress further increases the probability of managerial 
restructuring one year after distress. 
Severity of distress impacts further in the second year. The more severely 
distressed firms are more likely to go for dividend cut/omission and debt 
restructuring. However, less severely distressed firms are more likely to invest 
internally (i. e. increase capital expenditure) in the second year. Finn size 
continues to influence strategy choice. Large firms are significantly less likely to 
raise cash via equity issue or undertake acquisitions. From the perspective of small 
firms, they are more likely to raise cash and make acquisitions. The need to raise 
cash is probably motivated by a lack of slack resources. Acquisitions, however, are 
more likely to be driven by the need to diversify and reduce over-reliance on 
existing lines of businesses. Large firms with potentially higher slack resources 
appear to resist such actions, at least in the year aflcr distress. 
"'As posited by Schleifer and Vishny (1992), the asset market is illiquid when the general 
economy, and hence the majority of firms, is not performing well, In contrast, when only the 
industry is in decline, firms outside the industry may still bid for assets in the declining industry, 
thus providing some liquidity to the industry's asset market. 
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9.3.3 Strategy choices and their determinants: Second year after distress 
The logit models of strategy choices made in the third year of distress 
(distress year + 2) are shown in Table 9.5. In contrast to the models in Tables 9.3 
and 9.4, only six of the third year models are significant at least at 10%. 
McFadden's W ranges ftom 5% to 25%. 
Lenders make dividend cutlomission more likely but surprisingly make cash 
generative actions less Rely. Inside shareholders are joining outside shareholders 
in resisting acquisitions in the third year. 
As regards governance structures, after two years of passive influence, dual role 
CEOs are more likely to adopt cash generative actions such as equity issues. Also, 
weak governance structure, proxied by non-executive Chainnen, is associated with 
unwillingness, on the part of management to invest in capital expenditure. Outside 
directors are largely inactive in the third year, perhaps giving time for the benefits 
of earlier restructuring to show through. 
The impact of external economic condition remains important. As in prior 
years, managers are likely to be replaced when the economy is doing poorly. Debt 
restructuring is also more likely during a downturn whilst capital expenditure is 
curtailed during a downturn. Industry condition continues to play a key role. Finns 
are less likely to invest by way of acquisitions when die industry condition is poor. 
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Where an internal problem is a cause of distress, the need to raise equity 
funds is increased in the second year after distress. Severely distressed fims 
continue to need dividend cut/omission and cut in their investments both 
acquisitions and capital expenditure, as a way of alleviating their financial distress. 
Surprisingly, debt restructuring is less likely for severely distressed finns in the 
second year after distress. This may be due to successful debt restructuring in the 
first two years. Indeed, it may be too late for severely distressed firms to 
restructure their debt in the third year of distress. In contrast, large firms are more 
inclined to restructure their debts to alleviate any financial strain in the third year. 
Large firms' financial slack may have allowed them to delay taking a painful debt 
restructuring until much later. 
9.3.4 Strategy choices and their determinants: A three year summary 
In Table 9.6, the results of the logit models of turnaround strategy choice 
reported in Tables 9.3 to 9.5 are summarised to highlight the impact of each 
agency or control variable on the probability of choosing or avoiding different 
strategies. 
Impact of agency monitoring mechanisms 
In Table 9.7, a comparison between the predicted impact shown in Table 
4.3 and the actual impact surnmarised in Table 9.6 is presented. The following 
discussion refers to both Table 9.6 and 9.7. 
307 
Table 9.6: Summary of the effect of each explanatory variable on restructuring 
strategy choice [Distressed sample] 
This table summarises the results in Tables 9.3 to 9.5. The multiple influences of 
each explanatory variable on the probability of various restructuring actions occurring are 
highlighted. Variables that are significantly positively/negatively related to particular 
strategies (i. e. increasing/decreasing the probabilitY of those actions occurring) in the 
logistic regression models in Tables 9.3 to 9.5, are separately listed. 
Probability of restructuring action 
Explanatory 
variable 
Increased Decreased 
Leverage Dividend cut/omission Cash generative actions 
Debt restructuring 
........................................................................................................................................................... Inside shareholding Operational restructuring 
Acquisitions 
Equity issue 
............................................................................................................................................................ Outside Dividend cut/omission Operational restructuring 
shareholding Asset sales 
Acquisition 
Capital cxpcnditurc 
Equity issue 
Cash generative actions 
............................................................................................................................................................. Chairman cum CEO Equity issues 
Acquisitions 
Casb generative actions 
............................................................................................................................................................. Non-executive Capital expenditure 
Chairman Managerial rcstructuring 
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Table 9.6: Summary of the effect of each explanatory variable on 
restructuring strategy choice strategies [Distressed sample](Contd. ) 
Probability of restructuring action 
Explanatory Increased Dccrcascd 
variable 
Proportion of Operational restructuring 
outside directors 
............................................................................................................................................................. Economic Managerial restructuring Asset sales 
downturn Dividend cut/omission Capital expenditure 
Debt restructuring Cash generative actions 
............................................................................................................................................................. 
Industry downturn Asset sales Acquisition 
Cash generative actions Capital expenditure 
.......................................................................................................................................................... Internal problem Managerial restructuring 
Equity issue 
Debt restructuring 
............................................................................................................................................................. Severe distress Dividend cut/omission Acquisitions 
Debt Testructuring Capital expcnditUTe 
Debt restructuring 
............................................................................................................................................................. Size Debt restructuring Operational restructuring 
Acquisition 
Equity issue 
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As predicted, lenders prefer dividend cut/omission. Lenders are also 
inclined to restructure their lending. This behaviour is also observed earlier with 
our poor performing sample (see Section 7.3) and confinns our alternative 
prediction made in Section 4.3. The alternative prediction counters tile general 
intuition that lenders would naturally prefer not to restructure debt and make 
sacrifices. It suggests that lenders' positive association with debt restructuring 
seems to prevail by definition as high leveraged firms are bound to need more debt 
restructuring than low leveraged ones. 
Surprisingly, lenders resist cash generative actions (in the third year). It is 
plausible that lenders, through the debt restructuring exercise, have secured their 
lending on whatever worthy assets remain in the distressed firm. Since secured 
assets are not disposable unless with lenders' prior approval, managerial discretion 
over asset sales is reduced. 
Inside shareholders do not favour any strategies but disfavour operational 
restructuring, acquisitions and equity issues. Again, this behaviour confirms earlier 
predictions, except for the resistance to acquisitions. The latter may be born out 
of inside shareholders' desire to avoid injecting new funds into the ailing finns to 
support acquisitions. 
Outside shareholders appear to support inside shareholders in resisting 
operational restructuring, acquisitions and cash generative equity issues. Tile 
resistance to operational restructuring is similar to that reported earlier with the 
poor performing sample (see Section 7.3). However, as discussed in Section 7.2 
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under blockholder dominance, this resistance to operational restructuring may be 
premised on the cost and 'pain' of operational restructuring. Cash is often 
expended to meet redundancy and closure costs, putting pressure on cash flows 
available for dividends. 
As prcdictcd, outsidc sharcholdcrs also rcsist assct saics and cash 
consuming capital expenditure. Unexpectedly, fliey are willing to support dividend 
cuts/omissions. Perhaps, they consider dividend cut/omission to be less painful 
than subscribing to equity issues (forgoing income is better than having to throw 
good after potentially 'bad' money). Otherwise, outside shareholders' behaviour 
is largely as predicted in Section 4.3 and shown in Table 9.7. 
Chainnan cum CEOs favour acquisitions and cash generative equity issues. 
The preference for investments is as predicted. However, favouring cash 
generative equity issues (in the third year of distress) is quite unexpected. 
However, if dual CEOs are determined to keep theirjobs, they may have no choice 
but to buy out lenders by raising equity and paying them ofT. Substantial asset 
sales at this juncture may be less feasible as any worthy assets would have: been 
sold or charged to lenders in exchange for their continued support, thus potentially 
rendering equity issues necessary. 
As predicted, and in spite of lenders' dominating influence during financial 
distress, non-executive Chairmen manage to resist managerial restructuring. 
However, they do go along with the idea of curbing capital expenditure, a 
behaviour contrary to earlier predictions. As suggested earlier, this might be the 
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quid pro quo for the non-executive Chairmen to protect managers from 
replacement. In the final analysis, a board structure with a non-executive 
Chairman does promote managerial entrenchment. 
Outside directors do not oppose any particular strategies. However, they do 
favour operational restructuring, abehaviour that matches our prediction. During 
times of financial distress, outside directors still play an effective monitoring role 
in ailing firms. 
Impact of control factors 
Distressed firms react to deterioration in their business environment. Faced 
with an economic downturn, they resort to managerial and debt restructuring. 
Cash generative actions, however, are also more difficult in a depressed economic 
climate. With difficulty in raising funds, investments are also less likely in harsh 
economic conditions. 
In contrast, when their industry as a whole experiences a downturn, 
declining finns are still able to pursue cash generative asset sales. Investments, 
both acquisitions and capital expenditure, however, are less likely during an 
industry downturn. 
Finns with an internal cause of decline are more likely to restructure their 
operations, management and debt. Firms facing a severe distress would need to 
resort to dividend cut/omission and debt restructuring and cut down on 
investments. Large firms, being more resourceful, are able to refrain ftom 
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operational restructuring, and less likely to resort to equity issues. However, they 
are more inclined to restructure their debts, but less inclined to make acquisitions. 
Large firms' more diversified and international business operations necessitates 
more complex debt structure than small firms. Large firms are consequently more 
likely to restructure their debts than small firms. Unwilling to raise equity funds 
and preferring to renegotiate financing with creditors, large distressed finns are 
understandably not going to have the financial muscle to pursue acquisitions. 
Joint impact of explanatory variables on strategy choice: A summary 
Table 9.8 summarises the joint impact of one or more agency or control 
variables on the probability of choosing or avoiding a particular strategy. It 
answers the questions 'which factors make a given restructuring strategy more 
likely and which factors make it less likelyT and 'what is the coalition of 
stakebolders bearing on the adoption of a given strategyT 
Operational restructuring is resisted by all shareholders but favoured by 
outside directors. Large fin-ns appear to have the slack resources to withstand the 
pressure for operational restructuring. 
Asset sales are again resisted by outside sharcholders. Bad economic 
condition also makes asset sales less likely. In contrast, poor industry condition 
still provides some sort of a market for asset sales. 
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Table 9.8: Joint impact of explanatory variables on individual restructuring 
strategy choice [Distressed samplel 
As explanatory variables collectively influence the choice of restructuring 
strategies, the combined impact of explanatory variables on the choice of a specific 
restructuring strategy is summarised from the results reported in Tables 9.3 to 9.5. 
Explanatory variables that are significantly positively/negatively related to a specific 
strategy, in the logistic regression models in Tables 9.3 to 9.5 (i. e. increase/decrease the 
probability of that action occurring) are shown. 
Explanatory variables 
Restructuring strategy Probability increasing Probability decreasing 
Operational restructuring Proportion of outside Inside shareholding 
directors Outside shareholding 
Size 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Asset sales Industry downturn Outside shareholding 
Economic downturn 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Acquisition Chairman cum CEO Inside sharcholding 
Outside shareholding 
Industry downturn, 
Severe distress 
Size 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Capital expenditure Outside sharcholding 
Non-executive Chainnan 
Economic downturn 
Industry downtum 
Severe distress 
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Table 9.8: Joint impact of explanatory variables on individual restructuring 
strategy choice [Distressed samplel(Contd. ) 
Explanatory variables 
Restructuring strategy Probability increasing Probability decreasing 
Managerial restructuring Internal problem Non-executive Chairman 
Economic downturn 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Dividend cut/omission Leverage 
Outside shareholding 
Economic downturn 
Severe distress 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Equity issue Chairman cum CEO Inside shareholding 
Intemal problem Outside sharcholding 
Size 
........................................................................................................................................................................... 
Debt restructuring Leverage Severe distress 
Economic downturn 
Internal problem 
Severe distress 
Size 
.......................................................................................................................................................................... Cash generation Chairman cum CEO Leverage 
Industry downturn Outside shareholding 
Economic downturn 
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Chairman cum CEO favours acquisitions although all shareholderS Tesists 
it. A severe decline in perfonnance and the existence of an industry downturn 
further depress the incidence of acquisitions. Large finns too disfavour 
acquisitions. In the case of capital expenditure, it is resisted by outside 
shareholders and non-executive Chainnen. Again, severe decline and industry 
downturn reduces the chance of incurring capital expenditure. So, would an 
economic downturn. 
Managerial restructuring is resisted, predictably, by non-executive 
Chainnan. However, the case for a cbange in leadership is enbanccd when the firm 
decline is caused by internal factors or when the economy is facing a downturn. 
Lenders' call for dividend cut/omission is supported by outside 
shareholders. In addition, a severe decline in perfonnance or an industry downturn 
makes a cut/omission imperative. 
Fund raising via equity issues is resisted by all sharcholdcrs, although tile 
existence of an internal cause of distress makes it more likely. As discussed 
earlier, Chainnan curn CEOs support for equity issue may be driven by their desire 
to raise funds and buy-out lenders. Large finns, liowcvcr, appear to have the 
resources to refrain from making equity issues. 
Lenders in highly leveraged firms have a strong impact on debt 
restructuring. The need for debt restructuring is amplified when the economy is 
facing a downturn, when the firm has an internal cause of distress or when its debt 
structure is complex, as proxied by firm size. 
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Outside shareholders and leverage jointly impact on cash generative 
actions. As discussed earlier, highly leveraged firms tend to have their assets 
secured by way of a charge to lenders, especially after a debt restructuring 
exercise. Hence, the ability to raise cash via asset sales is restricted. 
To summarise, certain stakeholder groups seem to act in similar ways to 
reduce or increase the probability of certain restructuring actions. Outside 
directors make operational restructuring more likely whilst all sharcholders make 
it less likely. outside sbarebolders' resistance to asset sales is not countered by 
other stakeholders. Interestingly, tile preference of Chainnan cum CEO for 
acquisitions is contested by all shareholders. However, disapproval by outside 
shareholders and non-exccutive Chairmen of capital expenditure is unchallenged. 
Management entrenchment proxied by a non-exccutive Chairman structure, makes 
managerial restructuring less likely. Dividend cut/ornission is demanded by lenders 
and supported by outside shareholders. Chainnan cum CEOs' enthusiasm for 
equity issues is frowned upon by all shareholders. Lenders make debt restructuring 
more likely. Chairman cum CEOs preference for cash generative actions are 
contested, surprisingly by lenders. 
Our results thus reveal interesting and shiffing coalitions of stakclioldcrs vis 
a vis different turnaround strategies. 
9.4 Impact of lender and ownership types on restructuring strategy choice 
In our analysis so far we have, however, aggregated the different lender and 
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shareholder types. As in Section 7.4, the question then is which type of lenders 
and owners favour which type of strategy. To test for these individual impacts we 
rerun all the regressions in Tables 9.3 to 9.5 with three types of lenders instead of 
one, and four types of shareholders instead of two. They are short term lenders, 
bank lenders and unsecured lenders, and manager shareholders, 
manager-associated block shareholders, institutional block shareholders and non- 
institutional unassociated block shareholders. To maintain clarity of presentation, 
only the summary results are shown in Tables 9.9 to 9.10. The results of the 
individual logit regressions are included as Appendices 9.1 to 9.3 to this chaptcr. 
As wc know from Tablc 6.13, there arc a few corrclations bctween lcvcrage and 
shareholding variables which are moderately high. Hence, the results from the 
logistic regressions based on these collinear variables must be interpreted with 
caution. Nevertheless, they provide a significant insight into the differing impact 
of individual types of lenders and shareholders on finns' strategy choice during 
financial distrcss. 
9.4.1 Impact of lender types 
The results in Table 9.9 show that short term and unsecured lenders are the 
parties behind lenders' demand for dividend cut/omission. Interestingly, both short 
term and unsecured lenders instigate managerial restructuring in distressed firms. 
This was not observed in earlier regressions based on a single leverage variable. 
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Table 9.9: Summary of the effect of each explanatory variable on restructuring 
strategy choice: Individual variables [Distressed sample] 
This table summarises the results in Appendices 9.1 to 9.3. The multiple influences of each 
explanatory variable on the probability of various restructuring actions occurring arc highlighted. 
Variabics that are significantly positivcly/negatively rclated to particular stratcgics (i. c. 
incrcasing/docreasing the probability of those actions occurring) in the logistic rcgrcssion models 
in Appcndiecs 9.1 to 9.3, arc scparatcly listcd. 
Probability of restructuring action 
Explanatory variable Increased Decreased 
Short term leverage Managerial restructuring Acquisition 
Dividend cut/omission Capital expenditure 
Debt restructuring 
......................................................................................................................................................................... Bank leverage Debt restructuring Acquisition 
Equity issue 
.......................................................................................................................................................................... Unsecured leverage Asset sales 
Managerial restructuring 
Dividend cut/omission 
.......................................................................................................................................................................... Managerial shareholding Dividend cut/omission 
......................................................................................................................................................................... Institutional shareholding Dividend cut/omission Operational restructuring 
Debt restructuring Asset sales 
Acquisition 
Capital expcnditure 
Equity issue 
Cash generative actions 
.......................................................................................................................................................................... Non-institutional Operational restructuring Asset salcs 
unassociated 
shareholding 
Acquisition 
Capital expenditure 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Chairman cum CEO Cash generative actions 
.......................................................................................................................................................................... Non executive Chairman Capital expenditure 
Dividcnd cut/omission 
Managerial restructuflng 
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Table 9.9: Summary of the effect of each explanatory variable on restructuring 
strategy choice: Individual variables [Distressed sample](Contd. ) 
Probability of restructuring action 
Explanatory variable Increased Decreased 
Proportion of outside 
directors 
Operational restructuring 
Asset sales 
Cash generative actions 
......................................................................................................................................................................... Economic downturn Operational restructuring Asset sales 
Dividend cut/omission 
Managerial restructuring 
Capital expenditure 
Cash generative actions 
Debt restructuring 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Industry downturn Asset sales Acquisition 
Equity issue Capital expenditure 
Cash generative actions 
........................................................................................................................................................................... Internal problem Operational restructuring Asset sales 
Managerial restructuring 
Equity issue 
Debt restructuring 
......................................................................................................................................................................... Severe distress Dividend cut/omission Acquisition 
Debt restructuring Capital cxpenditurc 
......................................................................................................................................................................... Size Managerial restructuring Operational restructuring 
Debt restructuring Asset sales 
Acquisition 
Dividcnd cut/omission 
Equity issue 
Cash generative actions 
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It suggests the need to look at the impact of lender types on strategy 
choice. Bank and short tenn lenders are behind the high probability of debt 
restructuring observed earlier. In addition, they now jointly restrict investments, 
both acquisitions and capital expenditure. Apparently, bank lenders are behind the 
reduced probability of cash generative equity issues. Due to unsecured lenders 
lack of security, they understandably prefer assets to be sold to generate cash, 
presumably, to fund debt repayment. 
9.4.2 Impact of ownership types 
Manager-shareholders alone resist dividend cut/omission, a behaviour not 
observed earlier (see Tables 9.3 to 9.5). This is, however, consistcnt with our 
earlier prediction in Section 4.3 which suggests manager-owners dislike dividend 
cut/omission for the reason that it reduces their effective total income. 
Manager-associated shareholders, on their own, have no impact on restructuring 
strategy choice. Also, the earlier resistance to operational restructuring, 
acquisitions and equity issues by inside shareholders (manager and manager- 
associated shareholders) is lost. In contrast to the need to look at lender types, the 
results provide support to our earlier focus on combined ownership variables 
which are not only empirically correct (as they avoid multicollinearity) but also 
conceptually sound. 'Me conceptual soundness is based on intuition of combining 
shareholders who tends to be motivated and act in similar ways. 
Institutional block shareholders and non-institutiotial unassociatcd block 
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shareholders jointly resist asset sales and asset investments, both acquisitions and 
capital expenditure. Outside shareholders' disfavour of operational restructuring 
appears to be bome entirely by the strong resistance from institutional block 
shareholders in spite of non-institutional unassociated block shareholders upport 
for it. On the other hand, institutional block shareholders are supportive of the 
need for dividend cut/omission. They are, however, behind the resistance by 
outside shareholders to equity issues. Instead, they prefer lenders to restructure 
their lending to alleviate firins' financial distress. 
9.4.3 Impact of other agency and control variables 
As in Section 7.4, it would be interesting to know if the impact of other 
agency and control variables on strategy choice has clianged due to the use of 
individual lender and ownership types in the logit regression models. The impact 
of dual-CEOs is weakened. Dual-CEOs increase only the occurrence of cash 
generative actions and no longer influence the incidence of cash-consuming 
acquisitions. Non-executive Chairmen now additionally resist dividend 
cut/omission on top of managerial restructuring and capital expenditure. Outside 
directors influence is also enhanced as they now make cash generative asset sales 
more likely. 
The impact of external environment is largely as before. The exceptions are 
economic downturns now additionally make operational restructuring more likely. 
The existence of an internal problem now causes operational restructuring to be 
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more likely, but causes asset sales to be less likely. The difficulty in selling 
problem assets is not surprising. Large firms are now associated with more 
managerial restructuring and less with a need for cash generative asset sales. 
9.4.4 Joint impact of agency and control variables 
In Table 9.10, the joint impact of agency variables bearing oil the adoption 
of a given strategy is broadly similar to earlier discussion in Section 9.3.4. 
However, non-institutional unassociated shareholders join outside directors in 
pressing for operational restructuring. Inside shareholders (manager and manager- 
associated shareholders) no longer reduce operational restructuring. Interestingly, 
the previously absent impact of lenders is now being felt. 
Unsecured lenders, togedier widi outside directors, now call for asset sales. 
Unsecured lenders, by virtue of their unprotected lending are naturally more keen 
to dispose of assets to raise cash to repay their lending than the protected secured 
lenders. 
Dual CEO and manager-associated shareholders no longcr have any impact 
on acquisitions. In contrast; lenders, short term and bank, now restrict acquisitions. 
Similarly, lenders (short term) also curb capital expenditure, joined surprisingly 
by non-executive Chairmen. Presumably, non-executivc Chairmen havc to be seen 
to be performing their fiduciary duties, and their support may be part of a deal for 
managers to keep theirjobs. 
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Table 9.10: Joint impact of explanatory variables on restructuring strategy 
choice: Individual variables [Distressed sample] 
As cxplanatory variabics collcctivcly influcnce the choicc of rcstructuring stratcgics, the 
combined impact of explanatory variables on the choice of a specific restructuring strategy is summariscd 
from the results reported in Appendices 9.1 to 9.3. Explanatory variables that arc significantly 
positivcly/negativcly related to a specific strategy, in the logistic regression models in Appendices 9.1 to 
9.3, incrcase/dccrease the probability of that action occurring. 
Explanatory variables 
Restructuring 
Probability increasing Probability decreasing 
strategy 
Operational Non-institutional Institutional shareholding 
restructuring unassociated shareholding Size 
Proportion of outside 
directors 
Economic downturn 
Internal problem 
............................................................................................................................................................. Asset sales Unsecured leverage Institutional shareholding 
Proportion of outside Non-institutional 
directors unassociated shareholding 
Industry downturn Economic downturn 
Internal problem 
Size 
............................................................................................................................................................. 
Acquisition Short term leverage 
Bank leverage 
Institutional shareholding 
Non-institutional 
unassociatcd shareholding 
Industry downturn 
Severe distress 
Size 
............................................................................................................................................................. Capital expenditure Short term leverage 
Institutional shareholding 
Non-institutional 
unassociatcd shareholding 
Non-cxccutive Chairman 
Economic downturn 
Industry downturn 
Severe distress 
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Table 9.10: Joint impact of explanatory variables on restructuring 
strategy choice: Individual variables [Distressed sample](Contd. ) 
Explanatory variables 
Restructuring Probability increasing Probability decreasing 
strategy 
Managerial Short term leverage Non-executive Chairman 
restructuring Unsecured leverage 
Economic downturn 
Interrial problem 
Size 
............................................................................................................................................................. Dividend Short term leverage Managerial shareholding 
cut/omission Unsecured leverage Non-cxecutive Chairman 
Institutional shareholding Size 
Economic downturn 
Severe distress 
............................................................................................................................................................. Equity issue Industry downturn Bank leverage 
Internal problem Institutional shareholding 
Size 
............................................................................................................................................................. 
Debt restructuring Bank leverage Short term leverage 
Institutional shareholding 
Economic downturn 
Severe distress 
Internal problem 
Size 
.......................................................................................................................................................... Cash generation Proportion of outside Institutional shareholding 
directors Economic downturn 
Chairman cum CEO Size 
Industry downtum 
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Indeed, non-executive Chairmen still decrease the likelihood of managerial 
restructuring, although now lenders, short term and unsecured, are increasing it. 
Manager-owners and non-executive Chairmen are active in resisting dividend 
cut/omissions. Manager-owners' behaviour is predictable, as they stand to lose 
income from a dividend cut/omission. Non-executive Chairmen's acquiescence 
to the same action is symptomatic of managerial entrenchment. Dual CEOs and 
manager-associated shareholders no longer have any impact on equity issues. 
Strangely, bank lenders make it less likely. 
Institutional sharebolders support debt restructuring, but sliort tenn lenders 
disapprove of it. Perhaps, short term lenders are not willing to make any sacrifice 
flowing from a debt restructuring, as they are in a stronger position than longer 
term lenders. In other words, they prefer their debt to be repaid soon. Outside 
directors now join dual CEOs to demand cash generation strategies. 
9.5 Effectiveness of restructuring strategies for distressed firms 
In the previous section, we have examined die impact of agency monitoring 
and control variables on restructuring strategy choice. In this section, we extend 
the investigation to cover the consequences of distressed firms adopting those 
restructuring strategies. We aim to find out if the strategies are instrumental to 
corporate recovery from distress. 
As widi the poorly performing sample, we test for the difference in choice, 
timing, and intensity of restructuring strategies between recovery and non-recovery 
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firms for pointers to what drives recovery. We employ logit and OLS regressions 
of recovery on intensity of restructuring strategies to test for the effectiveness of 
those strategies. Due to the choice of capturing strategies through accounting 
information, rather than strategy announcements, event study analysis is not 
feasible for the distressed sample. As discussed in Section 6.3.1, the choice of 
purely accounting-based ddalition. of restructuring actions for tile distressed firms 
is premised on two important reasons. First, the use of an accounting-based Z 
score computed on an accounting period basis necessitates the classification of 
strategies taken on the same basis. Simply, though strategy announcement is 
swiftly reflected in stock returns it is not speedily reflected in Z scores. Put 
differently, there exists a serious timing mismatch bctwccn strategy 
announcements (which impact upon stock returns immediately) and actual 
financial movements reported in accounting periods (which impact upon the Z 
score). Secondly, it is of great interest wlictlicr strategies extracted from 
accounting reports can predict clianges in Z scores 
- 
bascd on composite 
accounting ratios. 
As shown in Tablc 6.12, of the 201 samplc finns cxatnincd in the carlicr 
section, 13 which become distressed in 1993 arc excluded for lack of data, and 22 
became insolvent or taken over in flie two post distress years. The final sample for 
the purpose of exatnining strategy effectiveness consists of 166 recovcry and non- 
recovery firrns. Recovery is defined as the reversal to positive Z score in the two 
years after distress (see Section 6.2.4 for definitions). Finns still in distress (finns 
with negative Z score) two years afler distress are tenned non-recovery finns (see 
Section 6.6.2). 
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9.5.1 Financial characteristics of recovery and non-recovery firms 
Table 9.11 shows difference in profitability and cash flows between the 
recovery and non-recovery finns in the pre-distress, distress and post-distress 
years. Panel A of Table 9.11 shows the profitability and cash flows in the distress 
year for the recovery and non-recovery firms. None of the six profitability and 
cash flow measures are statistically different between the two groups in the 
distress year. Similarly, they are not significantly different in size, as measured by 
pre-decline year total assets. Therefore, both groups have identical financial 
characteristics in the distress year. But what about performance two years post- 
distress? Do recovery finns actually achieve real gains in operating perfonnance 
vis-a-vis non-rccovcry finns? 
Panel B of Table 9.11 shows the average of two post-distress ycars 
profitability and cash flows for tile non-recovery and recovery groups. In all six 
measures, recovery firms outperform non-recovery ones by a vcry significant 
margin. Therefore, recovery in Z score two year post-distrcss is based on real 
gains in firms' operating performance. 
Next we explore the difference in ways in which managers of recovery and 
non-recovery firms go about restructuring their stricken firms. We look at the 
choice of strategies, their timing and intensity of implementation. Finally, we test 
the impact of intensity of restructuring strategies on recovery in firm, performance 
two years post-distress. 
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Table 9.11 Financial characteristics of recovery and non-recovery firms 
[Distressed sample] 
This table shows the financial performance of recovery and non-recovery firms 
before and after distress, and their size. For definitions of variables refer to Table 6.10. 
The difference in means is tested using the t-statistics and the non-parametric Mann- 
Whitney Wilcoxon tests (z stat. ). indicate significance of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
Non- 
Recovery recovery 
firms firms 
Performance measures Mean Mean t-stat. z stat. 
(0/0) 
Panel A: Profitability and cash flows in the distress year 
PBIT/SaIcs 4.09 4.48 0.24 0.28 
Earnings per share growth 8.28 10.21 1.33 1.24 
Return on equity 6.87 3.22 0.66 0.87 
Return on asset 8.81 9.47 0.2 0.29 
PBITD/Capital employed 2.63 4.81 0.64 0.16 
PBITD/Total debt 7.6 9.8 0.29 0.09 
Size (IM) 356.7 441.1 0.53 0.47 
Table B: Profitability and cash flows 
- 
average of two years post distress 
PBIT/Sales 6.58 0.4 3.73*** 4.70*** 
Earnings per share growth 38.19 
-8.24 4.05*** 4.07*** 
Return on equity 13.32 6.13 1.01 2.46** 
Return on asset 14.04 5.81 2.61 3.55*** 
PBITD/Capital employed 7.07 0.49 1.98* 2.81*** 
PBITD/Total debt 33.26 
-1.06 3.77*** 3.86*** 
Sample 97 69 
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9.5.2 Frequency and timing of restructuring 
Table 9.12 shows the frequency and timing of restructunng strategies 
undertaken by recovery and non-recovery firms for three years, beginning with the 
distress year. 
In the distress year, operational restructuring actions are taken by over 50% 
of firms in both groups. Heavy asset investment in terms of capital expenditure 
and acquisitions characterise both groups in the distress year, indicating 
overinvestment as a possible cause of their distress. Over a third of sample finns 
appear to start reducing their assets in the distress year. The only significant 
difference between recovery and non-recovery finns in tcnns of distress year 
strategies lies in debt restructuring. Over 10% of non-recovcry finns restructure 
their debts whilst only 3% of recovery finns do so. 
In the first year after distress, with tile exception of operational 
restructuring and mvestments, restructuring intensifies, especially by non-rccovcry 
firins. Since operational restructuring is usually tile first turnaround strategy to be 
adopted at the first sight of performance decline, it is not surprising that its 
importance declines as the firm sinks into distress. Put differently, a finn can only 
cut costs and close operations to a certain level. Acquisition and capital 
expenditure subside rapidly due presumably to liquidity constraints, with the 
exception of an increase in capital expenditure by recovery finns. However, these 
differences are not statistically significant. 
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In the first year after distress, operational restructuring, dividend 
cut/omissions and debt restructuring are carried out by a significantly higher 
percentage of non-recovery firms dian recovery firms. This trend is repeated in the 
second year after distress. The results clearly refute any suggestion (see Section 
5.6) that managers of non-recovery firms are inactive and sit on their backs in the 
wake of financial distress. 
Managerial inaction is not an apparent cause of non-recovery as non- 
recovery firm managers restructure more intensively than those of recovery firms. 
Also, there is little titning difference as non-rccovery firms do not rcstructurc any 
later than recovery ones. Therefore, any suggestion that non-rccovcry firms do not 
respond swiftly to distress is unsubstantiated. 
9.5.3 Intensity of restructuring 
Table 9.13 shows the intensity of restructuring by recovery and non- 
recovery firins in response to financial distress. Since intensity of managerial 
restructuring is not measurable from accounting information, it is not exatnincd". 
As restructuring strategies measured by their intensity are the explanatory 
variables in the following effectiveness analysis, cash generative action, which is 
the sum of asset sales and equity issues, is excluded to avoid duplication. 
"In the poorly performing sample, it is possible to track the number of directors replaced 
and hence intensity of managerial restructuring because strategies arc entirely news-bascd. 
However, for the distressed sample, it is not possible to track the number ordirectors replaced 
since company annual reports and accounts seldom comment on changes in directors other than 
resignation and reelection of directors on rotation each year. 
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Table 9.13: Intensity of restructuring by recovery and non-recovery flrms: 
Distressed sample 
This table shows the intensity of restructuring by recovery and non-rccovcry f inns. Operational 
restructuring is measured by the cost of restructuring as reported in the company accounts as a proportion 
of prc-distress; year total assets. Asset sales, acquisition and capital cxpcnditurc arc measured by the cash 
flows cxpcndcd/pre-distrcss year total assets. Dividend change is the change in current ycar dividends 
over dividends in the prc4strcss year. Equity issue is mcasurcd by cash raised by cquity issuc/prc-disircss 
year total assets. Diffcrcnce in the means bctwecn recovery and non-recovcry f inns arc tested using t and 
non-parametric Mann-Whitnicy Wilcoxon (z) tests. denotes signiricancc at I'VO, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Sources: Datastrcam International and Company Reports and Accounts. 
Rccovcry Non rccovcry 
firms firtris Difference in means 
Restructuring strategy Mean Mean t-stat Z-stat 
Distress year 
Operational restructuring 2.85 2.41 0.81 0.84 
Asset sales 5.35 4.74 0.77 1.18 
Acquisition 19.13 22.27 0.76 0.87 
Capital expenditure 13.54 14.68 0.64 0.53 
Dividend change 
-3.05 -9.03 0.87 0.45 
Equity issue 0.76 1.16 1.34 0.24 
Distress ycar+1 
Operational restructuring 1.53 2.80 2.07** 2.26** 
Asset sales 8.01 10.70 1.09 0.97 
Acquisition 13.09 20.78 1.32 0.05 
Capital expenditure 16.80 18.64 0.47 1.22 
Dividend change 2.58 
-16.35 1.65 2.25** 
Equity issue 5.22 9.29 1.24 0.37 
Distress Y-Qar +2 
Operational restructuring 1.72 3.51 1.75* 1.96** 
Asset sales 9.07 14.30 1.18 0.00 
Acquisition 13.12 14.74 0.34 0.99 
Capital cxpenditure 19.55 19.80 0.04 1.09 
Dividend change 16.59 
-31.71 3.61*0* 4.67*** 
Equity issue 4.28 2.34 1.02 1.98** 
Distre ss year +I and+ 2 
Operational restructuring 3.48 6.95 2.55** 2.43** 
Asset sales 17.28 23.25 1.09 0.83 
Acquisition 27.44 31.50 0.50 0.02 
Capital expenditure 36.50 39,07 0.28 0.97 
Dividend change 15.99 
-40.99 2.51** 3.28*** 
Equity issue 17.80 23.78 0.60 0.11 
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Intensity is measured by the cashflows generated or drained by a strategy, 
as a ratio of pre-distress year total assets, with the exception of dividend change 
where the change is related to pre-distress year dividend per sharc'9. Adjustments 
are made for outliers, ie. set to two standard deviations, so as to normalise the 
distributions of intensity variables. 
None of the strategies is significantly different between recovery and non- 
recovery finns in the first year. However, one year after distress, non-rccovery 
firms appear to restructure their operations significantly more intensively than 
recovery ones. This trend is continued in the second post-distrcss year, caused 
perhaps by lack of effectiveness in the previous year. 
There is no significant difference in the deployment of asset sales, 
acquisition and capital expenditure strategies. The difference in dividend cliangc 
between recovery and non-recovery finns in the first and second year after distrcss 
is highly significant. over die two post-distress years, recovery finns increase their 
dividends by 16% whilst non-recovery finns slash their dividends on avcragc by 
41%. 
Unquestionably, dividend cut or omission is used intensively by non- 
recovery firms to conserve scarce cash resources. The significantly lower lcvels 
of equity issue by non-recovery fmns, two years after distress, may not be due to 
"As discussed in Section 6.4.2, the choice of pre-distress values is based on the need to 
avoid contamination by severity of distress. For example, more severely distressed firms by 
construct will tend to have larger fall in assets and dividends from the prior year. Therefore, 
relating say asset sales and dividend changes to prior year asset and dividend per share values, will 
cause such firms to show higher intensity of asset sales and dividend changes, than less severely distressed firms. 
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managers' lack of efforts but to lack of enthusiasm on the part of investors to 
support failing management teams. So, if non-recovery is not due evidently to 
inaction, late action or lack of intensity in actions, is poor strategy implementation 
the cause for non-recovery? 
It is plausible that managers of recovery firms are not only doing the right 
things but also doing them rightl We look to the logit and OLS regression results 
for evidence to confinn that it is not the lack of action but rather ineffective 
implementation of it is the cause of non-recovery. 
9.5.4 Restructuring and corporate turnaround of distressed firms 
As discussed in Section 6.3.2, corporate tumaround or recovery is defined 
as the return to positive Z score two years post-distress. As argued in Scction 5.2, 
a direct method of examining strategy effectiveness is to test the association 
between restructuring strategy and the extent of corporate recovery from financial 
distress. This involves running logit and OLS regressions of recovery and change 
in Z score in the two post-distress years from the pre-distress year level", on two 
post-distress years' intensity of restructuring strategies and control variables. As 
discussed in Sections 6.1 and 8.5, due to the causality problem associated with 
restructuring in the year of distress, only post-distress restructuring is included. 
We therefore restrict our regression of recovery on strategies to those taken in the 
two years after distress. 
"Since recovery is measured by the return to pre-distress performance i. e. positive Z 
score, the extent of recovery is therefore the difference in Z score two years post-distress from 
the pre-distress year's Z score. 
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Table 9.14 shows the logit and OLSTcgressions ofTecovcry and the Z score 
two years after distress on two year post-distress intensity of restructuring 
strategies and control variables. As the outcome of restructuring is recovery or 
non-recovery, logit regression in Table 9.14 measures the impact of explanatory 
variables on the likelihood of a firm recovering or not recovering. OLS 
regressions complement the logit regression by capturing the magnitude of 
recovery as represented by change in Z score two years post-distress from the pre- 
distress year. 
The signs of coefficients in both logit and OLS regressions arc quite 
similar. The W of both regressions is reasonably good, indicating that restructuring 
strategies and the control variables explain a significant part of the recovery story. 
Higher intensity of operational restructuring appears to be associatcd 
negatively, rather than positively, with Z score changes. This confinns results in 
Chapter 8, which suggest that higher intensity accompanies lack of effectiveness 
in implementation. 
As with poor performing firms (see Section 8.6), dividend changc is 
positively related to recovery. In other words, non-recovery firms cut/omit 
dividends, whilst recovery ones increase it. It appears that finns in general do not 
use dividend cut/omission promptly as a recovery strategy to conserve cash during 
financial distress, but rather as a strategy of last resort when restructuring is not 
working and non-recovery imminent. Likewise, debt restructuring also appears to 
be a strategy of last resort, as it is negatively related to corporate recovery. 
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Table 9.14 Logit and OLS regressions of recovery and change In Z score 
two years post-distress from the pre-distress year, on intensity of 
restructuring strategies and control variables [Distressed sample] 
Cocfficicnts of the logistic and OLS regressions of recovery and change in Z score two years 
post-distrcss from the prcodistrcss year, on two year post-distrcss intensity of restructuring stratcgics and 
control variables arc shown. For dcrinitions, see Tables 6.2 to 6.3. Industry condition is represented by 
the Z score of median firm in the distressed firm's industry sector. Since Z score is a one year score, two 
variables arc therefore required to proxy for industry condition two years post-distrcss. Cocfficicnts arc 
tested for significance using the Wald / Mcst statistic. Regression p values arc shown to indicate 
significance. 
Model: Recovery =f(Operational, asset, managerial andfinancial restnicturing Intensity, 
and control variables) 
Model 1 Model 2 
Logit 
regression OLS regression 
CoCff. p Coeff. p 
Operational restructuring 
-3.33 0.17 -11.90 0.03 
Asset sales 
-0.50 0.55 -1.88 0.31 
Acquisitions 
-0.43 0.40 -1.42 0.20 
Capital expenditure 0.30 0.58 
-0.08 0.94 
Managerial restructuring 
-0.03 0.93 -0.15 0.85 
Dividend change 0.31 0.07 0.62 0.08 
Equity issue 
-0.17 0.68 0.29 0.75 
Debt restructuring 
-1.56 0.02 -6.08 0.00 
Internal cause of distress 0.35 0.43 1.02 0.28 
Severity of distress 0.16 0.13 0.47 0.03 
Finn size 0.05 0.67 0.15 0.56 
Economic condition post-distress 0.01 0.87 0.13 0.25 
Industry condition- one year post-distress 
-0.10 0.35 -0.11 0.63 
Industry condition- two year post-distress 0.11 0.25 
-0.08 0.71 
Constant 0.46 0.75 
-1.69 0.59 
McFadden's R-Square /A R2 16.9% 25.7% 
Chi-square /F statistic 30.60 5.05 
Regression p-value 0.00 0.00 
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Therefore, both dividend cut/omission and debt restructuring are potentially 
caused by poor crisis management on the part of non-recovery firms' managers. Less 
severely distressed fmns, are more successful in regaining their pre-distress level of 
score, two years after distress. 
FroM the earlier frequency and intensity analysis, asset sales appear to be very 
much the broad strategy adopted by both groups, perhaps, resulting in a lack of 
significance in explaining recovery. Overall, there is no evidence that lack of 
restructuring efforts is a cause of non-recovery. Instead, non-recovery appears more 
likely to be caused by ineffective strategy implementation. 
As discussed in Section 8.5, there appears, from the regression results, that 
there may be a potential causality problem, in that the cause and cffcct of strategies 
may be indeterminable. In other words, a strategy may be triggcrcd by the dcclinc 
or the strategy itself may have caused the decline. For example, adopting operational 
restructuring as a turnaround strategy means it is triggered by the fmancial distress. 
However, poor initial operational restructuring may necessitate further rounds of 
operational restructuring. The initial poor restructuring thus becomes a cause of 
further decline and distress. Therefore, conclusions cannot be drawn solely on the 
regression results but rather interpreted in conjunction with the frequency, timing 
and intensity results. 
9.6 Summary and conclusion 
Managers in firms that experience financial distress may choose a variety of 
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alternative methods of restructuring them to restore their financial health. However, 
managerial choices are constrained by agency monitoring and are determined by the 
complex interplay of the ownership structure, corporate governance and Icnder 
monitoring of the firms in istress. 
Our results, from examining 201 distressed firms, show that turnaround 
strategy choices in distressed finns are indeed significantly influenced by both 
agency monitoring and control variables. The demand to curtail cash consuming 
acquisitions and capital expenditure by lenders, outside or unassociated blockliolders 
and non-executive Chainnen appears predictable and uncontrovcrsial. 
However, lenders' preferences are countered by non-cxecutivc Chainnen, in 
the case of top management replacement, and by outside blockholdcrs, in the case 
of asset sales. Manager-shareholders are largely inactive, perhaps rcflecting their 
lack of influence when firms sink into distress. However, they join non-exccutive 
Chairmen in resisting equity issues which inevitably require financial commitment 
and sacrifices from them as shareholders. Outside block shareholders oppose cash 
consuming actions as well as cash generative asset sales and equity issue. Outside 
directors play an important role in distressed firms. They induce more operational 
restructuring and press for swift cash generative asset sales. 
Based on examining 166 distressed firms for effectiveness of turnaround 
strategies, we find no support for managerial inaction as a cause of non-recovery 
from financial distress. Instead of sitting on their backs, managers of non-recovery 
fmns often appeaT to take Telatively vigoTous Testructuring actions. The evidcncc also 
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does not support timing as a cause of non-recovery, as similar proportions of 
recovery and non-recovery fmns appear to restructure their operations in the distress 
year and in the following two years. In fact, more non-recovery firms restructure 
their operations, cut/omit dividends, raise equity and restructure their debts. Non- 
recovery firms also appear to restructure their operations and cut dividends more 
intensively than recovery finns. However, higher restructuring intensity by non- 
recovery fmns appears to be necessitated by failure of earlier post-distress strategy 
implementation. Failure of strategy implementation is supported by logit and OLS 
regression results which show higher levels of operational and debt restructuring, and 
dividend cuts to be associated with lower probability of recovery. 
In conclusion, intensive adoption of prescribed restructuring strategies is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for corporate recovery from financial distrcss. 
Effective strategy implementation appears to be the key to corporate turnaround. 
Corporate managers in non-recovery firms appear to lack tile requisite turnaround 
strategy implementation skills. As with the poorly performing fims, thcre is 
potentially a case for professional turnaround managers to work in partnership with 
corporate managers to resuscitate ailing firms. 
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Chapter 10. DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 
RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES: A COMPARISON 
BETWEEN POORLY PERFORMING AND DISTRESSED 
FIRMS 
10.1 Introduction 
In the preceding three chapters we report and discuss the empirical results 
on the determinants and effectiveness of restructuring strategies by poorly 
perfortning and distressed fmns. An interesting question that remains unanswered 
is whether the determinants of strategies are the same regardless of the level of 
performance decline, and whether the strategies arc equally efficctive for firms at 
different stages of decline. 
The objective of this chapter is therefore to compare the empirical rcsults 
for the two different performance decline samples. We aim to find out if the 
determinants and effectiveness of strategies are similar between firms experiencing 
different levels of performance decline. 
Specifically, we examine if different types of stakeholder dominance arc 
associated with similar choice of strategies for die two samples. Also, we compare 
and contrast the individual impact andjoint impact of agency and control variables 
on strategy choice. Finally, we compare the effectiveness of strategies in bringing 
about a turnaround in performance in the two sample groups. 
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10.2 Impact of stakeholder dominance and restructuring strategy choice 
Table 10.1 summarises the impact of stakeholder dominance on strategy 
choice in poorly perforniing and distressed finns. Definitions of lender, manager- 
owner, blockholder, dual-CEO and board dominance are described in Section 6.5. 
When firms are dominated by lenders, all restructuring strategies are 
intensified except for managerial restructuring. For tile poor perfonncrs, dominant 
lenders press for operational restructuring, asset sales and equity issue to raise 
cash, cut/omission in dividends to conserve cash, cut in capital expenditure and 
restructuring of debt if actions taken are inadequate to restore ability of the finn 
to meet debt covenants or repayment requirements. Wien firms sink into distress, 
dominant lenders call again for dividend cut/omission and debt restructuring and 
reduction in all investments. 
Where manager-owners form the dominant stakeholder group in poorly 
performing fmns, they tend to disfavour investments and refrain from most actions 
such as operational and managerial restructuring, and cash generative asset sales 
and equity issues. However, when the firm becomes distressed, dominant owner- 
managers" influence is much reduced. They are able to resist only operational 
restructuring and cutlomission in dividends which harm themselves (as they hold 
significant shareholding in the firm) and their fellow shareholders. 
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When fmns are dominated by external unassociated blockholders, dominant 
blockholders in both sample groups resist cash generative asset sales. In poorly 
performing firms, they also manage to resist cash consuming capital expenditure 
and costly operational restructuring. 
When lenders, owner-managers, or blockholders are not dominant, and the 
Chairman is also the CEO, such dominant dual-CEOs increase the probability of 
investments in both sample groups. Predictably, they decrease the probability of 
managerial restructuring in poorly performing firms, but surprisingly increase the 
same in distressed finns (in the third year of distress, when dual-CEOs' resistance 
is weakened). When finns are in distress, dual-CEO dominant board resists 
dividend cut/omission. However, in the case of distressed firms, they favour 
equity issues. 
When the fmn is not dominated by lenders, owner-managers, blockholdcrs 
or dual-CEOs, the board collectively dominates the firm"s decision making 
process. In poorly performing firms, restructuring is favoured. Finns' opcrations 
are restructured, assets are sold, and acquisitions made, in order to revcrsc the 
finns' fortunes. On the contrary, such a board has little influence in distressed 
finns. 
To surnmarise, in both samples, lender dominance increases restructuring 
actions except for cash-consuming investments. Also, when managcr-owners 
dominate the firms decision making, they reduce die chances of firm, restructuring. 
Blockholder-dominant finns are equivocally resistant to asset sales. More 
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interesting is the preference for investments and resistance to managerial 
restructuring in dual CEO-dominated firms across the two samples. 
10.3 Impact of agency and control variables on restructuring strategy choice 
In order to perform a complete comparison of the impact of individual 
agency and control variables between the two sample groups, we employ results 
from the logit regression model based on individual lender and ownership 
variables rather than the combined variables. Table 10.2 summarises the impact 
of explanatory variables on the choice of restructuring strategies in the poorly 
performing and distressed samples. 
10.3.1 Impact of lenders 
In Panel A of Table 10.2, short tenn creditors make turnaround strategics 
such as cost cutting and cash generative actions more likely in poorly pcrforming 
finns. However, when finns are distressed Oley press for top management changcs 
and debt restructuring, and call for a reduction in or a halt to dividend payments 
and acquisitions. Likewise, bank creditors make cash generative actions more 
likely and capital expenditure less likely in poorly performance finns. But, when 
fhms sink into distress, they make debt restructuring more likely and acquisitions 
less likely. Surprisingly, bank creditors make equity issue less likely in distressed 
firms. As discussed in Section 9.3, it may be that high leverage distressed firms arc 
unattractive investment propositions for equity investors. Unsecured creditors 
make operational restructuring and dividend cut more likely in poorly performing 
firms. When distress sets in they also press for asset sales and managerial 
restructuring. 
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10.3.2 Impact of owners 
In Panel B of Table 10.2, manager-sharcholders in poorly pcrfonning finns 
are interestingly not in favour of any restructuring and they actively reduce the 
occurrence of operational restructuring, asset sales, acquisitions and equity issues. 
However, when firms are in distress, manager-sliarelioldcrs appear only to be 
successful in resisting one restructuring action 
- 
dividend cut/omissions. Titis 
behaviour is consistent with the large shareholding of managcr-sharcholdcrs. 
Dividend cut/omissions can bave a painful effect oil maiiagu-shareboldcrs' total 
income. 
Institutional shareholders exhibit a similar bchaviour to managa- 
shareholders. They disfavour costly operational restructuring and cash gcticrativc 
asset sales in poorly perfonning finns. Additionally, whcn finns arc in distrcss. 
they furdier oppose cash-conswning acquisitions and capital expcnditurc, but sccin 
equally detennined in their refusal to stump up any new cash via equity issues. 
However, during distress, d1ey go along with dividend cuts/omission but pcrsuadc 
lenders to restructure their lending. 
Non-institutional shareholders unassociated with matiagcnicia display 
similar patterns of behaviour to institutional investors. They also dislike 
operational restructuring, asset sales and cash generative actions in poorly 
performing firms. However, they are instrumental in calling for inanagcnicnt 
changes and are supportive of dividend cuts/omission. When firms arc in distress, 
they still disfavour cash generative asset sales and cash-consuming investments but 
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they also insist on keeping up operational restructuring efforts. The demand for 
operational restructuring during distress is in contrast to their resistance to the 
same strategy when the firm is merely poorly performing. Presumably, such 
shareholders are only willing to back costly operational restructuring if it is an 
inevitable ie. finn in distress, strategy for a turnaround in perfonnance to be 
achieved. 
Shareholders associated with management lack influence on stratcgy choicc 
particularly when firms sink into distress. During period of poor paformance, 
manager-associated shareholdings are in favour of growth via acquisitions but 
surprisingly in a show of independence call for top management changes in the 
later stage of decline. However, the influence is very weak (significant at 10%). 
10.3.3 Impact of corporate governance 
In Panel C of Table 10.2, management entrenchment, cpitoinised by the 
combined role of Chairman and CEO, reduces the chances of inanagrial 
replacement and cash generative actions but increases the chances of capital 
expenditure in poor performing firms. However, in a twist of events, when firms 
slide into distress, Chairmen cum CEO are more inclined to adopt cash generative 
actions perhaps as a way to buy out encroaching lenders. 
Behaviour of non-executive Chainnen resembles that of Cliainncn cuni 
CEO during a period of poor perfon-nance. They disfavour cash gcticrativc assct 
sales and favour investments, both acquisitions and capital expenditure. However, 
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with the onset of distress, they call on managers to reduce their capital 
expenditure. In return, non-executive Chairmen may offer to shelter managers 
from being replaced and support manager-owners in resisting dividend 
cut/omissions. 
Outside directors are effective in their oversight of managers. They induce 
asset sales, managerial restructuring and cash generative actions in poorly 
performing firms, and additionally operational restructuring in distressed firms. 
Where the firm is merely poorly performing, they encourage investments via 
acquisitions and capital expenditure as recovery measures, after two years of 
restructuring (see Table 7.4). As predicted in Section 4.3 outside directors do not 
disfavour any tumaround strategies. 
10.3.4 Impact of control variables 
In Panel D of Table 10.2. external economic conditions, remarkably, 
impact upon all firms in similar ways regardless of the levels of performance 
decline. When economic conditions are good, firms are able to sell more assets 
and raise more cash, and in turn invest to reverse decline. In contrast, when 
economic ondition is bad, firms in decline have to conduct more operational and 
managerial restructuring and cut/omit their dividends. Firms in distress also tend 
to need more debt restructuring. 
Impact of industry condition is broadly dissimilar for poorly perfonning 
and distressed firms. Good industry condition calls for more operational 
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restructuring to improve competitiveness in poorly performing firms, it also 
provides the condition for acquiring more proritable outrits to reverse dccline in 
distressed finns. When the industry is down, cash generative assct sales arc made 
more likely for distressed firms. However, where the f inn is poorly performing 
and the industry is down, turnaround strategies are called for to avoid a dcclinc to 
distress 
- 
capital expenditure to improve competitiveness and proritability, cut or 
omission of dividends to conserve cash, and restructuring of both management and 
debt. Industry condition, however, has a mixed impact on finns' equity funds 
raising decision. Where die firm is poorly perforniing, an industry downtum makes 
equity issues less likely. However, if a finn is in financial distress and thc industry 
is facing a downturn, equity issues are madc morc likcly. Presumably, the 
desperate need for cash to bail out a distressed finn operating in the trough of its 
industry cycle, makes a rescue equity issue imperative (albcit at huge discounts). 
Severity of distress has quite similar impact on both sample groups. Low 
severity means greater affordability for invcstnicnts to rcvcrsc dcclinc. High 
severity invariably means cut or omission in dividends for both sampic groups. 
Additionally, for poorly performing firms, severe decline calls for operational and 
managerial restructuring. However, whcrc the firm is in distrcss, scvcre distress 
inevitably means restructuring of debt. 
The role of size in poorly perfonning and distrcsscd finus is similar. Small 
firms with potentially lower levels of slack resources seem to nccd more 
operational restructuring and dividend cut/omissiol, in both samplc groups. 
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However, where the firms are in distress, small firms also need to conserve or 
raise cash more aggressively via asset sales, equity issues and cut in investments. 
In contrast large distressed firms are more inclined towards managerial and debt 
restructuring. As discussed in Section 6.6.2 and shown in Table 6.13, large finns' 
strong negative association with managerial shareholding in distrcsscd finns may 
have contributed to their ease to remove weakly-cntrcnclicd managers. 
Summary 
In summary, both lender and outside director groups arc vcry activc 
promoters of restructuring. Lenders generally favour cash gcncration and disfavour 
cash-consuming investments. Overall, shareholders resist costly operational 
restructuring and option-value destroying asset sales and financially painful equity 
issues. Weak governance cbaracterised by a dual CEO or non-mcutive Clininnan 
structure encourages investments, and resistance to matiagcrial rcstructuritig wid 
cash generative actions. Strong governance epitomised by a high proportion of 
outside directors in the board of directors, lead to a high hicidmcc of rcstructuring. 
Crucially, they do not disfavour any kind of restructuring stratcgy. Economic 
downturns increase operational and managerial restructuring and dividcnd 
cutlomýissions but make cash generative actions more difficult. Industry downturns 
have a similar impact to economic downturns except that cash gcncrativc 
opportunities are no longer restricted. The existence of an imcnial Causc of decl ine 
requires a range of remedial actions except investments. Severe decline means 
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more drastic restructuring and fewer investments. Large firms appear to be able 
to resist restructuring and afford investments except when the firm is in distress, 
when they readily restructure both their management and debt finance. 
10.4 Joint impact of agency and control variables on restructuring strategy 
choice 
Table 10.3 surnmarises the collective influence of explanatory variables on 
restructuring strategy choice in both poorly perfonning and distressed firms. 
Operational restructuring 
Operational restructuring is made more likely by short tcnn and unsccurcd 
creditors in poorly performing firms. Ironically, outside non-institutional 
shareholders and outside directors, and not Icridus, arc the supportcrs; of 
operational restructuring in distressed firms. Presumably, wlicn finns sillk into 
distress lenders are more interested in debt repayment than in the firms' long tcnn 
health. Shareholders, in general, disfavour financially costly and cash draining 
operational restructuring in poorly perfonnitig flimis but only institutional 
shareholders have the clout to oppose such actions in distressed finns. Economic 
downturn and the existence of an internal cause of decline also make opcrational 
restructuring more likely. Industry downturn (for poor pafonning finns only) and 
large firm size make operational restructuring less likely. Prcstunably, intcnial 
operational restructuring is a less appropriate remedy for industry dowrittims and 
large firms' slack resources may shelter them from the nccd to rcstructurc tlicir 
operations. 
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Asset sales 
The coalitions of stakeholders inducing asset sales are largely similar in the 
two sample groups. Lenders and outside directors are in favour whilst shareholders 
(and non-executive Chairmen in poorly performing firms) oppose asset sales. 
Asset sales are more difficult if die economy as wbole is in decline titan wben the 
industry is in decline. 
Acquisitions and capital expenditure 
Entrenched managers, proxied by high manager-associatcd sharcholding 
structure, favour investments in poorly preforming firms. Also, outsidc dirwors 
favour investments as a recovery strategy in poorly pcrfonning finns. In contrast, 
when the finn sinks into distress, no stakeholder groups favour it. Generally, 
lenders and shareholders dislike both acquisitions and capital cxpctiditurc in both 
sample groups, and fewer large firms appear to invest to reverse distress. 
However, if the external environment is bad and the finn suffcrs a scvcrc dcclinc, 
investments are less likely. On the other hand, capital expenditurc is rcquircd to 
improve efficiency and competitiveness if poorly perforniftig finns facc an 
industry downturn. 
Managerial restructuring 
Top management replacements in poorly performing firms arc drivcn by 
outside directors and outside sharebolders whilst short tenn and unsccurcd kndcrs 
are understandably the active campaigners in the case of distresscd f inns. Bad 
364 
external environment appears to cause more heads to roll in both sample groups. 
So do severe decline (in poorly prefonning firms) and the existence of an internal 
cause of decline (in distressed firms). Predictably, entrenched management in the 
form of dual CEOs (in poorly performing firms) and non-executive Chainnen (in 
distressed firms) also make top management replacement less likely. 
Dividend cut/omission 
Cash conservation in the form of dividend cut/omission is supporld by 
lenders, particularly unsecured ones, and outside shareholders in both sample 
groups. Sin-fflarly, bad external environment, severe decline and small size appear 
to drive firms in both sample groups to resort to dividcnd cut/otnissions. 
Predictably, owner-managers and non-executive Chairmen dislike such a movc in 
distressed firms. 
Equity issue 
In the case of equity issue, the factors influencing it are mixed. Industry 
downturns make it more likely (or pressing) in distressed firms but less likcly in 
the case of poorly preforming firms. The existence of ititcrnal problems also 
necessitates fund raising via equity issues in distressed finns. Understandably, 
institutional shareholders disfavour equity issues, in order to avoid risking good 
money over bad investments. Surprisingly, bank lenders make equity issues less 
likely for distressed firms. 
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Debt restructuring 
Higher bank creditors, institutional shareholding, the existence of an 
internal problem and severe distress increase the probability of a debt restructuring 
in distressed firms. However, only industry downturns increase the likclihood of 
debt restructuring in poorly performing firms (but no stakeholder disfavour it). 
Bad economic environment also induces more debt restructuring in distressed 
fmns. Strangely, short tenn lenders dislike debt restructuring in distressed finns. 
Presumably such restructuring jeopardises the repayment of their debt in the short 
tenn. 
Cash generative actions 
Outside directors press for cash generative actions in both sample groups. 
Lenders are also champions of such a move in poorly performing finns, whilst 
Chairmen cum CEO are in favour of the same in distressed firms. The motives of 
Chainnen. cum CEOs are likely to be the raising of cash to buy out encroaching 
lenders. Bad economic conditions appear to reduce the chances of cash generative 
actions in both sample groups. Opposition to cash generative actions comes fronj 
shareholders in both sample groups. However, Chairman cum CEO and non- 
executive Chairmen also have the clout to oppose such actions in poorly 
perfon-ning finns. 
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10.5 Effectiveness of restructuring strategies 
In Chapter 8, we have examined the effectiveness of restructuring strategies 
by poorly perfonning finns using both the event study and regression 
methodology. However, for distressed firms in Chapter 9, we use only the 
regression 
, 
methodology to assess trategy effectiveness for the simple reason that 
strategies are based on accounting information and not news announcements. As 
such, our comparison of the effectiveness of strategies between the poorly 
performing and distressed samples is restricted to the regression results. 
Table 10.4 shows the results of logit and OLS regressions of rccovcry and 
two years' cumulative stock returns ranking/change in Z score two year post- 
distress from the pre-distress year, on restructuring strategies and control variablcs 
for the poorly performing/di stressed sample. 
As discussed in Section 8.5, the choice of company announcunctits for the 
poorly perfon-ning sample mean accounting-based capital expenditures, which are 
not announced separately from annual results, are excluded froin the rcgrcssion in 
the poorly performing sample. 
The regression results for the distressed sample arc appreciably less 
significant than for the poorly performing sample. I'lie lack of association betwccii 
accounting-based strategies and recovery in Z score can potentially be due to the 
muld-factor nature of Z score. On the other hand, the strong association betwccii 
company announcement-based strategy and changes in stock retinis in poorly 
performing firms produce the significant coefficients in Table 10.4. 
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Table 10A Logit and OLS regressions of recovery on intensity of 
restructuring strategies and control variables: A comparison between poor 
performance and distressed samples. 
This table sun-unariscs Table 8.7 and Table 9.13 Cocfficicnts of the logistic and OLS 
regressions of recovery and two years' cumulative stock returns ranking in the market post-distrcss 
(change in Z score two years post-distrcss from the prc-distrcss year), on restructuring strategies 
and control variables are sbown. See Tables 6.1 to 6.3 for definitions and sources of infonnation. 
Sample sizes for the poor performing and distressed samples are 188 and 166 firms respectively 
Model 1 Model 2 
Logit regression OLS regression 
Poorly Distressed Poorly Distressed 
performing performing 
Explanatory variable Coeff. p Coeff. p Cocff. p Cocff. p 
Restructuring strateSy 
Operational restructuring 
-3.60 0.08 -3.33 0.17 -16.31 0.09 -11.90 0.03 
Asset sales 
-0.08 0.84 -0.50 0.55 -2.30 0.40 -1.88 0.31 
Acquisitions 0.08 0.74 
-0.43 0.40 0.88 0.60 -1.42 0.20 
Capital expenditure 0.30 0.58 
-0.08 0.94 
Top management change 
-0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.93 -0.26 0.00 -0.15 0.85 
Dividend change 0.17 0.07 0.31 0.07 1.99 0.00 0.62 0.08 
Equity issue 0.48 0.28 
-0.17 0.68 5.28 0.04 0.29 0.75 
Debt restructuring 
-2.30 0.04 -1.56 0.02 -14.77 0.00 -6.08 0.00 
Controlfactors 
Internal cause of distress 
-0.09 0.87 0.35 0.43 -1.76 0.60 1.02 0.28 
Severity of distress 0.02 0.53 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.28 0.47 0.03 
Firm size 0.46 0.02 0.05 0.67 2.38 0.05 0.15 0.56 
Economic condition 
-0.02 0.73 0.01 0.87 -0.17 0.70 0.13 0.25 
Industry condition 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.00 
Industry condition- I year 
-0.10 0.35 -0.11 0.63 
after distress year 
Industry condition 
-2 year 0.11 0.25 
-0.08 0.71 
after distress year 
Constants 
..... 
-1.36 
................. 
0.14 
....... 
0.46 
.. . 
0.75 42.45 0.00 
-1.69 0.59 
..............................................  McFadden's R-Square /Adj R? 46.9% ............ 16.9% ........ .............. 55.8% ............ ............... 25.7% ......... 
Chi-square /F statistic 119.2 30.6 19.2 5.1 
. 
Regression p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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In the logit regressions, the distress sample has and shares only two out of 
six significant coefficients found in the poorly performing sample. Positive change 
in dividends is a significant factor in driving up both stock returns and Z scores, 
two year post-decline. The relation between positive dividend change and Z scores 
exemplify the potential causality problem highlighted earlier in Section 8.6. Since 
recovery and not non-recovery finns can afford to raise their dividcnds, the 
positive relation between increase in dividend and Z scores (or positive cliangc in 
Z scores) is unsurprising. In contrast debt restructuring is significantly negatively 
related to changes in stock returns and Z scores, over two post-dccline years. Dcbt 
restructuring may be viewed as a last resort and adopted too latc, thereby 
signalling worsening recovery prospects. Top management changcs havc a 
significant impact on stock retums but not oil Z scorcs. Similarly, control variabics 
- 
size and industry condition during restructuring have a significant impact oil 
stock returns but not on Z scores. In spite of the negative rcactions to cquity issuc 
announcements, in particular by recovery firms (see table 8.5), equity issues arc 
related to recovery in poorly performing finns. 
The OLS regressions have similar results. All the significant cocfficictits 
in the logit regression plus the addition of equity issues are significant in the OLS 
regression for the poorly performing sample. 
In the case of the distressed sample, operational restructuring and sevcrity 
of distress are two new variables, on top of dividend changes and debt 
restructuring, significantly related to recovery in Z score. Less severely distressed 
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finns have understandably higher chances of returning to pre-distress level Z score 
than more severely distressed firms. Interestingly, the negative association 
between operational restructuring and recovery in Z scores is consistent with the 
negative association with recovery in stock returns in the poorly performing 
sample. However, as with the logit regressions, top management changes, equity 
issue, firim. size and industry condition are significantly related to recovery in stock 
perfonnance but not in Z scores. 
10.6 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, we set out to examine if Ole determinants of strategy choice 
and the effectiveness of restructuring strategies are the same irrcspcctivc of the 
level of performance decline. Specifically, we compare and contrast the empirical 
results discussed in Chapters 7 to 9, and highlight the similarities as well as 
dissimilarities in strategy determinants and effectiveness bctwccii the poorly 
performing and distressed samples. 
The comparison reveals striking similarity in determinants of strategy 
choice but some differences in the impact of restructuring strategies on recovery 
in firms' stock return performance and Z scores. 
Analysis of stakeholder dominance and strategy choicc show dominant 
lenders to prefer most restructuring strategies but disfavour investnicnts. 
Conversely, dominant owner-managers esist most restructuring whcrc the firm is 
merely poor perforniing. However, they are only successful in resisting operational 
restructuring and dividend cuts/omissions where the firm is distressed. Dominant 
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blockholders are able to resist cash generation and cash consumption during a 
period of poor performance but only cash generation in a period of distress. Dual 
CEO dominated boards favour investments and resist managerial restructuring. 
Non-dual-CEO boards appear largely in favour of restructuring and oppose no 
strategies. 
Analysis of the individual impact of agency mechanisms hows lenders to 
be broadly in favour of all types of restructuring except for cash constuning 
investments. Passive and perhaps powerless manager-sharcholdcrs in distrcsscd 
fmns are in stark contrast to their active counterparts in merely poorly performing 
fmns, who resist a wide range of strategies. Overall, outside blockholdcrs oppose 
most restructuring strategies except for managerial restructuring, dividend 
cut/omission and debt restructuring. Managerial entrenchment in form of 
Chairman cum CEOs' and non-executive Chairmen favours capital expenditure 
but disfavours managerial restructuring. Entrenched managers also dislike cash 
generative action when the finn is merely poorly pcrfonning, in which case they 
still have the clout to resist such measures. Outside directors are largely cffcctive 
in their oversight role as they promote greater levels of tcstnicturing. 
The changing influences of stakeholders in promoting or opposing different 
strategies highlights the importance of managing the shifting coalitions between 
stakeholders during perfonnance decline. Lenders and outsidc directors' 
preference for operational restructuring is opposed by all sharcholders except for 
non-insfituflonal unassociated shareholders in distressed firms. Similarly, lenders 
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and outside directors' preference for cash generative assct sales arc chalIcngcd by 
most shareholders, and non-executive Chainnen when the firm is merely poorly 
perfonning. Investments are favoured by entrenched managers but arc generally 
discouraged by lenders and other shareholders. The exceptions are manager- 
associated shareholders and outside directors support for investincilts as a recovery 
strategy during the later phase of the turnaround. Managerial restructuring is 
promoted by outside directors and block shareholders when the firm is poor 
perfonning but by lenders when the finn is in distress. Entrenched inamigers 
proxied by Chairman curn CEOs or non-executive Chairmen resist such an action. 
Dividend cut/omission is favoured by lenders and supported by outside block 
shareholders, but resisted by manager-owners and non-executivc Chaimicn. Equity 
issues are resisted by shareholders and inexplicably lenders in distressed finns. 
Institutional shareholders and lenders jointly make debt restructuring morc I ikcly 
in poorly performing firms. Cash generation is promoted by lendus and outsidc 
directors, but shareholders and entrenched managers resist it, cxccpt for dual 
CEOs' preference for it in distressed finns. Mien finns arc in distress, only 
institutional investors have the clout to oppose cash-gencrative actions. 
Restructuring strategies are able to explain a large proportion of the 
recovery in stock returns in the poorly performing sample but only a small albeit 
significant proportion of recovery in Z scores. The weaker association between 
strategies and Z scores is potentially due to the historical pcrspcctivc of Z scorcs 
compiled based on past accounting figures, which serve best to mcasurc the 
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current bankruptcy risks of firms. Put differently, the current Z score, based on 
accrual-based accounting numbers, is perhaps unable to fullY reflect the impact of 
individual strategies on the finns' future cash flows. Potentially, a prospective Z 
score computed on the basis of the impact of future cash flows (from turnaround 
strategies) to current accounting numbers may register a far stronger association. 
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Chapter 11. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
11.1 Introduction 
In Chapter I we outlined the broad objectives of this study as the 
examination of the determinants of restructuring choice and the effectivcness of 
restructuring strategies. Also, we aimed to test the applicability and effectiveness 
of restructuring strategies to firms with differing levels of performance dcclitic. 
The three research questions to be explored were: 
1. What are the determinants of restructuring strategy choice in response to 
perfomance decline? 
How effective are the prescribed turnaround strategies in contributing to 
corporate turnaround from performance decline? 
3. Arc the generic turnaround strategies equally applicable to and cfTcctivc for 
firms experiencing different degrees of perfonnance decline? 
We explored the above empirical questions with two samples of firms with 
different levels of performance decline 
- 
one merely poorly performitig and the 
other in financial distress. The aim is to obtain a complete understanding of how 
strategy choices are made, whether they are effective, and if finns experiencing 
different degrees of decline react or the strategies work, diffcrcntly. 
We employ logit regression methodology to examine the impact of lendcrs, 
ownership, governance and control variables on firms' restnicturing strategy 
choice. For both the poorly perfonning and distressed samples, we use logit and 
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OLS regressions to test strategy effectiveness via examining the association 
between intensity of post-decline restructuring to post-decline recovery in 
performance. Additionally, for the poorly performing sample, we use the event 
study methodology to measure the effect on shareholders' wealth of strategy 
announcements, as a complementary measure of strategy effectiveness. 
The samples consist 297 poorly performing and 201 distressed firms. The 
samples are reduced to 188 and 166 firms respectively for the two groups, in 
examining strategy effectiveness two years post decline. 
In the following sections, we surnmarise the rcstilts of our empirical 
analysis with regard to the objectives we set out earlier, and discuss the 
implications of these results for corporate managers, lenders, shareholders, and 
governance policy makers. Areas for further research arc also suggcstcd. 
11.2 Determinants of restructuring strategy choice 
In Chapters 7 and 9, we empirically examine the dctcrminants of 
restructuring strategy choice, for a sample of poorly performing and a sample of 
distressed firms, applying a comprehensive strategy determinants framework. 
Logistic regressions arc employed to test the impact of a range of explanatory 
variables on strategy choices. The results provide interesting new insights into 
managers' strategy selection process. Tn this respect, we consider we havc 
succeeded in our first objective of understanding wbat factors induce inanagas to 
choose or avoid certain restructuring strategies in the wakc of pcrfonnancc 
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decline. 
Our results confinn that the different, and often conflicting, welfare 
implications for different stakeholders resulting from recovery strategies cause 
managers' choice of recovery strategies to be determined by a complex interplay 
of the ownership structure, corporate governance and lender monitoring of the 
firms in decline. There is also evidence of shiffing coalitions among lenders, 
managers and directors in the choice of recovery strategies. 
The results have practical implicaflons for Icnders, managm, sharcholdcrs, 
outside directors and policy makers. 
Lenders 
The benefits of lender monitoring arc evident in the poorly pcrforming 
sample. Lender-dominated firms are more likely to opt for operational 
restructuring and are less likely to approve of a cash-consuming strategy such as 
capital expenditure. Lenders' insistence on operational restructuring, aimed at 
4stopping tile bleeding' or 'avoiding cash haemorrhage', can be valuc-enhancing 
in the long run. Operational restructuring actions such as layoffs, closurcs and 
integration of facilities are often associated vvith large charges against earnings and 
cash outflow in the short tcrin, but they can reduce costs and increase profitability 
and cash outflows in the long run. Also, the beneficial effects of lendcr monitoring 
are felt in distressed finns, as well as poorly perfonning ones. For instance, 
lenders' insistence on strict financial control, evidenced by restriction on capital 
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expenditure, helps to conserve scarce cash resources, and avoid corporate failure. 
On the other hand, lenders tight financial reign through discouraging 
investments can cause an under-investment problem in both poor performing and 
distressed samples. Lenders may not only be depriving firms of vital resources 
necessary to compete and reverse decline but also weaken their strategic health by 
favouring short term cash generative measures to facilitate debt repayment. Also, 
lenders' strong preference for cash generative actions in spite of disapproval froin 
shareholders pose the question whether lenders wield excessive power. Indeed, the 
results reveal some potentially detrimental effects of lender dominance. It raises 
the question whether banks are unwittingly too keen to pull the plug on ailing 
finns which lack short tenn cash generation ability in spite of their healthy long 
term potential. 
In respect of the excessive powers of lenders, policy makers are aucinpling 
to revamp the 1986 Insolvency Act. The current debate ccntres on removing the 
floating charge or at least curtailing the rights of floating charge holders in the 
event of a firm sinking into financial distress i. e. unable to service debt obligations 
as they fall due or breaching key debt covenants. A floating charge holder has 
powers even surpassing those of fixed charge holders (see Appendix 2.1). 
Although fixed charge holders can seize the assets being charged to them, in the 
event of a default, they have no powers of management, as opposed to floating 
charge holders. In other words, only floating charge holders have the right, without 
court approval, to appoint an administrative receiver to manage the finn's 
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operations. UK banks generally require both a fixed and floating charge for 
substantial lending. 
Removal of floating charge may have a significant impact on how firms are 
managed in a turnaround situation and how lending is structured. Corporates' 
freedom from the clutch of lenders may be gained at a high cost, as lenders will 
inevitably seek higher returns from the much riskier no-floating charge lending. 
A compromise may lie in curtailing the rigbts of floating charge holdcrs. Instcad 
of an outright ability to appoint an administrative receiver, they will need prior 
court approval. In this scenario, other affected parties and the distrcssed finn's 
managers in particular are able to present their own views and restructuring 
proposals. 
A new 'Insolvency Act' which cutbs some of the excess powers con fcffcd 
on lenders may ease the financial hardship faced by turnaround managers. 
Perhaps, through reduced pressure to liquidate assets and reduce debts, tumaround 
managers can focus on achieving survival and long term profitability in the finns' 
chosen product/markets. Corporate failures which may result from lenders desire 
to take control and liquidate assets to repay themselves, may potciltially bc 
reduced. 
On the other hand, there are undoubtedly significant bencrits flowing from 
lender monitoring in Poor performing and distressed firms. Indeed, announcement 
of debt issue is viewed positively by the stock market, linked to the rcduction of 
agency costs flowing from lender monitoring (James, 1987). Thcrcfore, to 
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continue to incentivise lenders to perform such monitoring, sacrifices must 
continue to be made by other stakeholders, such as the present granting of top 
priority rights to lenders. 
Managers 
Wifli regard to managers, in the case of poorly performing firms, the results 
imply that when they call the shots e. g. when governance structure is wcak as 
proxied by a dual CEO and non-executive Chainnan structure, they tend to pursue 
self-serving interests which result in less restructuring and top managenicnt 
replacement. Also, excessively higb managerial sbarcliolding and control are 
shown to cause managerial inertia and inaction vis a vis prfonnaticc dcclinc. 
Entrenched managers' resistance to restructuring can push the finn down a spiral 
to failure and should therefore be curtailed. However, in the case of distrcsscd 
fums, manager shareholders are largely inactive, reflecting their eroded influeticc 
when finns have sunk into distress. 
Shareholders 
In the case of shareholders in the poorly perfonnirig sample, the results 
imply that non-institutional rather than institutional shareholders are active 
monitors, evidenced by their influence in instituting top trianagemait changes and 
dividend cuts/omissions. This difference in behaviour may stein from short- 
tennism on the part of institutional investors. Unlike non-institutional blockholders 
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who generally make a strategic investment in the ailing finn, institutional investors 
have been accused of cutting their losses and selling out on the first sight of 
financial trouble (Pound, 1988). The reluctance in initiating management changes 
brings to question the independence and commitment of institutional sharcholders. 
Institutional shareholders' behaviour is symptomatic of Pound's (1988) argumcnt 
of a less effective monitoring role for institutional shareholders. Spccifically, lic 
arpes that institutional shareholders' other business dealings with the company 0- 
e. g. underwriting and broking, may lead to a conflict of interest detracting from 
effective monitoring. In other words, large institutions may possibly have 
compromised their monitoring obligations by their close working relation with 
ailing corporates who provide them with vital underwriting or other profcssional 
income. However, the tight City regulatory regime covering the erection of 
'Chinese Walls' between the broking and underwriting and the investincia side 
of large institutions makes such an allegation difficult to prove. Overall, outside 
shareholders do generally seem to go along with management sharcholdcrs on 
strategy choice except for investments and managerial restructuring. 
However, shareholders' general reluctance to support any type of 
financially costly strategy such as operational restructuring or option valuc- 
destroying strategies uch as asset sales looks worrying. The evidence implies that 
shareholders' hort-termist view may drive UK corporates to focus on short term 
profit objectives and targets. The remedy, therefore, lies in persuading investors 
to take a more long term view of corporate investments. In this respect, the train 
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is set in motion, recently, with institutional investors beginning to press for key 
changes in the corporate governance of their investee firms. 
Corporate governance 
The Cadbury Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(the Code) is the most authoritative report on corporate governance at the titne of 
writing. It emphasises checks and balances within the structure of a company, 
especially at the board level which assists directors in fulfilling their duty to act 
in the interests of the company and guard against undue conccntration of powcr 
among top managers. Paragraph 1.2 of the Code says that there should bc a clearly 
accepted divisionOf Tesponsibilities at the head of a company which will cnsure 
a balance of power and authority such that no one has unfcttcrcd powers of 
decision. The report says that the calibre and number of non-cxccutivc directors 
should be such that they carry significant weight in the board's dccisions, and that 
they should be independent. However, the report does not lay dowri the proportion 
of non-executive directors in the board. Tile argument put forward is that it is the 
quality of the non-executives that counts and not the numbers. 
The implication of our empirical results for both samples on the role of 
outside or non-executive directors are highly interesting. Boards with a large 
outside director presence are shown to be effective in their oversight of managm, 
as they intensify adoption of many turnaround strategies. This implies strong 
support for the Cadbury code of practice. 
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However, the Cadbury's code of best practice may perhaps be inadequate 
in the light of our results. The power and beneficial impact of outside director 
monitoring appears to lie in numbers. The threat of significant numbers of non- 
executives revolting against (and potentially voting out) executive directors, exerts 
tremendous pressure on executives to behave properly. Hence the lack of a 
recommended minimum number of non-executive directors or a proportion of 
non-executive directors in the board of directors may reduce substantially the real 
impact of non-executives, in particular, on firms' strategic decisions during a 
critical period of performance decline. 
The results from both swnples have even more serious implications for the 
role of Chainnen and CEOs. Wien both roles are coinbincd, the rcsults show 
detrimental effects. Entrenched Chairmen cum CEOs refrain from taking 
managerial restructuring and cash generative actions, and favour invcstinctits. It 
implies that dual CEOs are more interested in empire building, or at Icast in 
maintaining it, during period of performance decline, when scriOUS TCStructuring 
efforts are necessary for recovery. In this respect, the Cadbury code of practice 
fails to call explicitly for the separation in the role of Chainnan and Chief 
Executive Officer. However, although the report does not explicitly call for the 
separation of the posts of chainnan and chief executive, the report does clearly 
emphasise that in principle they should be. The jury is still out on whether the 
weak suggesfion for a separafion of the chainnan and chief executive positions has 
any persuasion at all, in practice. 
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Also, the results Wghligbt the crucial role board Chainnen play in corporate 
governance in poorly performing and distressed firms. Part time non-executivc 
Chairmen's tendency to promote strategies similar to those favourcd by a 
Chairman cum CEO structure implies that an 'outside" Chainnan furthcrs 
managerial entrenchment. An executive Chainnan, essentially, not only ensures 
division of power at the corporate head i. e. roles of Chairman and CEO are 
separate, but also ensures 'mutual monitoring' of actions between thc Chairman 
and CEO from the 'inside'. Consequently, when the Chainnan is in a non- 
executive capacity, monitoring from Ole inside is absent, kaving the CEO to wicid 
supreme control over the firm. In this regard, the Cadbury code fails again to 
emphasise the need for full-time Chairmen to play the vital role of an informcd 
'inside' board monitor. 
Control factors 
In addition, our results show significant impact from previously igtiored 
control factors on strategy choice. Specifically, die external economic and industry 
conditions influence significantly the availability and attractiveness of, and the 
need for, certain strategies. Firm size, severity of decline and internal cause of 
decline also impact significantly on restructuring strategy choice. Large finns 
appear to have the financial slack to withstand decline better. This rcflect finaticial 
strength to weather the stonn with no cash constraints in ternis of investing for 
strategic change. Managers of poorly performing large firms arc better able to stcer 
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their fmns back to recovery than managers of smaller firms. Finns suffering from 
severe decline or severe financial distress, are observed to need greater levels of 
restructuring than their less severely afflicted counterparts. Firms reporting an 
internal cause of decline also restructure more intensively, in particular, through 
internal operational restructuring, and interestingly, managerial restructuring, 
The importance of controlling for contextual factors implies that results 
from the only other study of this nature by Ofek (1993), which ignores such 
influences, have to be interpreted cautiously. Also, results from past relatcd studies 
employing less comprehensive determinants models may be potentially flawed due 
to the problem of omitted variables. 
Potentially, corporate failures can be explained by poor agency monitoring 
during decline, resulting in poor choiceOf8ppTOpriate turnaround strategies. 
11.3 Effectiveness of restructuring strategies and corporate turnaround 
In Chapters 8 and 9, we examine the frequency of recovcry and non- 
recovery by firms adopting the prescribed strategies. We investigate the timing, 
intensity and shareholder wealth impact of restructuring strategies (in the case of 
poorly perforraing firms). We also run regressions to test the impact of intensity 
of restructuring strategies on recovery from performance decline. In this context, 
we have augmented our understanding of whether restructuring strategies arc 
effective in contributing to corporate turnaround from performance decline. 
For the poorly performing sample, the results show asset and managerial 
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restructuring to be effective and operational and financial restructuring to be 
ineffective. Our results suggest that the root cause of non-recovery is bad 
implementation of restructuring strategies and not their timing or intensity. For 
similar strategies, non-recovery fmns' managers are perceived by the market to be 
far less effective in their implementation. 
Our results for both samples show no support for managerial inaction as a 
cause of non-recovery from decline. Instead of sitting on their backs, managers of 
non-recovery fmns appear to take apparently vigorous and inteilsivc rcstructuriiig 
actions. The evidence also does not support timing as a cause of tion-rccovcry, as 
similar proportions of recovery and non-recovery firms appear to restructure their 
operations in the distress year and in the following two years. In fact morc non- 
recovery firms restructure their operations, cut/omit dividends, raise equity and 
restructure their debts earlier. Non-recovery firms also appear to restructure their 
operations and cut dividends more intensively in the later years of declinc/distrcss 
than recovery firms. However, higber restructuring intensity by non-rccovcry f inns 
appears to be necessitated by failure of earlier strategy impleincritation. This is 
supported by logit and OLS regression results which show higher levels of 
operational and debt restructuring, and dividend cuts/omissions to be associated 
with lower probability of recovery. 
The results have major implications for managers and shareholdcrs. 
Managers must recognise that half hearted attempts at implementing restructuring 
strategies are seen through by investors at large. Hence, appearing to be 
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restructuring is insufficient to convince the stock market. Rather, managers must 
be seen to be carrying out the restructuring credibly and seriously. Taking a 
different perspective, the root of managers poor strategy implementation may lie 
in corporate managers being, generally, poor 'turnaround' managers. Hence, there 
may be a case for engaging professional turnaround managers to work in 
partnership with corporate managers to resuscitate ailing firms. 
For shareholders, it implies that they can take comfort from the fact that the 
UK stock market is efficient and prices correctly reflect the impact of information 
about flie effectiveness of strategies released to flie market, as tlicy arise. The stock 
market appears to interpret restructuring announcements correctly as pointcrs to 
eventual recovery or non-recovery. 
In conclusion, timely and intensive adoption of prescribed restructuritig 
strategies is an insufficient condition for corporate recovery from poor 
performance. Effective strategy implementation appears to be the key to corporate 
tumaround. 
11.4 Determinants and effectiveness of restructuring strategy cholce: A 
comparison between poorly performing and distressed firms 
In chapter 10, we set out to examine whether the determinants of strategy 
choice and the effectiveness of restructuring strategies are the same irrespective 
of the level of perfonnance decline. In this respecý we have succeeded in our third 
objective of understanding whether the same turnaround strategies are equally 
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applicable to and effective for both poorly performing and distressed firms. 
The results reveal a striking similarity in the deterrninants of strategy choice 
but some differences in the impact of restructuring strategies on rccovcty in firms' 
stock perfonnance and Z scores. 
Impact of lenders 
The role of lenders is similar in both poorly performing and distrcsscd 
firms. Lenders are generally in favour of all restructuring except for cash 
consuming investments. However, lenders are only able to instigate managonctit 
changes when firm performance has reached distress level. 
Impact of ownership 
Man ager-sharehol ders' passive and somewhat powerless behaviour in 
distressed fmus is in stark contrast to the activism of tlicir counterparts in poorly 
performing firms. Dominant owner-managers prefer investment and growth and 
resist most other restructuring where the firm is merely poor pcdonning. However, 
they are only successful in resisting operational restructuring and dividcnd 
cuts/omissions where the firm is distressed. This shows the influence of inanaga- 
shareholders diminishes as firms sink deeper into distress. 
Outside blockholders oppose most restructuring strategics except for 
managetial restructwing, dividend cut/omission and debt restructuring. Dominant 
blockholders resist cash generation and cash consumption during period of poor 
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performance but only cash generative actions during period of financial distress. 
Hence, the importance of outside blockholders to restructuring strategies changes 
with the level of performance decline. 
Impact of corporate governance 
Managerial entrenchment in the form of Chairman cum CEO and non- 
execufive Chairman favours capital cxpcnditure but disfavours managcrial 
restructuring. Chainnen cum CEO and non-executive Chainnen also dislike cash 
generative action except when the finn is distressed, in which case cash generation 
is imperative. Dual-CEO dominated firms also favour invcstments and inakc top 
management changes less likely. The Tesults thus confinn the darinivital cffccts 
of managerial entrenchment proxied by the existence of Chairman cum CEO and 
non-executive Chairman, irrespective of the firm's level of performance decline. 
Outside directors are largely effective in thcir oversiglit role as tlicy 
promote greater levels of restructuring. The efficacy of outside dircctors and thcir 
impact on restructuring strategy choice is similar at all levcls of pcrfonnaticc 
decline. 
Effectiveness of restructuring strategies 
The difference, if any, in the effectiveness of restructuring stratcgics 
between poorly performing and distressed firms is difficult to measure duc to 
absence of shareholder wealth impact analysis of strategy announcements for the 
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distressed sample. However, based on flie results of the logit and OLS regressions 
of recovery in stock returns/Z score on intensity of restructuring strategies and 
control factors, we observe a number of similarities and dissimilarities. 
The distressed and the poorly performing samples report the same 
unfavourable impact from operational restructuring, dividend changes and debt 
restructuring on recovery. However, the favourable impact of equity issue, firni 
size and industry condition experienced by the poorly perfonning sample is not 
felt with the distressed sample. This contrast is likely to be causcd by the 
difference in performance measures between the two samples. Ile use of stock 
returns for the poorly performing sample to measure recovery invariably shows a 
close association between recovery and equity issues and the rcturns of the finns 
FTA industry sector. 
Restructuring strategies are able to explain a large proportion of the 
recovery in stock returns in the poorly performing sample but a smaller but 
significant proportion of recovery in Z scores. The weaker association betwccn 
strategies and Z scores is potentially due to the historical orientation of Z scores 
- 
compiled based on past accounting figures, which serve best to measure thc 
current fmancial health and bankruptcy risks of firms. Put differently, the current 
Z score, based on accrual-bascd accounting numbers, is perhaps unable to fully 
reflect the impact of individual strategies on the firms' future cash flows. Perhaps, 
a prospective Z score computed on the basis of the impact of future cash flows 
(from turnaround strategies) to current accounting numbers may register a far 
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stronger association. 
11.5 Issues for further research 
While this study has identified an interesting range of influences on strategy 
choice 
- 
debt, ownership, governance and control factors, our logit regression 
methodology is successful only in capturing the individual and joint impact of 
explanatory variables on restructuring strategy choice. However, there may exist 
potential or latent variables in the form of complex interactions between 
explanatory variables, which have not been unexplored. More sophisticatcd tests 
onthe complex interactions between the various agency factors may be possible 
with tools such as LISREL which are claimed to be designed for such tests. 
This study provides vital new insigbts into die effectiveness of restructuring 
strategies in bringing about a swift turnaround in performance two years after 
decline/distress. However, the impact of strategies may take longer than two ycars; 
to show through, and therefore the impact of strategies on long term recovery may 
differ from that on medium term recovery from performance decline. This 
limitation is more applicable to the distressed sample as Z score measures the 
bankniptcy risk of a firin at the balance sheet date and does not reflect the future 
impact of recently implemented strategies. In contrast, the use of a leading 
indicator i. e. stock return, which captures the expected future casliflows deriving 
P__ 
- from all strategies implemented to date in the poorly performing sample mitigatcs 
this problem. 
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Leading on from the effectiveness issue, our results show that the root 
cause of non-recovery lies, for the average sample firm, not in choice, timing or 
intensity of strategy but poor implementation. Consequently, blind and intensive 
adoption of prescribed restructuring strategies is inadequate, and the focus should 
therefore be put on implementing strategy correctly and credibly. However, we 
have not explored the micro-structure of the implementation process such as the 
organisational and cultural parameters of change and show the factors aiding or 
impeding the successful implementation of restructuring strategies. In this rcspcct, 
case-study analysis of a sample of successful and failed turnaround finils should 
reveal the details of how reported strategies are conceived and the factors aiding 
or impeding the process of implementation, and flie true eventual success or failure 
of strategies. Due to the need to identify the exact timing of inipicinctitation or 
announcement of strategy, such an approach may only be practicable for firnis in 
the poorly performing sample. 
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